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Thesis

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN SOME RECENT
PHILOSOPHIES OF RELIGION

by

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(B. S., Florida Southern College, 1944)

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

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Purpose of the study. The purpose of this study is (1) to present, impartially, the solutions to the problem of evil which have been advanced by certain present-day philosophers of religion; (2) critically to evaluate these findings; and (3) to attempt to unite these views into a satisfactory synthesis. Coherence is posited as the chief criterion of truth.

Reason for attacking the problem. The problem of evil looms large in a world that otherwise glows with wonder. Is there room for basic evil in such a world in which there is so much beauty? Or, is evil a mere urge of man's creation? Has evil existed from the beginning of all things, and will it continue until the end of time irrespective of

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

Ever since man has inhabited the earth, the shadow of evil has haunted his mind. Throughout the ages he has asked, "What is evil, whence did it come, and what is to become of it?" In return, great minds have answered with what seemed to them the solution for all times. Many have been the theories advanced; yet, with further enlightenment of man, the problem has reshaped itself and appeared again and again, each time more insistent than ever on a better explanation. A problem that is so universal, so ageless, so resistant to annihilation, acts as a magnet to man's spirit of investigation.

I. THE PROBLEM

Purpose of the study. The purpose of this study is (1) to present, impartially, the solutions to the problem of evil which have been advanced by certain present-day philosophers of religion; (2) critically to evaluate these findings; and (3) to attempt to unite these views into a satisfactory synthesis. Coherence is posited as the chief criterion of truth.

Reason for attacking the problem. The problem of evil looms large in a world that otherwise glows with wonder. Is there room for basic evil in such a world in which there is so much beauty? Or, is evil a mere ogre of man's creation? Has evil existed from the beginning of all things, and will it continue until the end of time irrespective of

man? How may man distinguish, with certainty, that which is evil from that which is good? Is it possible to diminish the total amount of evil prevalent in the universe? If such a possibility exists, then what about the further possibility of eliminating all evil for all time? These are a few of the many questions which fleet through the mind of the ordinary thoughtful man as he reflects on his every-day meetings with both glory and disaster. It is natural that man, repeatedly confronting Nature's two-faced role of fairy-godmother and demon-vulture, should seek his own most satisfying explanation of the paradox. It is proper that he turn to some of the most enlightened and fertile minds of his own age for guidance.

II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

Before entering on the study, it is well to specify the meaning of certain basic terms.

Value. Henry N. Wieman has defined value as "a simple relation between desiring mind and thing desired."¹ Edgar S. Brightman uses the term to apply to "whatever is actually liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved or enjoyed by any one at any time."² Webster's New International Dictionary lists the word (which is derived from the Latin valere, to be strong, to be worth) as meaning "the property or aggregate properties

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1. Wieman, SHG, 5. This and all following abbreviations are explained under the author's name in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.
 2. Brightman, POR, 88.

of a thing by which it is rendered useful or desirable, or the degree of such property or sum of properties; worth; excellence, utility; importance." Throughout this study the term will be used to mean realized desirability or worth of an object. It will be used interchangeably with its synonym, good. Values which are desirable-in-themselves will be called intrinsic values, and those which lead to intrinsic values will be called instrumental values.

Disvalue. For Henry N. Wieman, disvalue or evil is a "definite and specifiable character of events; it is what obstructs or destroys the good."³ According to Edgar S. Brightman, disvalue is a term applied to "whatever is harmful, painful or undesirable, or disapproved." It is "what is contrary to any purpose or ideal."⁴ In this thesis, the term disvalue will apply to any object which is opposed to the good. It will have the opposite meaning to value, and the term will be used interchangeably with its synonym, evil. Evils which are disvalues-in-themselves will be called intrinsic evils; those which help to produce an intrinsic evil, or hinder the development of an intrinsic good, will be called instrumental evils.

Natural evil. Natural evil will be the term used in this paper to include all the effects of natural conditions adverse to man, conditions that produce disease, death, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and other catastrophes that come upon good men and bad alike.

3. Wieman, SHG, 85.

4. Ferm, EOR, 263-4.

Moral evil. In this study, the wrong choices or doings of human beings, and their consequences, which often strike at the innocent as well as the guilty, will be called moral evil.

Aesthetic evil. Ugliness, in all its forms, will be called aesthetic evil, in this study.

Surd evil. Throughout this thesis, surd evil will mean that type of evil which, at least up to the present time, seems to have no value of any kind for anyone, anywhere, or under any circumstances. The term will be applied to those forces in the universe which apparently either contribute nothing toward, or are obstructive to, the world process of continuous growth-toward-perfection. It will include evil which "good comes in spite of, not because of."⁵

The Given. The given, for any will, is the experience which that will does not make, but finds. It is "given" in the sense of being nonvoluntary or unwilled. However, the will may take a reasonable or unreasonable attitude toward it.

Aggressor. Aggressor will mean that force or principle which makes an invasion of, or begins a struggle to overcome, an opposing force or principle.

Resister. Resister will mean that force or principle which struggles to prevent the aggression of an opposing force or principle.

5. Brightman, POR, 246.

III. ORGANIZATION OF REMAINDER OF THE THESIS

Chapter Two will tell of the history and present status of the problem of evil. It will deal but briefly with its history, because this study is concerned chiefly with some present-day reasonable views. The third chapter will describe the method of procedure used in the attempt to find a fresh solution to the hoary problem. It will be followed by the classification of kinds of evil, and Chapter Five will tell of the treatment of these kinds of evil by some Twentieth Century philosophers. The next division will be devoted to a critical evaluation of the main conclusions of the interpretations considered. There will follow a summary of the resultant beliefs of this study in Chapter Seven, and the last Chapter will offer a Selected Bibliography.

For Heraclitus and other early Greek thinkers, evil was but a phase, a discord which became part of a harmony in relation with the rest of the cosmos (good) in the universe. Man saw only the opposite notes, good and evil, but God saw the whole, which was good. Plato found the good to exist in the world of pure, unchanging ideas. The rational, unchanging principle behind the world was the good.¹ In the unreal, fleeting, changing world of senses which includes hunger, thirst, passion and all the other desires, he attributed the existence of evil.² For Aristotle, the principle involved in self-realization was good, and

1. Plato, Rep. in Cornford, RF. 137; 301-30.

2. Plato, Rep. in Cornford, RF. 212.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM

Since man has been able to reason, he has been confronted with evil of some sort or another in countless experiences. As man has progressed in knowledge, evils have multiplied and increased in complexity. The solutions offered appear as varied as man himself, yet there runs a thread of unity through it all. It seems possible that the mind of man holds the potential key. The genealogy of evil may offer suggestions for a solution.

A persistent problem of philosophy. As far as the history of the human race is concerned, evil appears always to have existed in some form or other. Ancient man grappled with the problem, and his solutions were remarkably close to those of present-day thinkers.

For Heraclitus and other early Greek thinkers, all evil was but a phase, a discord which became part of a harmony in relation with the rest of the music (good) in the universe. Man saw only the opposite notes, good and evil, but God saw the whole, which was good. Plato found the good to exist in the world of pure, unchanging ideas. The rational, unchanging principle behind the world was the good.¹ To the unreal, fleeting, changing world of sense which incites hunger, thirst, passion and all the other desires, he attributed the existence of evil.² For Aristotle, the principle involved in self-realization was good, and

1. Plato, Rep. in Cornford, RP, 137; 301-20.

2. Plato, Rep. in Cornford, RP, 212.

that which prevented activity toward development of the rational process was evil, for man, because man was a rational being whose self-realization was dependent upon the mastery of reason over feeling, desire and appetite. Both Philo and Plotinus found in matter the source of all evil, and in God the source of all good.

The continuous presence of evil in a universe supposedly created by an all-powerful, all-loving God, has given no end of trouble to Christian philosophers as well as to their predecessors. This is probably due to the fact that Christianity borrowed many of its beliefs from Babylonian, Assyrian, and other religious traditions which drew a sharp line of distinction between light and darkness, life and death, good and evil, and oftentimes believed that special gods ruled over each realm. The Apologists taught that God had made man good, but man had turned to the flesh, and in so doing brought sin into the world. Since then, every man was born in sin, and could be saved only through the divine grace of God. For St. Augustine, God was perfect, created the world out of nothing, and because he was perfect could not have created evil. Evil was relative to man; it was part of the world pattern, which was good. In his design of the universe God intended that evil show up the good. Therefore, evil was a mere absence of good. The philosophers of scholasticism leaned toward the views of St. Augustine. St. Thomas Aquinas taught that God made everything, including man, for a purpose, and that the highest good of all things was the realization of that purpose. Although all things aimed at goodness, sometimes they failed. The result was evil, a lack of goodness.

Modern philosophy sought to solve the problem with which

religion struggled so desperately. Thomas Hobbes found that good and evil were matters of motion, and relative to the individual. As the nature of the individual changed, he claimed, good things could become evil, and evil things good. For both Descartes and Spinoza, evil was caused by an error in judgment by man whose knowledge of the facts was incomplete. Spinoza held that anything which aided toward the self-realization of an object was good; that which blocked man's striving toward God (self-realization) was bad. Leibnitz believed that this was the best-possible world rather than a perfect one. According to him, God limited himself when he expressed himself in finite beings, and these limitations resulted in suffering or sin. For Kant and Fichte, the existence of the moral law within man implied a rational universe, favorable to the realization of man's moral development. Man's failure to obey the moral law was the cause of chaos and evil. The will-to-live caused all the struggle in the world, including the evil and suffering which resulted from it, Schopenhauer asserted. According to him, denial of the individual will, self-sacrifice, was the solution to the problem.

Modern philosophy's attempt to reach a satisfactory solution was as futile as that of religion. Recent philosophic thought about the problem has been much concerned with man's social relationships. It has, then, offered an ethics of the human group rather than that of divine laws. It has leaned toward relativity, toward judging goodness and evil as qualities of acts relative to the situation in which they are performed. However, many modern thinkers still hold to the old position that good and evil are absolute. Upon one fact, many thinkers of both schools have agreed. Reason alone is capable of inflicting the mortal

wound on man's peculiar foe. As with other parasites, it is difficult to destroy this enemy without simultaneously causing injury to its contending host. A skilful use of reason, therefore, is required.

Some Twentieth Century philosophers have offered reasonable solutions to the problem, with a view to helping man gain a vantage ground from which to attack with renewed effort his ancient enemy; for, man is as persistent in his determination to conquer, as is evil in its persistence to exist. Some of the more popular views in the modern world suggest that:³ (1) moral evil is a result of human freedom, (2) nonmoral evil is punishment for moral evil, (3) nonmoral evil serves as a disciplinary educator of character, (4) evil is incomplete good, (5) evil is needed as a contrast to the good, (6) nonmoral as well as moral evil is a result of freedom (of either God, or man, or both), (7) evils are needed in the universe perhaps, as instruments to beings other than men, (8) all evils serve an unknown good, (9) evil is unreal, (10) good and evil are the outcome of processes or entities which are axiologically neutral. In this thesis, Hastings Rashdall, a personal idealist who believed in a limited God, and thinks that all evil is a means toward a higher good, Henry Nelson Wieman, a religious naturalist who believes in a limited, impersonal God, and thinks that the only real evil is that which is obstructive to the process of creation, and Alfred Ernest Garvie, a theist who believes in a limited God, yet holds to the doctrine of revelation, and believes that evil is due to man's freedom, will be considered especially. Their views will be compared with those of Edgar Sheffield

3. Brightman, POR, 260-272.

Brightman, a personal idealist who has attacked the problem afresh from a more empirical standpoint. Two other contemporary thinkers will be discussed and quoted, and several will be mentioned.

Inadequacy of former explanations. However, all the views which have been advanced thus far, including those of Edgar Sheffield Brightman, fall short of serving all the demands of experience. Much of this insufficiency to satisfy the reasoning needs of the whole man (for man is a dreamer as well as a fact), his dreams as well as his present reality, is due to the very nature of the problem. Although dealing with an object which extends in all directions beyond the bounds of actual experience, all views are limited in their solution to only past and present-day available evidence. It seems that science, which of itself has failed to serve mankind to its highest ends, still remains dictator to its mistress, metaphysics. It is a question whether speculation which lacks an obvious foundation of actual experience must walk forever hand in hand with incredulity! Possibly new fields of experience will become open to man, and throw further light upon the problem which one writer has dismissed as a pseudo-problem.⁴

4. Wieman, SHG, 87.

CHAPTER III

PROCEDURE IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

As man grows in knowledge and understanding of his environment, new light will be thrown upon the age-old problem of evil. That view which seems most satisfactory to man at the present may become repulsive to his reason in his future view of experience.

Sources of data. In arriving at what seemed the most reasonable, and consequently most satisfactory solution, it was necessary to consider as much information as could be gathered from books and articles written by or about selected investigators. An Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Vergilius Ferm, and The Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, were consulted frequently. In addition to reading matter, personal observations and reflections, as well as discussions with interested seekers-for-an-answer, entered into the formation of the conclusions of this thesis.

Method of handling sources. In cases where a philosopher seemed to change his view, the one maintained in his latest publication was credited. If his view on any point of importance was not clear, then the author's statements relative to the view were considered, and a probable interpretation adopted.¹

1. This was necessary in the case of Alfred Garvie, who seemed to recognize the independent existence of matter, yet claimed that reality could be interpreted best from the point of view of mind.

Points upon which all the selected philosophers agreed were searched for, and if those points seemed consistent with the facts of experience, and the demands of reason, then they were viewed as probable sign-posts on the road to the true solution.

Where there was disagreement, and the conflicting views seemed equally probable, search was made for an outlook which would make use of both views. Solutions which were incompatible with either reason or available evidence were rejected. A solution was sought which went beyond, but did not conflict with, the facts of experience, because reason must see far beyond the bare facts of actual experience.

Although an impartial evaluation of the solutions offered was attempted, nevertheless it is possible that there were unconscious influences from both scholasticism and personal idealism.

CHAPTER IV

CLASSIFICATION OF KINDS OF EVIL

Values are objects which are actually enjoyed, liked, prized, esteemed, desired, or approved by any one at any time. Values are intrinsic or instrumental. An intrinsic value is one which is desired or enjoyed for its own sake, as an end in itself. The enjoyment of a good story, an invigorating swim, or a brisk walk are intrinsic values. Instrumental value is any fact whatever, whether in one's experience or out of it, which helps to produce the experience of intrinsic value. If an ocean voyage is looked upon as an intrinsic value, then any extra work or deprivation, however distasteful it may be intrinsically, is an instrumental value if it provides money needed to make the trip possible.¹

Evil is always a contradiction of good or value. Evils, like goods, are intrinsic or instrumental. Intrinsic evil is the opposite to intrinsic good. It is disvalue in itself, and nothing can make it into intrinsic good. Blasphemy and error are examples of intrinsic evil. Instrumental evil is any fact whatever, whether in one's experience or out of it, which helps to produce an intrinsic evil, or to avert an intrinsic good. Failure to get one's proper amount of sleep may be instrumental error. It makes one less efficient, thereby averting an intrinsic good, maximum efficiency. At the same time it makes more possible an indefinite amount of error.²

1. Brightman, POR, 89.

2. Brightman, POR, 240-43.

There are many methods of classifying evils. The most general classification distinguishes between those rooted in the nature of things not caused by man, and those that originate in human life.

Sentient and non-sentient evil. Dr. Garvie distinguishes between sentient and non-sentient evil. Sentient evil is evil which involves beings that have some sense of feeling. This evil is of two types, physiological and psychological. That found in the lower forms of consciousness is distinguished from that found in man. Man is held, ultimately, for his own evil.

Non-sentient evil is evil in which no consciousness is directly involved, although life is damaged and man's interests harmed. Spanish Moss destroying the life of the live oak is such an evil. It is instrumental evil in that it causes anxiety and extra hours of labor to man. Non-sentient evil exists both independent of man and because of man. That which is dependent upon him, whether due to choice or ignorance, is considered moral evil. For instance, a poor yield of grain due to man's failure to rotate his crops is moral evil. It is evil in its effect upon man, and is due to carelessness, ignorance, or laziness. Non-sentient evil which exists independent of man is looked upon by Dr. Garvie as apparent evil. Hurricanes, earthquakes, and the like are examples.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman's classification of evils. A very practical classification, the one which will be adhered to chiefly in this paper, is offered by Edgar Sheffield Brightman. He distinguishes between disvalue-claims (objects judged to be evil before being subjected to the test of coherence), and disvalues (objects subjected to the test

of coherence, and found to be evil). He further differentiates between intrinsic evil and instrumental evil. Intrinsic evil is the name given to that kind of evil, such as error or blasphemy, which is a disvalue in itself. The term instrumental evil is applied to facts which may lead to either good or evil ends, according to the will of their experiencer. An over-abundance of wealth or a lack of it is such an evil. Dr. Brightman lists ~~that~~ five kinds of evil which exist in experience.³ They are (1) an incoherent will, (2) ignorance, (3) maladjustment, (4) incompetence, and (5) the dysteleological surd. These types will be discussed in Chapter V. Dr. Brightman's method of analysis is dialectical; he offers evidence of a good which can overcome every type of evil, with the possible exception of some dysteleological surd. He refuses to accept the position that the enormous amount of seemingly unnecessary evil in the world is indicative of either a blind force, or one not interested in man, behind the universe. The good, he maintains, is just as big a problem as evil. The fact that there is a value which can overcome every evil is an important part of the whole evidence. Another trump that he holds is the fact that evil never has had the strength completely to overcome the good that attacks it. It is still very probable that right is might.⁴

Henry N. Wieman's grouping of evils. Dr. Wieman's classification is unusual. What in itself is undesirable is intrinsic evil because it is in itself anti-value, whether or not it has further instrumental

3. Brightman, POR, 244-46.

4. One "Plato" can counteract a thousand Hitlers (this writer's view).

disvalue. He finds two general types of intrinsic evil, destructive and obstructive. Destructive evil is the term applied to that which opposes the already created good; obstructive evil is used to describe that which opposes the creative good. Obstructive evil is the more deadly by far, he teaches, because it is opposed to the only ultimate and absolute good, creativity.

Dr. Wieman calls the evils which did not originate in man "inertia" and "protective hierarchies." He believes that the danger of inertia is one of the basic evils of the world. It grows out of the evils of hierarchies, which in turn it produces. He finds that hierarchies are necessary to "lift beyond the reach of the great inertias some few individuals with whom creativity can produce the highest good."⁵

Evils which are caused by man, Dr. Wieman calls sin, immorality, and demonry. Sin, for him, is "any resistance to creativity for which man is responsible."⁶ Dr. Wieman believes that most sin is unconscious and unintentional, while Dr. Brightman believes that nothing unconscious or unintentional is sin, however harmful it may be. Demonry is indulgence in "the most glorious vision of good that our minds can achieve at any one time when that vision refuses to hold itself subject to creativity."⁷ For Dr. Wieman, this is the most subtle, and dangerous, and obstructive sin that man can commit. Immorality is the term Dr. Wieman uses to describe action which leads one to defy the actual world or to strive to extricate himself from it in order to live for some other realm.

5. Wieman, SHG, 125.

6. Wieman, SHG, 126.

7. Wieman, SHG, 128-29.

The terms mentioned on the foregoing pages will appear more frequently than elsewhere in Chapters V and VI of this thesis.

CHAPTER V

TREATMENT OF KINDS OF EVIL BY SOME

TWENTIETH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS

Since the necessary acceptance of the discoveries of modern science by great religious thinkers, the interpretation of evil has had to be modified greatly.

God no longer reigns upon a throne in the heavens above, nor does the spirit of evil rage in a hell below, beckoning souls to his furnace. No, heaven and hell are looked upon by the modern theist as states of the mind. God, for him, exists everywhere, at all times, and is eternally creating his world. The modern theist is an adherent of the theory of evolution.

There are two major ways of looking at God, the key symbol which men have used to express the preferred type of personality to which their own orientation tends. The Christian orthodox way is to think of God as an omnipotent, omniscient, infinitely perfect Divine Being. But certain empirical religious thinkers, consciously aware of suffering, struggle, and the destructive power of elemental forces, seek to interpret God in terms more consistent with the evidence observed. Their search leads to a God of infinite goodness but limited power.

It is a shallow though natural tendency for the person addicted to science to scorn religious symbols such as "the personality of God" and to talk in terms of fields of force and natural processes, as if description of the world and the prediction of its course were more important than the interpretation of these findings. They find God as well

as the universe to be mere energy. It is true that this is a healthy contradiction to the frequent tendency of the religionist to talk as if religious utterances were rivals to the scientific knowledge of the world rather than syntheses.

If persons sympathetic to science cannot find interpretations which the enlightened individual of today can use in expressing his own longings, and in giving to his own life a sense of direction in ways which do not negate science in its own sphere, yet give an adequate account of personality itself, they can be sure other types of persons will do this task in their own way, and the world which results may not be a world in which the scientific attitude is accorded a high place.

In this chapter, some typical explanations of evil will be considered and compared with those of Edgar Sheffield Brightman, a theist, whose views are most convincing of all to the writer of this paper. The solution offered by Hastings Rashdall seems a necessary forerunner of Dr. Brightman's view which seems most coherent with the facts of experience. Dr. Rashdall's view will be considered first. Other views discussed will include those of the more orthodox theist, Alfred E. Garvie, and a religious naturalist, Henry M. Wieman.

I. THE VIEWS OF HASTINGS RASHDALL

Influences affecting Dr. Rashdall's view. Hastings Rashdall was much attracted by the intellectual freedom and speculative daring of St. Thomas Aquinas (who laid great stress upon the supremacy of the intellect) and he strove to do for his modern age what St. Thomas had done for the Middle Ages - offer a theological system which would unite

Christian beliefs and the best current philosophy into a harmonious whole.

In working out such a system, he was influenced by Bishop Berkeley whom he admired, and from whose Principles of Human Knowledge he derived much of his idealistic metaphysics.

There is an Aquinas-Berkeleyan air about his solution to the problem which has proved to be most troublesome to the Christian faith, the presence of too much unjustifiable and poorly distributed evil in a supposedly rational universe which is supposed to be willed by a God of love.

Summary of his view. Dr. Rashdall believes that an idealistic theism rooted and grounded in ethics, and developed along self-deterministic lines, can best interpret the evil of the world.

It represents God as the ultimate source of all being in the Universe that has a beginning, and as directing the world-process towards the goal which shall attain as much of the highest ideally conceivable good as can become actual. He calls upon the higher spiritual beings who have derived their existence from Him to aid in this process. It is a real, and not a merely apparent, struggle to which their God-derived moral consciousness invites them. The evil is a real evil, though an evil destined to be more and more diminished. The rapidity with which and the extent to which the evil will be diminished and the good attained really does depend in part upon human effort. It is true doubtless that God knows how much each of us is capable of aiding towards the process, and how much he will aid; but we do not know, and no human being ever can know until he has acted.¹

Dr. Rashdall defends this view against all other existing views, but is not wholly satisfied with it himself, as the following statement

1. Rashdall, TGE, II, 355.

reveals:

. . . . The only point at which a difficulty is created either for Morality or for Religion by the acceptance of Determinism lies in its tendency to make God in a sense the 'author of evil' - a sense which in no way excludes the equally true proposition that man is the author of it. In a sense, indeed, man is the sole author of evil; for man alone wills the evil otherwise than as a means to the true good. God wills the evil only as a means to the good, and to will evil as a means to the good is not to be evil, or to will evil as such, or to exhibit any defect of Goodness. . . . I admit frankly that it would be more satisfactory to be able to say that God was in no sense the cause of evil. That is only to say that I could wish the Universe were better than it is; and, if God be the God who is revealed to us by our moral consciousness, He wishes that too.²

Theory of good and evil. Dr. Rashdall's theory of the good is the most important factor in his determination, explanation, and solution of evil. Goodness and reason are inseparable for him, and the extent to which all goods, both high and low in his scale of value, are realized in the individual man, determines for him the rationality or irrationality of the world. He ties up his whole theory of values with his utilitarian system of ethics. For him, the moral judgment is the sole determiner of value. The moral law has a real existence, and there is such a thing as absolute morality, for, he maintains, there is something absolutely true or false in ethical judgment, whether "we or any number of human beings at any given time actually think so or not."³ He warns:

2. Rashdall, TGE, II, 345.

3. Rashdall, TGE, II, 211.

An absolute Moral Law or moral ideal cannot exist in material things. And it does not (we have seen) exist in the mind of this or that individual. Only if we believe in the existence of a Mind for which the true moral ideal is already in some sense real, a Mind which is the source of whatever is true in our own moral judgements, can we rationally think of the moral ideal as no less real than the world itself. Only so can we believe in an absolute standard of right and wrong, which is as independent of this or that man's actual ideas and actual desires as the facts of material nature. The belief in God, though not (like the belief in a real and an active self) a postulate of there being any such thing as Morality at all, is the logical presupposition of an 'objective' or absolute Morality. A moral ideal can exist nowhere and nohow but in a mind; an absolute moral ideal can exist only in a Mind from which all reality is derived. (Or at least a mind by which all Reality is controlled.) Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God.⁴

For Dr. Rashdall, the moral faculty is essentially reason. In other words, right and wrong, good and evil, are intellectual concepts or categories which can not be "reduced to any kind or sort of mere feeling."⁵ Morality, he claims, is impossible and meaningless, or at least defective, for a being who lacks normal functions of thought, feeling, and will.

Dr. Rashdall believes that goods of all kinds can be compared, and that we can place goods of all kinds on a single scale, and assign to each its value in relation to the rest. He states:

4. Rashdall, TGE, II, 212.

5. Rashdall, TGE, I, 175.

However much superior the value of a good act may be to that of a transitory pleasure, we still use the term 'value' of both, and we use it in the same sense: the two kinds of value differ as being at the top and the bottom of the same scale, not as representing two totally incommensurable scales. There can be only one ultimate scale of values, however heterogeneous the objects which we appraise by that scale.⁶

The value of a good he finds to be relative to many circumstances. Also, goods do not exist separately, but mutually influence and interact with, each other. Their place on the ladder of values has no meaning independent of their relation to other values. He finds pleasure to possess true value of varying degrees.

Pleasure is of many different kinds: some kinds of it are doubtless of very little value - some perhaps have a negative value, but other kinds of pleasure are of high value, and pleasure is an element in all the highest and most desirable kinds of conscious life. I cannot, therefore, dismiss the pleasure-side of life in the light and airy way which is fashionable with some idealistic philosophers.⁷

Happiness, for him, is a more important element in well-being than pleasure, and "far more inseparable than most other pleasures from the goods to which we ascribe the highest values."⁸ The goods which he places on the highest rungs of the ladder leading to the ideal of good, are the aesthetic, intellectual, and character goods, in ascending order. For him, goodness, meaning morality, a rightly directed will,⁹ is the highest good of all, and the moral law which guides man to that choice is

6. Rashdall, TGE, I, 174.

7. Rashdall, GM, 130.

8. Rashdall, TGE, II, 58-9.

9. Rashdall, TGE, II, 42.

a part of the ultimate nature of things, on a level with the laws of physical nature. With Plato of old, he recognizes the moral law as having its source "in the source of all reality."¹⁰ The good, for him, is neither goodness nor happiness, but both together. It is the ideal life of our highest ideals, and is unknown to human experience. Says Dr. Rashdall:

The ideal life or the good is an ultimate conception which does not admit of further definition, and the content of which we can only express by enumerating the various elements or aspects of it, and then explaining in what way they are to be combined. Among these elements happiness and pleasure are both included, but they are not the whole; though no doubt the kind of happiness and the kind of pleasure which do enter into the ideal life are inseparable from those other elements of it which we call goodness or the good will, knowledge, thought, the contemplation of beauty, love of other persons and of what is best in them.¹¹

The very idea of morality, for him, implies action directed toward an end which has value.

Right and good are correlative terms for Rashdall. The concept good is logically prior to the concept right, for the term right is meaningless except in reference to the good. The right, for Rashdall, is that course of action which will produce the most good under existing conditions. He holds that "the good will may possess infinitely more value than any consequence that it wills, but unless that consequence be good, the will cannot be good, either."¹² No action, then, is right except "in so far as it tends to produce a good." He believes that "when we have

10. Rashdall, PR, 74.

11. Rashdall, TGE, II, 60.

12. Rashdall, TGE, II, 42.

to choose between goods, it is always right to choose the greater good."¹³ In doing his duty, Rashdall maintains, man always chooses the greatest good for himself. He concedes that there are times when it is the duty of man to choose the right in preference to an immediate good; man should do right, always. According to him, if man were to commit a little moral evil in causing a small amount of moral evil in another, in order to save a large group of persons from suffering a great amount of undeserved punishment, then that small evil would not be wrong, but right. (Such small sins were committed by the heroes of the underground during the last world conflict.) Rashdall offers as an example the hypothetical case of committing the sin of inducing, through bribery, a Chinese Mandarin to become traitor to his country and set free a group of Europeans who would otherwise be exposed to torture and death. Says Rashdall:

Give that bribe, and the moral character of your Mandarin will have taken a downward turn; withhold it and twenty European men, women, and children will die in torture and dishonor. It is only a fanatic to whom the small deterioration of one Mandarin, ex hypothesi not a character of the highest order, will seem a more valuable end than the saving of twenty European lives with all their possibilities of happiness. . . . We really think it more important to spare so much suffering than to avoid the slight deterioration of one Mandarin's character.¹⁴

For him, the sacredness of the person is the greatest factor to be considered in choosing between goods. Never is it right to use a person as a means to attain a speculative good, nor can it ever be right for a man to do, in any other way, an immediately wrong act for the sake

13. Rashdall, TGE, II, 38.

14. Rashdall, TGE, II, 44-46.

of any other advantage to himself or others.

Dr. Rashdall does not feel that it always is necessary to choose goods of highest value. There are times, according to him, when a small amount of a higher good must give way to a large amount of a lower good. Although art occupies a higher position in the scale of values than comfort and eating, it is not necessary for the development of character (highest good) to buy pictures and books at the expense of lowering one's standard of ordinary living.

Dean Rashdall insists upon the stand that, in human action, the amount of good produced can be determined only after an act has been committed. A good will without contents, for him, is bare or meaningless.

According to him, the same moral consciousness which judges an object or an act to possess value is the sole judge of evil. The very essence of the moral judgment he declares to be not merely that the right act promotes the end which the moral consciousness declares to be good, but that the wrong act retards it.¹⁵ And, voluntary acts are not the only things which possess value. The sufferings which hurricanes and eruptions cause in conscious beings is bad, for him, and is "none the less bad because it is not due to human volition."¹⁶ Says he:

Entirely apart from the question, 'who caused such things?' I judge that pain or discordant music or ugly pictures (i.e. of course the enduring of pain by conscious beings, the listening to discords or the contemplation of bad pictures by conscious beings) are bad things. They seem to me bad whether they arise from

15. Rashdall, TGE, II, 287.

16. Rashdall, TGE, II, 328.

chance or necessity or voluntary action. . . . The will that deliberately causes or refuses to fight against such things may be, and I believe is, a worse evil than the pain or the bad music or the ugly pictures. But unless these things were evils, the will that refused to remove them would not be evil either; its acts would not be acts of a wrongly directed will.¹⁷

"Pain is an evil and sin is a worse evil, and nothing on earth can ever make them good," he declares.¹⁸ Here again he recognizes pain as evil, which is not a moral evil. He believes that however great the evil of pain and suffering, greater still is the evil of a will which permits that pain and suffering to exist, if it is possible for that will to prevent the same.

For him, evil is very real. It is far, far more and worse than the mere absence of good. Moreover, it is not evil merely from the point of view of man, but for the God whose moral consciousness is the very source of man's conscience. It is a force which must be fought by man with God's help. The ultimate power of the universe he believes to be on the side of man-inclined-toward-the-good.¹⁹

An objectively valid morality implies belief in the fundamental rationality of the universe, he believes.

Theory of the purpose of the universe. Dr. Rashdall holds that man's view of the ultimate nature of things must be based on experience as a whole. Since the moral consciousness is an integral part of man's experience, it should be considered in forming any theory of the universe

17. Rashdall, TGE, I, 136-7.

18. Rashdall, PR, 80.

19. Rashdall, PR, 84.

as a whole, he believes.²⁰

Human morality he looks upon as a revelation, imperfect, of the ultimate nature of reality which is essentially mind.

And yet it is quite clear that the world itself cannot be supposed to exist merely in the individual mind. Thought itself necessarily leads the individual up to the idea of a world which is not merely his world, of a world which exists independently of him, of a world which is common to all minds, but which no human mind knows all at once and in all its completeness. Things exist only for mind, and yet the things that the individual knows he does not create but only discovers. He discovers that they existed before he knew them, before he was born, before (so far as he knows) any mind like his existed upon this or any other planet. And yet, if matter can exist only for mind, there must be some mind for which all that is exists; and if the world is one, that mind must be one Mind.²¹

For him, God alone is eternal, and is the source of all being. However, he does not identify God with the Absolute. The Absolute, he teaches, includes God and all other consciousnesses, not as unrelated beings, but as members of a system. God is the source of all other spirits; but once a spirit comes into existence, it ever after possesses individual identity. This is important to Rashdall's treatment of evil, because he holds that although God is the source of the human will, nevertheless man is responsible for his own sins.

There is nothing in all this to alter the fact that the individual is the cause of his own acts; the individual is immediately conscious of his own activity. If God causes those acts, He causes them in quite a different way from that

20. Rashdall, TGE, II, 223.

21. Rashdall, TGE, II, 225-26.

in which He causes other events - events in the natural world, or even the acts of non-moral animals. For purely ethical purposes we need not look beyond the immediate cause of the acts; the cause why a bad act is done really is the fact that there is a bad soul in the world. Nothing can alter that, and that is all that we want from a purely ethical point of view.²²

Canon Rashdall believes that the universe itself must have a purpose or a rational end which a perfect reason would call good, and therein he confronts much difficulty. He finds that there is too much of what the moral consciousness of man judges to be evil in the world to call it wholly a creation of a rational, just mind. He is willing to concede that some of what we call evil in the world is a necessary condition to the good. For instance, much good, he holds, involves struggle against both physical and moral evil. Too, he finds that happiness is dependent upon the satisfaction of wants, and wants denote a lack of desired objects. Just the same, so much evil as actually exists seems to him unnecessary. A much smaller quantity, he reasons, would satisfy sufficiently the necessities of struggle. The distribution of evils, too, he thinks is irrational. Indeed, from the point of view of empirical evidence, Dr. Rashdall finds no reason at all for believing that the world contains more good than evil, or that it has any good end or object in the future.

And when I ask myself whether the good that is realized in this transitory existence (if this were all) is really worth all the pain that it costs, I begin to have doubts. The doubts are

22. Rashdall, TGE, II, 340.

strengthened when we turn to the higher goods, when we think of the small number of those who have participated to any high degree in the best intellectual life, in the highest aesthetic enjoyment, in the most satisfying forms of practical activity. And when we turn to the strictly ethical side of life, how few are those who have attained; how mixed has been the character even of the reputed saints and heroes; how low has been the general level, how appalling the mass of sin and selfishness, excuseless cruelty and irrational hate! Is the good that is produced really worth the misery, the ugliness, the sin which it has cost?²³

It is evil, from Rashdall's point of view, that the man who chooses the highest goods is not able to enjoy the lowest goods as well. Likewise, he believes it is evil that one who chooses the lowest goods can never go beyond the enjoyment of them into the realm of aesthetic, intellectual and moral pleasures. There is, for him, something radically irrational about a universe which forever separates these higher and lower values.

So greatly disturbed is he by the enormous amount of undeserved evil, and so sorry for man, that he thinks were he given the opportunity to eliminate all life from this planet by pressing a button, he would do so.²⁴ That is a strong statement for a person who so loves both God and man to make! "Why," he wonders, "should we suppose God to be so much less loving and compassionate than man (as to permit such unnecessary evil to exist)?"²⁵

His theory of a limited God. Dr. Rashdall does not believe that

23. Rashdall, GM, 130-31.

24. Rashdall, GM, 132.

25. Rashdall, GM, 132.

God, who, for him, is the source of all love, could hurt man willingly. The universe, with all its evils, was willed by God, yes. But were it possible to create a better world, he would have done so, Rashdall teaches. God might, he says, be called omnipotent in that he possesses all the power there is in the world. On the other hand, he finds God to be limited by necessities which lie within his own nature. These necessities involve the laws of reason, and freedom of the will. For instance, God cannot change the past, construct a square circle, or make the sum of two plus two be other than four. In the same way, he cannot evolve highly organized beings without a struggle for existence, or train humans in unselfishness without allowing the existence of both sin and pain. Since God's purpose is to increase moral development, he is limited to conditions which make possible such development. These limitations are not forced upon God by any outside power.²⁶ Upon this argument, Rashdall explains the existence of evil in the world as a necessary factor toward the production of the good.

I should insist, indeed, that the willing of a world with so much evil in it implies a certain limitation of the divine Power; and I should point out that, though we can see the necessity for the evil up to a certain point, we cannot see in detail the necessity for all the evil that actually exists. But still substantially it is right, as it seems to me, to find the explanation of the evil - so far as our limited intelligence can find it at all - in the values which are realised in and by the struggle against it, and in the other values to the production of which we must suppose the evil to be a necessary means.²⁷

26. Rashdall, GM, 52-6.

27. Rashdall, GM, 129.

God is rational, for him, then, and his mind is directing the universe to a good end.

The end of the Universe must be the evolution of souls in which what our moral consciousness pronounces good shall be more and more realized. If less good is at any time realized in preference to more good, that represents one of those inherent limitations without the assumption of which we cannot give any reasonable or intelligible account of the Universe being what it is.

In speaking of the end of the Universe we must not of course assume that the realization of this end lies only in the future, that it is literally a 'far off divine event': whatever has any value in the present forms part of the end. . . . The end which we must suppose to be the end of the Universe must be the greatest good on the whole, the greatest good that is possible; that is to say, the good that necessarily flows from a Will of perfect goodness but limited power.²⁸

In answer to his objectors that a limited God might be a defeated God, Rashdall gives the very reasonable reply:

A rational being does not will evil except as a means to a greater good. If God be rational, we have a right to suppose that the world must contain more good than evil, or it would not be willed at all. A being who was obliged to create a world which did not seem to him good would be a blind force, as force is understood by the pure Materialist, not a rational Will.²⁹

His theory of immortality. Dr. Rashdall does not believe that God willed so imperfect a world as this as an end in itself, even if this seemed the best possible world to him (God). The moral ideal should be capable of realization. That Rashdall finds to be impossible in this life,

28. Rashdall, TGE, II, 289-90.

29. Rashdall, PR, 84.

due to man's limitation of knowledge. If the ideal life exists nowhen, for no person, nowhere, then there is no such thing! It must exist in and for persons, he believes. But, the moral consciousness of man points to such an object. For Dr. Rashdall, that and the triumph of good over evil can be explained only upon the postulation of immortality.

There is only one way in which the good realised in these years of earthly life can be supposed adequately to outweigh the evil; and that is to look upon earthly life as but a part, a preliminary part, a relatively short stage in the development of souls which have a long period of development and vast possibilities of increasingly valuable experience open to them after they have been delivered from the bodily organisms which determine, and which limit, their present capacities for action and for enjoyment. With the hypothesis of immortality we can regard the world as a reasonable world expressive of a purpose for the realisation of the highest possible good, and a purpose which on the whole and in the end will be accomplished: without immortality I do not see that we can. To put it more simply, with immortality we can believe that God is Love, and the world an expression of that Love: without it we cannot.³⁰

Life, as experienced on this planet is, then, for Dr. Rashdall, an evil means toward the realization of the moral ideal in a future existence which will be rational, and wherein the good will prevail.

Dr. Rashdall's views compared with those of Dr. Brightman.

Both Dr. Brightman and Dr. Rashdall are personal idealists who believe all of reality to be of the nature of mind. The universe, for them is a system, a society of minds, separated though derived from, and intimately

30. Rashdall, GM, 132-33.

related to, one supreme mind which is the source of all being. Dr. Rashdall offers the moral argument and the idealistic argument as his reasons for believing in God.³¹

For Dr. Brightman, every fact implies God; God is revealed in every fact.³² He finds reasons for belief in God in:

The evidence of the rationality of the universe, the evidence of the emergence of novelties, the evidence of the nature of personality, the evidence of values, the evidence of religious experience, and the evidence of systematic coherence.³³

These evidences Dr. Brightman discusses in detail in Chapter VI of his Problem of God.

Because of the presence in this universe of a tremendous amount of seemingly unnecessary physical evil, pain, and suffering, as well as moral evil, which seem neither the result of man's poor choice nor necessary to his mental (including moral) or physical development, both thinkers are forced, by their faculty of reason, to view as limited in some way, the God whose will is responsible for all being. They find it more coherent with the facts of experience to view his power as limited rather than his goodness.

It seems logical that a God as limited as Dr. Rashdall's should have been found before Dr. Brightman's God, which at first seems shocking, but with further acquaintance becomes most compatible with reason.

Dr. Rashdall finds, in God, eternal necessities which are part

31. Rashdall, TGE, II, 225-228.

32. Brightman, POG, 144.

33. Brightman, POG, 148.

of his (God's) own internal nature. These necessities, pertaining to the laws of reason and freedom of the will, prevented God from willing a universe in which the good might be completely realized without the use of evil means, Dr. Rashdall teaches. This view conceives of God as the ultimate author of evil, even though he uses it as a means toward the good. Dr. Rashdall tries to release his God of guilt by declaring that man alone is the author of evil as a tool of destruction.

Dr. Brightman is not satisfied with a God who is the willing author of evil, regardless of the means for which he uses it. There is altogether too much evil, he believes, to attribute it to the limitation of God by the laws of reason or the free will of man.³⁴ He searched through the facts of evolution and of daily life, and finally found a God who is further limited. The will of Dr. Brightman's God is limited by what he calls *The Given* within his (God's) own personality.

The Given consists of the eternal, uncreated laws of reason (including logic, mathematical relations, and Platonic Ideas) and also of equally eternal and uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects (qualia), disorderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is the source of surd evil. The common characteristic of all that is "given" (in the technical sense) is, first, that it is eternal within the experience of God and hence had no other origin than God's eternal being; and, secondly, that it is not a product of will or created activity. For *The Given* to be in consciousness at all means that it must be process, but unwilled nonvoluntary consciousness is distinguishable from voluntary consciousness.

34. Brightman, FOG, 172.

both in God and in man. God's finiteness thus does not mean that he began or will end; nor does it mean he is limited by anything external to himself. Strictly we should speak of a God whose will is finite rather than a finite God; for even the finite God is absolute in the sense of being the ultimate source of all creation.³⁵

This view absolves God from all guilt. According to it, God did not create The Given, but uses it to express his divine purpose which is good. On the other hand, his purpose is denied full expression because of eternal brute facts within The Given. God is in control of The Given at all times, so there is no possibility of his becoming a defeated God. When his divine will is thwarted by facts within The Given, then God finds by means of other facts within The Given, "new avenues of advance and forever moves on in the cosmic creation of new values."³⁶

Because Dr. Rashdall tried so desperately but unsuccessfully from the point of view of available evidence to free his God of the responsibility for a too-evil universe, it seems probable that had he lived seven years longer, he would have found great satisfaction in the following solution to the problem which baffled him so much:

We suggest the hypothesis of The Given in God which corresponds to and accounts for those factors in experience (not due to human will) which frustrate the attainment of the highest values. This Given is an eternal aspect of the consciousness of God, a problematic datum or retarding factor. It is akin to sensation in man. Just as sensation limits the will and reason of man, yet presents problems which can be solved in rational terms, so The Given limits the will and probably the foreknowledge of God,

35. Brightman, POR, 337.

36. Brightman, POR, 338.

without limiting his goodness or his rationality or his power so to mold The Given as to derive value from it. God would no longer be omnipotent or omniscient or impassible; but he would remain the perfectly benevolent Creator and the perfectly wise Knower of all actual existence. He would also be the controlling power of the universe, guiding it through all struggles and delays toward an ever-enlarging value. There is no limit to his capacity for bringing meaning out of what seems meaningless. He struggles, but is never baffled. The Given would account for natural evils and the "mistakes" of evolution would give God an eternal reason for activity, would render him more sympathetic with the limitations of man, would give more significance to the temporal process, and yet would not unduly impair the divine dignity, but would maintain God's transcendence and, by providing for the mysterious and irrational along with the moral and the rational in his nature, make him a more worthy object of numinous worship.³⁷

Both Dr. Brightman and Dr. Rashdall hold to a belief in immortality, but for different reasons. For Dr. Rashdall, such a belief is necessary in defense of a perfectly good God who must have willed this universe as a means toward some future end which is good. No just God, Dr. Rashdall believes, would have brought man into this world of evil merely in preparation for this future good unless he were to share in it. Therefore, he reasons, man is immortal.

Dr. Brightman's God needs no such defense. He suffers with, for, and more than man in his struggle with The Given which he did not choose. Dr. Brightman's God is not only the source of all good, but the preserver and increaser of the same. It is upon that factor of God's nature that Dr. Brightman favors the possibility of immortality. Since mind-intent-

37. Brightman, POG, 192-93.

upon-the-good is the most valuable object in the universe, Dr. Brightman reasons that God will conserve and even increase its value in a future existence.

Both philosophers find goods to be meaningless apart from their relationship to other goods. They assign value to goods in much the same manner. Each puts lower value upon goods which provide mere sensual pleasure, and respectively higher values upon aesthetic, intellectual, and moral goods. Dr. Brightman finds holiness to be of even higher value than morality. Of course the higher good of holiness includes the lower good of morality, for him.

The fact that Dr. Brightman finds a value that is even higher than Dr. Rashdall's highest value (morality) makes obvious a distinction in the authors' views of morality. Each finds good and duty essential factors in any ethical theory. "Ethics must reveal what value (good) ought (duty) to be attained; it must explain the obligation to achieve the good,"³⁸ says Dr. Brightman. Both theists agree that the moral consciousness of man is an integral part of his whole consciousness, but do not explain its ideal in like ways. For Dr. Rashdall, an absolute moral ideal exists in the mind of God, and is reflected in the mind of man. Man's moral consciousness is, for him, dependent upon this reflection of the absolute moral ideal for its judgment of value. In other words, man is capable immediately of moral judgment, although imperfectly so, due to the fact that the contents of the absolute moral ideal never can be apprehended fully by a finite mind. Dr. Brightman finds a "norm" born of

38. Brightman, ML, 14.

actual moral experience. It refers to "the best types of willing that can be practiced by human beings constituted as we are."³⁹ Dr. Brightman's moral norm itself is absolute, but allows for dynamic values, and so is more empirical than Dr. Rashdall's belief that values are static and absolute. Even if there were no God, man might acquire Dr. Brightman's moral norm by applying rational criticism to his feelings. This makes Dr. Brightman's view more practical than Dr. Rashdall's.

Criticism of Dr. Rashdall's view of evil. Dr. Rashdall's view that some evil is a means toward a higher good seems very compatible with the facts of experience. Experience has proved life to be a gradual unfolding of success from failure. In discovering America, Columbus failed absolutely in his goal. Every redman in America by being called Indian perpetuates the memory of that failure. David Livingstone studied medicine tirelessly for years after having completed his theological studies, with one purpose in mind. It was to spread the gospel in China. At the last minute an "opium war" prevented him from the entry to the country. Disappointed, he offered himself as missionary to Africa, and was accepted. His failure to reach China opened a whole continent to light and truth. Uncle Sam's failure at Pearl Harbor united his nation! But, on Dr. Rashdall's view, the same unity should have been realizable without such tragic destruction of life and property.

From there on, there seems to be inconsistency in Dr. Rashdall's system. One of his arguments for the existence of God is the idealistic argument in which he (Rashdall) recognizes the rationality of nature.

39. Brightman, ML, 15.

Yet he finds the universe, as we know it, to be morally irrational. There is far, far more evil existent in it than is necessary for the proper education of man's finer nature, and that evil is irrationally, unjustly distributed. There seems to be more caprice than reason behind its (evil's) distribution, he believes. Yet, the source of all being is, for him, a God of infinite goodness. For all the evil in the world, he refuses to hold man responsible. There is no choice; one must interpret him as laying the ultimate cause for evil upon the God of infinite goodness who creates all wills, both good and bad. To be sure, he postulates immortality as necessary to the completion of God's purpose. The trouble lies in the fact that man never yet has been able to produce facts which might warrant any future existence. If there is no future in which "the unrealized capacities of human nature"⁴⁰ might be attained, then Dr. Rashdall's God, upon the doctor's own findings, is responsible for a too-irrational, too-evil universe, in which "the good actually realized seems hardly worth the cost."⁴¹ Such a God does not seem the most worthy object in the world, of man's worship and devotion.

II. THE VIEWS OF ALFRED ERNEST GARVIE

All of Dr. Garvie's beliefs center upon his firm conviction, through faith, that Christ Jesus is a true revelation of the character of God.⁴² That is, he is more theologian than philosopher. Interested in the evils (which he called moral diseases) of the world⁴³ from a social

40. Rashdall, GM, 136.

41. Rashdall, GM, 136.

42. Garvie, CIS, 62-70.

43. Garvie, CCS, 84.

point of view, he advocates a gradual reform in the economic system and the social order which is dependent upon it. The new order, he thinks, should be built upon the nature of God, as revealed in the personality of Christ, self-realization by self-sacrifice.⁴⁴ He believes that only when nations as well as individuals are willing to sublimate their own desires to the good of the whole race, will mankind find peace.

His conception of the good. Dr. Garvie believes that human weakness needs divine support for this life. This support is provided by divine grace, the goal of which is the absolute good. "Grace is the disclosure of God's ultimate purpose for mankind, a redeemed, reconciled, and perfected race, in loving fellowship with him, and growing likeness to him,"⁴⁵ he says. The Good, in which the human good is an element, and the realization of which it is factor, is universal, he teaches. He believes it to be self-realization through self-sacrifice, an ideal impossible of complete realization by man, but realized in the personality of Christ Jesus who "is the pattern of the perfect life because He came, not to be served, but to serve and to give His life a ransom for many."⁴⁶ Man's self-realization through self-sacrifice, Dr. Garvie interprets as man's conscious and voluntary fulfilment of God's purpose for himself, nature, animals, and his fellows. The ideals of truth, beauty, holiness, and love, Dr. Garvie believes to be eternal and absolute in God;⁴⁷ for him, the more man strives, successfully, toward the realization of these values,

44. Garvie, CCS, 218-18.

45. Garvie, CCS, 111.

46. Garvie, CIS, 64.

47. Garvie, CIS, 138.

the more moral he becomes. The term "morality" Dr. Garvie applies to man in his attempt to reach perfection; the term "holiness" he applies to God in his possession of perfect goodness and righteousness. Morality and religion are inseparable, but not identical, terms for Dr. Garvie.⁴⁸

According to Dr. Garvie, that which satisfies a man's desire is a good, for him, and what a man desires is dependent upon the manner of man he is. Choice, he believes, is determined by the whole man, not a special faculty within him.⁴⁹ For Dr. Garvie, man's good includes the provision for his physical necessities.⁵⁰ Good, he teaches, should be of the whole man, economic and aesthetic, as well as rational and moral. However, truth and goodness hold the higher place in his scale. The Good, for him, can be not merely an individual good; it must be a social good. Action must be conscious and voluntary in order to be judged good or bad, he maintains. According to his view, if a man chooses a good and fails, because of his own weakness, to achieve that good, then he is blameworthy; if he chooses an evil which, because of any interference other than his own choice, results in a good, then he is deserving of no praise. "The degree in which the whole is expressed in the resolution must measure the praise or the blame, if action is hindered," he declares.⁵¹

Dr. Garvie distinguishes between the motive and the intention of an act. The desire for an object, he calls the motive; the means of

48. Garvie, CF, 110.

49. Garvie, CIS, 123.

50. Garvie, CIS, 129.

51. Garvie, CIS, 123.

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49. Gervie, *Op.*, 123.
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God, the universe and immortality. Dr. Garvie believes that God is immanent in all things, yet transcendent.⁵² All of nature, of which he believes man to be a part "whatever else or more he may be,"⁵³ Dr. Garvie declares to be a product of God's divine will. The universe, for him, is a unity, and of the nature of mind.⁵⁴ He believes that God is supra-personal, is "past finding out" by human searching, and that he contains in his reality "abysmal depths no plummet of human experience or speculation can fathom."⁵⁵ Of God's purpose he writes:

He cannot be less than personal, lacking in any perfection which in our human ideals we can conceive, but He must be recognized as supra-personal, since our conception of perfection in our ideals cannot be the measure of His reality. We may, however, be confident that what God is as personal is not in contradiction with what He is as supra-personal. God is true; in Him is no lie; He does not deceive us,

52. Garvie, CF, 78-9.

53. Garvie, CF, 29.

54. Garvie, CF, 40, 76.

55. Garvie, CF, 78.

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- 82. Gervie, CP, 75-9.
- 83. Gervie, CP, 29.
- 84. Gervie, CP, 40, 78.
- 85. Gervie, CP, 78.

nor do we deceive ourselves, when in religion we believe, trust, worship and obey Him as personal. In thus recognizing that God is supra-personal, we recognize His transcendence of nature and man; in the conception of the numinous, mysterium, tremendum, transcendence is asserted and the pantheism, which identifies God with the world, is rejected. Even in the personal relation of God to man, this transcendence is recognized and God is above and beyond the world in space and time. He is infinite (immense and eternal). As embodied spirit man is in space, and even as spirit his experience and character are conditioned by time. That he can recognize space and time as limitations, indicate that in thought and heart he can rise above and reach beyond time and space, and so conceive God as without these limitations. As Creator, Preserver, and Ruler of the world and man God must also be thought of as transcendent; only a God above all can stand to the world in these relations.⁵⁶

For Dr. Garvie, the dynamic activity of God is constantly expressing itself in matter, life, and mind, and the creation seems to him (Garvie) more immediate and constant than the already created. God, he says, is eternally active "in making and sustaining His world."⁵⁷ He warns:

Philosophy in interpreting the world cannot leave out, without loss of adequacy, God as ultimate cause, final purpose, and directive presence. The order of nature and the course of history bear witness, not to divine caprice, but to divine constancy.⁵⁸

Dr. Garvie believes that God is self-limited, and that his perfection determines the direction in which alone his power can be exercised, unless he denies his own nature.⁵⁹ Space and time, he thinks, has as much reality for God as has the world in space and time.⁶⁰ This fact is important, for him, because it means liberty and responsibility to man. Says

⁵⁶. Garvie, CF, 78-9.

⁵⁷. Garvie, CF, 99.

⁵⁸. Garvie, CF, 100.

⁵⁹. Garvie, CF, 109.

⁶⁰. Garvie, CF, 104.

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- 56. Garvie, *Op.*, 78-9.
- 57. Garvie, *Op.*, 92.
- 58. Garvie, *Op.*, 100.
- 59. Garvie, *Op.*, 102.
- 60. Garvie, *Op.*, 104.

he:

If duration is in some sense real for God, then future acts are not real for God as are past or present: they are excluded from His knowledge as not yet real. All possibility must be in God's knowledge, so that He may have the resources to meet any emergency, but not as actuality. So as regards the attribute of omnipotence, which has created so much difficulty for all attempts to find a solution for the problem of evil, here only this need be said. Omnipotence does not mean that God can do, or may be expected to do whatever men can imagine or desire. He can do what is possible, and possibility is limited by His nature, character, purpose, and act.⁶¹

The purpose of the universe, for Dr. Garvie, is continuous progression toward the realization of God's purpose. Man, he believes, can resist, hinder, and delay God's purpose by his disbelief, distrust, or disobedience. Dr. Garvie thinks there are times in history when it seems as if God is struggling in the losing and not the winning battle.⁶² He says that one of the unsolved problems of theology is "why God, the perfect God, fulfils His purpose in and through human imperfection."⁶³ Of God's purpose, he writes:

God has a purpose, and it can be only the purpose which is consistent with His perfection. As Father, revealed in Christ, that purpose is the salvation of mankind, and there is no hidden in contrast to this revealed will: as it is such a purpose it is one which cannot be fulfilled by omnipotence, suppressing human personality, but only by a love which in grace woos and wins man's confidence and obedience. God has the wisdom to devise, and the power to perform all that is necessary for the fulfillment of His purpose; but in His Fatherly Rule of man, He not only suffers, but calls and enables man to be his fellow-worker, not as independent of, or separate from Himself, but as the conscious and voluntary organ, in whom and through whom He works.⁶⁴

61. Garvie, CF, 105-6.

62. Garvie, CF, 213.

63. Garvie, CIS, 139.

64. Garvie, CF, 213.

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61. Gervie, *op. cit.*, 108-9.
62. Gervie, *op. cit.*, 213.
63. Gervie, *op. cit.*, 139.
64. Gervie, *op. cit.*, 213.

Dr. Garvie finds man's liberty not to consist in choosing as he pleases in an unreal vacuum. Man's choice is always "a response to an environment, the world around him, his own appetites or aspirations, or God."⁶⁵ In the redemption, Dr. Garvie finds the solution of the problem of God's admission of sin into his world, and his long patience with it.

Because He has the resources to redeem God creates human persons with liberty and responsibility, with the possibility but not the necessity to sin. If we may dare to use a human analogy: He takes the risk, He counts the cost, He pays the price of a family of God.⁶⁶

According to Dr. Garvie's view, God, in his righteousness, reacts against sin in forbidding, in judging, and in punishing. There is "nothing partial, arbitrary, or exceptional in God's judgments," for him, and he declares that history contains a record of the moral sovereignty of God in "visiting upon men the consequences of their iniquity."⁶⁷ He believes that a God indifferent or indolent as regards sin, commands no reverence. He accepts neither the doctrine of universal salvation nor that of eternal punishment, but holds to a belief which resembles that of conditional immortality.

An organism survives only as it adapts itself to its environment: if mal-adjusted it perishes. God made us for Himself; He is our environment, and an environment which not only demands, but promotes adaptation, and resists mal-adjustment. "Our hearts are restless until they find their rest in Him," for by His inward constraints He is drawing us unto Himself. Those who resist adaptation and persist in mal-adjustment must inevitably perish. Not by any annihilation by divine omnipotence; but by inevitable personal decay till the person ceases to be. Let me confirm this conclusion by a consideration already advanced. In dealing with the relation of God and man I have insisted that human personality develops out of bondage to its lower self into the freedom of the higher

65. Garvie, CF, 127.
66. Garvie, CF, 126.

67. Garvie, CF, 111.

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self, as God imparts Himself personally in grace, and man receives and responds personally in faith. The man who refuses that personal progress will and must degenerate till personality itself is lost, the eternal death. But surely those (if any) who so perish will be relatively so few, that we dare not say that the Redeemer has not fully justified the Creator in making man in His own image, and for His own likeness and fellowship.⁶⁸

He thinks that "nothing in our life that derives from God, and conforms to God will be lost, but held eternally."⁶⁹

His view of evil. Dr. Garvie finds the problem of evil to be pertinent to God's special relation to man. He recognizes two types of evil, physical and moral, which he calls pain and sin.

For him, natural phenomena (such as volcano, earthquake, and flood) which cause no loss or pain to man or animal, are not evil. Such processes he believes to be the result of physical forces and natural laws apparently "necessary to the evolution of a habitable earth."⁷⁰ He can not understand why God chooses destructive as well as constructive means toward achieving his purpose, but that does not disturb him, because he firmly believes that God, in his wisdom, always chooses the best possible way, within the limits of his divine nature, of expressing himself.⁷¹ There is pain, he believes, only where there is sentiency, and sentiency only where there is consciousness in some measure. He holds to a possibility that animals do not suffer from pain as man, due to the fact that man's sense of pain is increased by memory of past experience, and fear of future possibilities. He stresses the fact that pain is oftentimes a warning

68. Garvie, CF, 227.

69. Garvie, CF, 228.

70. Garvie, CF, 114.

71. Garvie, CF, 80.

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- 88. Garvie, *op. cit.*, 227.
- 89. Garvie, *op. cit.*, 228.
- 90. Garvie, *op. cit.*, 114.
- 91. Garvie, *op. cit.*, 80.

of danger, and in that way is beneficial in the preservation of life. There is no moral evil, or sin in the seeming cruelty of animals to one another, he holds, for it harbors no willed infliction of unnecessary pain. For him, it is the instinct of self preservation which prompts their apparent cruelty, and he comments:

Why God did not make all animals vegetarians, and allowed some to be flesh-eating is again a problem I leave unsolved, except to point out that domestication has been for the advantage of some animals. But even a vegetarian diet involves a destruction of life. I do not know whether vegetarians ascribe a fall into sin to the depraved cat, and regard the innocent cow as preserving its moral integrity. It does seem a necessity that plants should, as it were, prepare food for animals, and animals by their own death minister to the life of others.⁷²

The representation of nature as "red in tooth and claw" he brands an exaggeration and claims that there is much evidence of mutual help and care among animals. Moreover, the world of plant and animal life is "the stage of an abundant life, and even of life which is enjoyed,"⁷³ he asserts. He accuses man of imposing more cruelty upon animals than nature ever inflicts. Fox and deer-hunting, as well as all other pursuits of man which result in physical pain to his fellow-creatures, or destruction to the beauties of nature (failure to rotate crops and such abuses), Dr. Garvie looks upon as moral evil.

The problem of physical pain he finds to be more acute in the life of man, but nevertheless he finds reasons to consider it more beneficial than harmful. In his view, if man suffers more than animals, he

72. Garvie, CF, 115.

73. Garvie, CF, 116.

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⁷² Dr. Garvie, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
⁷³ Dr. Garvie, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

learns more from his suffering, finds more measures of relief, and even turns the apparent evil into good.⁷⁴ Dr. Garvie traces man's suffering to three sources:- the catastrophes of nature, his own body, and society.

The catastrophes of nature, he thinks are inevitable and more productive of good than harm in the long run. He believes that the pain which they inflict challenges man to find means (1) of avoiding the evil inflicted, if avoidable, (2) to relieve the suffering that comes from them, and (3) to restore the damage caused by them. He claims that science, industry, civilization, and culture have resulted from the struggle which nature has caused for man, and concludes:

Thus pain cannot be regarded as an absolute evil, but rather as a stimulant to study, sympathy, succour, the development of all man's capacities. Can we be sure that a cheaper education of mankind would have been so good or better?⁷⁵

For much of the disease in the world, Dr. Garvie blames man's ignorance, indifference, and indolence of the past. His observations from pastoral experiences lead him to believe that, in sickness, there is often personal gain in character for the sufferer as well as for those caring for him. He feels obliged to admit, however, that there are some forms of disease in which there is prolonged acute pain so wearing to the sufferer that death is preferable from every human point of view. The only solution he can offer to the question which screams loudest for a reasonable answer is that, facing such a tragic mystery, faith in God alone can command patience and submission.

74. Garvie, CF, 116.

75. Garvie, CF, 116.

76. Garvie, CF, 118.

learns more from his suffering, finds more measures of relief, and even turns the apparent evil into good.⁷⁴ Dr. Garvie traces man's suffering to three sources:-- the catastrophes of nature, his own body, and society. The catastrophes of nature, he thinks are inevitable and more productive of good than harm in the long run. He believes that the pain which they inflict challenges man to find means (1) of avoiding the evil inflicted, if avoidable, (2) to relieve the suffering that comes from them, and (3) to restore the damage caused by them. He claims that science, industry, civilization, and culture have resulted from the struggle which nature has caused for man, and concludes:

Thus pain cannot be regarded as an absolute evil, but rather as a stimulant to study, sympathy, success, the development of all man's capacities. Can we be sure that a cheaper education of mankind would have been so good or better?⁷⁵

For much of the disease in the world, Dr. Garvie blames man's ignorance, indifference, and indolence of the past. His observations from pastoral experience lead him to believe that, in sickness, there is often personal gain in character for the sufferer as well as for those caring for him. He feels obliged to admit, however, that there are some forms of disease in which there is prolonged acute pain so wearing to the sufferer that death is preferable from every human point of view. The only solution he can offer to the question which screams loudest for a reasonable answer is that, facing such a tragic mystery, faith in God alone can command patience and submission.

74. Garvie, *CF*, 118.
75. Garvie, *CF*, 118.
76. Garvie, *CF*, 118.

Dr. Garvie sees no evil in death in old age, especially if there be a continual existence of the whole personality.⁷⁶

Without death there could not be birth; it is the limited duration of individual lives which makes possible the succession of generations: the earth could not be the home of an immortal race. "Who knocks, who knocks? The coming generation." The old should hear that knock in the summons of death, and should be ready as was Colonel Newcome to answer, Adsum. A human organism passes necessarily through birth and development and decay and death; death is a physical necessity, man's ineluctable destiny on earth.⁷⁷

Death in youth and middle age, even if the physical event can be fully explained, Dr. Garvie thinks is a summons to faith.

To "man's inhumanity to man," the doctor lays more blame for suffering than to stupidity or cruelty. He believes that intellectual evil (ignorance) becomes a moral evil for man, if he does not accept the suffering which comes from it as an obligation to seek the knowledge and skill which might alleviate and remove that suffering. In attacking the social evils of his day, he reminds that the "Am I my brother's keeper?" attitude was the crime of Cain, the first murderer. He is firmly convinced that "if the heart feels keenly enough" thought will be busy to find the remedy for most of the ills of the world.⁷⁸ Social wrongs, he asserts, have their source in individual sins, although it is not always easy to fix the guilt and the blame. To selfishness and aggression in both men and nations, he lays much social evil. As a cure for these social wrongs and individual sins, he suggests that men and nations pattern their lives upon that of Christ.

77. Garvie, CF, 117-118.

78. Garvie, CF, 119.

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77. Garvie, *CF*, 117-118.

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For Dr. Garvie, sin is a comprehensive term which denotes man's disobedience to, and distrust of God. The term "wrong" means sin in its social effects; "crime" is the name he gives to sin as violation of social laws; and "vice" denotes sin as it reacts on the character of the sinner.

Dr. Garvie believes that:

Man's sin, great and grievous as it is, has not so corrupted the world that it has ceased to be the world God made, preserves, and rules, in which He still is and works. God did not leave Himself without witness in the souls of men; and the opposition of religion to faith is false for

"Where'er the spirit of man has gone
Agroping after the Spirit divine,
Somewhere or other it touches the throne,
And sees a light which is seen by none
Save those who seek Him that sits thereon."⁷⁹

Comparison of Dr. Garvie's views with those of Dr. Brightman.

In the belief of Dr. Garvie as well as Dr. Brightman, the object of a person's desire is, for him, a good. The terms "good" and "value" are synonymous. However, Dr. Brightman distinguishes a value-claim from a true value. A value-claim is any object of a man's desire which he judges, uncritically, to be a good.⁸⁰ By true value (or real value) Dr. Brightman means "a fully coherent fulfilled desire for a fully coherent object."⁸¹ "When value-claims are consistent and coherent with each other and with the other facts of experience," Dr. Brightman holds, "then the claims are verified; such value-claims are true values."⁸² He labels goods which are

79. Garvie, CIS, 467.

80. These are sometimes called "empirical values" or "apparent values."

81. Brightman, POR, 252.

82. Brightman, POR, 93.

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79. Gervie, *CIS*, 407.
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 81. Brightman, *FOR*, 252.
 82. Brightman, *FOR*, 93.

valuable as a means toward achieving a higher good instrumental goods; those which are good-in-themselves he calls intrinsic goods. The intrinsic values he further classifies into higher and lower values. The highest values for him are beauty, truth, and holiness, and for Dr. Garvie beauty, truth, and goodness (sacrificial love). Both thinkers believe the absolute good, the highest ideal toward which man should reach, exists in the person of God.

Dr. Garvie classifies all evils into two categories, physical and moral. At no time does he call the physical evil real except when it is due to man's actions. He uses the term "apparent evil" to describe it otherwise. Moral evil is real, for him, and it denotes improper relationship of man toward God. Wrong, crime, and vice, are types of moral evil all of which he attributes to man's abuse of his God-given liberty.

Dr. Brightman distinguishes between disvalue-claims and true disvalues, and instrumental and intrinsic evils, in the same way as he distinguishes goods. He offers a classification of evils which iron out many of the it-does-not-fit-there-nor-here difficulties common to the "either physical or moral" classification. He is conscious of a good to overcome every evil except one. Dr. Brightman finds in experience:-⁸³

1. A will that is more or less coherent. The irrational part of the will is evil, the rational part good. He does not hold man wholly responsible for his evil will as does Dr. Garvie. Part of the incoherence is probably dependent upon a thorough knowledge of psychology as well as theology. At any rate, it displays, on the part of the analyzer,

83. Brightman, POR, 244-46.

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an instance of "man's humanity to man."

2. The intellectual evil of ignorance. This, Dr. Brightman calls moral evil in so far as it indicates indolence on the part of man, and natural evil in so far as it is unavoidable. Because Dr. Garvie's classification is less implicit than Dr. Brightman's, it is difficult to say that he is in complete agreement. He believes that ignorance, which is responsible for pain, becomes moral evil if the sufferer does not accept the pain as an incentive to acquire the necessary knowledge or skill to alleviate or remove the suffering. In the case of disease, he lays most of the blame to man's ignorance, and he looks upon that ignorance as moral evil. Dr. Brightman holds that knowledge and wisdom, are the two values which can diminish this type of evil.

3. Maladjustment. Both philosophers think of maladjustment as intrinsic evil and find social maladjustment to be one of its worst forms. The religious ideal of a life (1) adjusted to the will of God, for Dr. Brightman, and (2) patterned upon the life of Christ, for Dr. Garvie, seems the best possible solution of the problem.

4. Incompetence. Dr. Brightman does not think of this evil as moral. He thinks it is unjust to call a person sinful because he is unskilful, but he does feel that an unskilful person experiences evil in his lack of skill. Dr. Garvie thinks of incompetence as moral evil. The good which overcomes incompetence is training or development which results in skill, Dr. Brightman believes.

5. The dysteleological surd. Dr. Brightman defines this term as an evil "which is inherently and irreducibly evil and contains within

an instance of "man's humanity to man."

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5. The dysaleological evil. Dr. Brightman defines this term

as an evil "which is inherently and irreducibly evil and contains within

it no principle of development or improvement."⁸⁴ He is not sure whether any such evil exists for certainty, but to his mind an evil such as imbecility shows nothing but intrinsic "worthlessness of the imbecile's existence and the suffering which his existence imposes on others."⁸⁵ Says Dr. Brightman of this type of evil:

A good man or a good God, in the presence of surd evil, could only exercise control--self-control, in order not to be overwhelmed by the evil, and objective control, in order that the evil may not overwhelm all values. The problem of evil in its most acute form is the question whether there is surd evil, and if so, what its relation to value is.⁸⁶

Both Dr. Garvie and Dr. Brightman share the view that man's abuse of his freedom is responsible for much of the intrinsic evil in the world. Dr. Brightman is unwilling to put the whole responsibility for moral evil on man's freedom. "Why," he wonders, "are there in the nature of things independent of human choice, so many temptations and allurements to evil choices?"⁸⁷ He does not believe that freedom explains either the force of temptation or the debasing consequences of moral evil. In his opinion, if there are causal processes in nature which result in suffering or destructions independent of man's intervention, then the extent to which God is responsible for such evil is a legitimate question. Dr. Garvie is not so sure. If there is no suffering or loss to man or animal, then destruction due to natural processes is not an evil, but God's chosen way (which, for Dr. Garvie, is the best possible way) of

84. Brightman, POR, 246.

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87. Brightman, POR, 260.

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87. Brightman, *POB*, 260.

expressing himself, he holds. He does not believe that lower forms of life which exist on the way up to the ascent of man suffer as much as Dr.

Brightman supposes.⁸⁸ Upon one important fact they agree. It is that God suffers with and feels for all forms of consciousness during the evolutionary process. Dr. Garvie's God is not a static, but rather a continuously changing consciousness, active at all times. Time for God has real duration, and his very nature, as revealed in Christ Jesus, is that of sacrificial love. This nature, Dr. Garvie calls perfection. There is no limit to God's power of redemption, so he is not afraid to allow man full freedom. Dr. Brightman's theory of God, whose nature is that of inexhaustible perfectibility,⁸⁹ is eternally active consciousness, too, ever molding the crude contents of His Given into forms of higher value.⁹⁰ Dr. Brightman believes:- (1) that physical space-time is God's standard space-time experience, (2) that energy and force are God's will controlling and directing this experience, (3) that the sense qualities of physical things are the "content" aspect of The Given in God's experience, while the mathematical formulae of physics result from God's will that His "content" shall be controlled by "form."

Dr. Garvie thinks of God as a God of righteousness as well as mercy⁹¹ who disapproves of sin and feels justified in exacting from man a penalty for his iniquity. In that way, Dr. Garvie explains much of the nonmoral evil of the world. Dr. Brightman rejects such an explanation as "repugnant to the ethical sense of modern Idealists."⁹² He thinks of God

88. Brightman, POR, 218.

89. Brightman, POR, 340.

90. Brightman, POR, 338.

91. Garvie, CF, 110-11.

92. Brightman, POR, 261.

88. Brightman, PGR, 216.
 89. Brightman, PGR, 240.
 90. Brightman, PGR, 228.
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It is impossible for Dr. Brightman to view nonmoral evils as God's educators for man's moral nature, as does Dr. Garvie. He recognizes that many apparent evils turn out to be good in disguise, that hardship often develops character, that suffering teaches sympathy, and that a community disaster oftentimes develops a sense of brotherhood. However, he sees no rationality in evils' distribution. Evils are neither evenly distributed nor are they passed out according to need. They not only fail to discipline in many instances, but they cause even further deterioration of character. A rational God would choose his educators more wisely, Dr. Brightman believes.

To sum up, for Dr. Garvie the only real evil in the world is that due to man's freedom. For Dr. Brightman, there is evil in the very nature of God, evil which is not chosen by him. God struggles to mold the evil into good, and he depends upon man to help him. There is evil other than that due to man's freedom; it is continuously being converted into the good; the process is eternal.

Both thinkers hold to a possibility of immortality. It is based on their belief in God as conserver of values. It is not a necessary postulate to the goodness of God.

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Criticism of Dr. Garvie's view. Dr. Garvie's view of evil seems fairly logical if one is able to view perfection as containing any imperfections from man's point of view. It seems that much of his difficulty would be avoided by accepting Dr. Brightman's view of God's nature. The writer of this paper feels, however, that Dr. Garvie is trying to believe in a limited God, but can not free himself from an earlier more orthodox belief. It seems apparent in his continual reference to any evil not due to man's choice as "apparent evil," and to his belief that much destructive natural phenomena are sent to punish man and remind him of his dependence upon God.⁹³ This view does not seem acceptable. It is one thing for man to feel dependent upon God, but something entirely different for God to exact such a view from man. Dr. Brightman's God wins man's perfect love, and awe grows out of it, whereas Dr. Garvie's God demands awe, and out of it grows artificial love such as a dog or a slave feels toward its master. Such love cannot hold in the face of both reason and extreme adversity.

The solution to the problem seems to lie in a combination of Dr. Garvie's view of God's nature as sacrificial love, and Dr. Brightman's view of The Given in God. Such a view will be offered in a later chapter.

93. Garvie, CF, 43.

94. Wierman, WNT, 188.

95. Wierman, WNT, 189.

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III. THE VIEWS OF HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

Influences affecting Dr. Wieman's views. Dr. Wieman has been interested in the problems of value ever since the days of his graduate study at Harvard University where he wrote his Doctor's thesis in that field under the guidance of Ralph Barton Perry and William Ernest Hocking. All of his writings since then have been concerned with value.

In his writings, there is a strong trace of John Dewey's experimentalism, well illustrated in his belief that the supreme good will be found "only as we learn to select stimuli in such a way as to give rise to the most delightful of all possible worlds."⁹⁴ He states there is no way of finding what stimuli to select, nor how to react, except by selecting experimentally and reacting experimentally until the best selection and the best reaction are discovered. Here Dr. Wieman does not seem to give due importance to all the evidence, past as well as present. While immediate present experiment is very necessary, nevertheless it is also true that man can learn from the experiments of past centuries, thereby saving much energy that might be applied to further progress. According to his belief religious experience makes such experimentation as is needed possible, and without such experience, the road to the supreme good is blocked.⁹⁵

Throughout his works there is also noticeable the influence of Alfred North Whitehead. This is especially discernible in The Wrestle Of

94. Wieman, WRT, 158.

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Religion With Truth in which book he defines the supreme good as the fulfilment of the most inclusive interest. Interest he looks upon as more than a mere organic response to a stimulus; it involves the stimulus as well. He defines interest as "a total process of interaction between organism and an environment "which involves at its higher levels, judgment, mentality, and "all the spiritual processes of human being."⁹⁶ Response he names as one persistent element in an interest, and certain environmental conditions another. He maintains that every interest involves, ultimately, as one necessary factor, "that structure of the universe which determines the totality of everything in so far as that totality affects the response."⁹⁷ Accordingly, he finds the ultimate cause to enter into every interest. He looks upon value, not as subjective nor merely human, although always relative to human beings, but as inherent in the totality of all being. As an illustration he offers the case of breathing.

Breathing is an interest, because it is one unit in the total process of living, just as love and aesthetic appreciation and worship are interests in the sense of being other units in this total process. Value inheres in the process of breathing when that process finds fulfilment. But breathing is by no means merely a human, nor merely an organic, process, although the organism is essentially involved in it. It is not correct to say that the organism alone breathes. Breathing is a process in which the air is just as active as the lungs. Breathing could not occur without the air any more than without the lungs. It is because air is constituted as it is, and behaves as it does, that breathing occurs But we can go farther than that. The sun and the earth enter into breathing. It is because of the earth that the air presses down fifteen pounds to the square inch at sea level and hence enters our lungs at the rate and

96. Wieman, WRT, 161-62.

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97. Wieman, WRT, 161.

Religion With Truth in which book he defines the supreme good as the fulfillment of the most inclusive interest. Interest he looks upon as more than a mere organic response to a stimulus; it involves the stimulus as well. He defines interest as "a total process of interaction between organism and an environment" which involves at its higher levels, judgment, mentality, and "all the spiritual processes of human being."²⁶ Response he names as one persistent element in an interest, and certain environmental conditions another. He maintains that every interest involves ultimately, as one necessary factor, "that structure of the universe which determines the totality of everything in so far as that totality affects the response."²⁷ Accordingly, he finds the ultimate cause to enter into every interest. He looks upon value, not as subjective nor merely human, although always relative to human beings, but as inherent in the totality of all being. As an illustration he offers the case of breathing.

Breathing is an interest, because it is one unit in the total process of living. Just as love and aesthetic appreciation and worship are interests in the sense of being other units in this total process. Value inheres in the process of breathing when that process finds fulfillment. But breathing is by no means merely a human, nor merely an organic, process, although the organism is essentially involved in it. It is not correct to say that the organism alone breathes. Breathing is a process in which the air is just as active as the lungs. Breathing could not occur without the air any more than without the lungs. It is because air is constituted as it is, and behaves as it does, that breathing occurs. . . . But we can go farther than that. The sun and the earth enter into breathing. It is because of the earth that the air presses down fifteen pounds to the square inch at sea level and hence enters our lungs at the rate and

26. Wieman, WRT, 101.
27. Wieman, WRT, 101.

in the density which breathing requires. Indeed if we had time to carry the investigation far enough we would find that this simple interest called breathing is a process involving vast and complex reaches of our total environment, past, present, and future. Therefore, if value consist of interest in process of fulfilment, and since the extra-human universe is just as much a constituent of this process as the human part of it, value inheres in the extra-human universe.⁹⁸

Dr. Wieman's metaphysical views have been affected, among others, by J. C. Smuts's "holism," and the development of his pragmatic approach to epistemology has been influenced by the writings of C. I. Lewis as well as the logical empiricists. In recent years he has been concerned with the critical insights of Barth, Brunner, Tillich and Berdyaev, and he has emphasized the importance of a religious attitude which centers around God.⁹⁹

Dr. Wieman's views may be classified as "theistic naturalism," and are best expounded in The Source of Human Good, published in 1946, in which volume he declares his indebtedness to Whitehead, Dewey and Bergson.

His theory of value. Dr. Wieman claims that any theory of value is true if it "identifies value with some one or more of the elements which we always find are present wherever we choose between alternatives."¹⁰⁰ He names six such theories. Two of them are subjective, and find value to exist fundamentally in the mind of man, or in the mind of God. Two he

98. Wieman, WRT, 162-63.

99. Martin, EPR, 87.

100. Wieman, SHG, 3.

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calls transcendental theories, and they find the core of value to be found in abstract eternity or in concrete eternity. Then, there are two "conceptual interpretation"s of value, one which finds the simple context of mind and object to be the seat of value, and the other which looks upon the complex context called the "situation" as the determiner. Dr. Wieman holds that while many of these theories are true, they are not equally useful. He seeks an interpretation which both will identify value and put it to use. He thinks the latter "contextual interpretation" which looks upon value as "a total complex situation, including whatever must be taken into consideration by practical operations which determine choice so that predictable outcomes can be known and approved,"¹⁰¹ can best serve his purpose. Several interpretations of the nature of value are examined by him and rejected as insufficient-in-themselves-alone. They are: value as goods, value as satisfaction, value as quality, and value as human control. However, in his asserted only true principle, that of qualitative meaning, he embraces all of the rejected principles.

His objection to "goods" as the guiding principle to the source of value is based on the fact that they are not always, under all circumstances, good, and hence cannot carry in themselves "intrinsically and essentially" the nature of goodness, but are dependent upon some reality "over and above their bare existence" to make them truly good.¹⁰² He warns that it is imperative, in this age, that men discover a universal principle that can guide them in choosing good that is common to all,

101. Wieman, SHG, 5.

102. Wieman, SHG, 10.

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101. Wieman, SHG, 8.
102. Wieman, SHG, 10.

and existent under all circumstances, would they save themselves from destruction.

Satisfaction he turns down as the guide (although he admits its possible specification of the nature of value) for the reason that interests become unpredictably transformed when one "meets the conditions and follows the procedures necessary to seek fulfilment."¹⁰³ One's interest at the end of an endeavor may be entirely different from the original satisfaction sought. One must learn to want what other people will allow, he points out, and if man cannot find a satisfaction that coheres with those of others and which "can be enriched by the progressive accumulation of many past ages,"¹⁰⁴ he will not escape bitter and increasing dissatisfaction. Here Dr. Wieman does recognize, to a certain extent, the value of past experience.

He rejects quality as the guiding principle for human conduct and choice, because the quality of emerging events is often very different from the quality they show when looked back upon. Time and the interconnection of events have much bearing upon the eventual depth of quality attributed to a happening, and prevent the quality of a present incidence from giving any accurate clue to its future rank in the realm of value, he claims.

This is very true, and is applicable to present day problems. Communism, which is considered in the western world as one of the greatest prevalent evils, may, a century from now, be looked upon as a saving

103. Wieman, SHG, 12.

104. Wieman, SHG, 13.

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factor of civilization. Christianity itself in the early stages of its existence was regarded with terror by many, and perhaps justifiably so. It is very possible that, after the destructive element of Communism has been eliminated as suicidal, the world will merge the best factors of that ideology with the best in Democracy, and find a road toward constructive political living. Personalists as well as Dr. Wieman recognize that fulfilment of purpose is such that it always takes time. Teleology is a long, slow process toward a goal. Is Communism, perhaps, a needed twist in the world situation to alert man to the fact that truth is circular, that there is always another side from the one on which any group stands?

Although "good includes human control, human control is not necessarily good," he says, in criticizing the human control principle.¹⁰⁵ Of John Dewey, who he believes is the most famous defender of this principle, he writes:

Dewey himself has many times asserted that any transformation of man's estate in the direction of greater good will transform the human mind itself with its evolutions and appreciative consciousness. If that is true, a notable consequence follows. The human mind, before the sequence of events whereby it will be transformed so as to appreciate the new creation, cannot appraise the value of that innovating outcome which will render its evaluations different from what they are now.

If Dewey means that the outcome of control may be fuller release and more potent working of a transformative process, which we must not try to control in the sense of determining what it shall produce but only serve by holding all our values subject to the transformation which it will work

105. Wieman, SHG, 15.

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upon us, then Dewey's assertion is true. But most of the time he seems to be saying that we can foresee the consequences of value, can appraise them as the best possible prior to our attainment of them, and can then direct the course of events to their attainment.¹⁰⁶

In naming qualitative meaning, which he asserts is intrinsically good, as the guiding principle for human conduct and choice, Wieman claims to follow a course which is radically different from the previously mentioned rejected interpretations of value. He writes:

We shall try to demonstrate that there is a creative process working in our midst which transforms the human mind and the world relative to the human mind. We shall then show how transformation by this process is always in the direction of greater good. The human good thus created includes goods, satisfaction of human wants, richness of quality, and power of man to control events. But the greater good cannot be attained by seeking directly to increase goods or satisfactions or quality of power. These can be increased only by promoting that kind of transformation creative of the greater content of good when created good is interpreted as qualitative meaning.¹⁰⁷

Thus, he gathers together and fits into his own idea of good four opposing views which he distinctly had rejected as separate theories. Qualitative meaning he defines as "any structure of interrelated events, together with their possibilities, when these events have appreciable qualities and when the structure as a whole can be represented by signs."¹⁰⁸ Those events belonging to the structure, and which serve to represent it as a whole, are signs. The possibilities belonging to such a structure make up that part of it not now included in actual events.

There are many reasons, according to Dr. Wieman, why it is good to feel the quality of events by way of signs. In this way it is

106. Wieman, SHG, 16.

107. Wieman, SHG, 17.

108. Wieman, SHG, 21.

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108. Wieman, SIG. 18.
107. Wieman, SIG. 17.
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possible to increase the range and variety of events felt without causing danger or destruction to the organism or exhausting its energy. The sound of thunder is an example of such a sign. By way of signs, one can feel through the sensitiveness of other people and can feel the quality of past events. (Art is the most useful sign which links a past age to the present.) He thinks it is good to feel the quality of events by way of signs because in that way the universe becomes qualitatively alive.

Dead matter takes on color and sound and all the emotional tones that go to make what we call the "life of conscious awareness." As more events become signs, as these signs take on richer content of qualitative meaning, as these meanings form a network of interconnective events comprehending all that is happening in the world, this universe becomes spiritual. It becomes more deeply and pervasively meaningful. It becomes the house of the human spirit, responsive to human need, expressive throughout of hope and fear, joy and sorrow, triumph and failure, defiance and despair, love and fellowship. Events cease to be material things merely and become a language, a prophecy, a song.¹⁰⁹

Dr. Wieman labels qualitative meaning a created good, the source of which is creative good. Only by following the trail of qualitative meaning, he believes, will man find creative good, which is the sole source of life's abundance.¹¹⁰

He finds three main categories in which values might be placed: creative good, which is absolute in so far as any kind of good can be absolute, created intrinsic good, and created instrumental good.¹¹¹ The latter two values are relative and should serve the former. It is his

109. Wieman, SHG, 23.

110. Wieman, SHG, 17.

111. Wieman, SHG, 69.

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102. Wieman, SHG, 23.
110. Wieman, SHG, 17.
111. Wieman, SHG, 22.

belief that, if human good is to be advanced, the three types of good call for distinct types of action. Creative good is what the professor (who finds five specific types of good--beauty, truth, knowledge, morals and religion) uses as his standard in all problems concerned with value.

Created good consists of events meaningfully connected. The structure of meaning which joins the past with the future that man thinks he appreciates, is relative value. These links of qualitative meaning which have value for the human organism do not have value, necessarily, for more minute ones. Also, the form of inter-relatedness belonging to events which cause growth in quality and meaning relative to one race, or class, or culture, will not, as a rule, be equally good for another. Thus, in created good, one always can find some standpoint from which its value disappears or changes. It is a good which must be qualified because it does not keep the same standard of goodness under all circumstances and conditions and in relation to every different sort of organism, human person, or social culture. The same system of events may in one reference be instrumental and in another, intrinsic. These findings are in harmony with those of Dr. Brightman and other personalists, as well as coherent with the facts of experience.

In the instrumental type, the quality of the events is either negligible, or irrelevant to their positive value. For instance, eating tasteless food might be of value in providing energy needed to participate later in an event leading to intrinsic good. In this case, the quality is negligible. Had the food been nauseating, the quality would have been irrelevant to the instrumental value. However, the eating of such food

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might acquire intrinsic value through other significant connections simultaneously experienced, such as happy memories, pleasant anticipations, or congenial companions. He defines instrumental value as:

A structure of events whereby each happening as it occurs does not acquire qualities from other events in the structure, or, if it does, these qualities are irrelevant to the value of the structure in the reference under consideration.¹¹²

When there is a break between two systems of events so that there is no way of communicating the qualities of the one to the other, the only connection between the two having any meaning at all must be instrumental or nonqualitative, Dr. Wieman says. He looks upon technology as instrumental, the power of which should be used, primarily, to search and serve the creative source of all good (to be discussed later) and only secondarily to serve the good as discerned through the structure of of man's appreciative awareness.

However, when an event takes on rich quality through significant connection with many other events, then the good experienced becomes intrinsic rather than instrumental. This change occurs often in everyday life. A good example is the man who chops wood. If, while he is chopping, bonds of meaning are established between his chopping and his beloved family, say, then the chopping becomes converted into an intrinsic good, no matter how tiring the act may be. Intrinsic value is defined by Dr. Wieman as "a structure of events endowing each happening as it occurs with qualities derived from other events in the structure."¹¹³ It is the appreciable world made richer with quality and meaning by the

112. Wieman, SHG, 55.

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creative event. Dr. Wieman looks upon culture as created intrinsic good. He repudiates the supremacy in value of all goods and goals of the created appreciable world and turns to what creates them for the sovereign good of life. Man, he says, must serve, not the greatest good he can appreciate, but the process which creates him and all the good of life. Dr. Brightman and other personalists would add that man must pattern his life upon the highest ideals attainable, the norms of truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness.

Creative good, according to Dr. Wieman, may be compared to instrumental value because it increases intrinsic good, and very often its own qualities are insignificant or indiscernible. However, it cannot be called instrumental, because it so alters the mind and purpose that what it produces is never what the mind planned for in the beginning.

When good increases, a process of reorganization is going on, generating new meanings, integrating them with the old, endowing each event as it occurs with a wider range of reference, molding the life of a man into a more deeply unified totality of meaning. The wide diversities, varieties, and contrasts of all the parts of a man's life are being progressively transformed into a more richly inclusive whole. The several parts of life are connected in mutual support, vivifying and enhancing one another in the creation of a more inclusive unity of events and possibilities. ... It is creative good ... By means of this creative good, systems of meaning having intrinsic value, previously disconnected so that the qualities of the one could not get across to the other, are so unified that each is enriched by qualities derived from the other. Meaningfully connected events, once instrumental, now become component parts of a total meaning, having intrinsic value.¹¹⁴

The creative event is always working in human life. Usually, it reorganizes the mind and transforms its appreciable world without revealing

114. Wieman, SHG, 56.

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Dr. Wieman finds the creative event to be transcendent to the extent that it is creative of the appreciable world produced to date, the world which is subject to human control. Nevertheless, it is material existing in space and time, and can be discovered in this world by the proper analysis, he claims.

its own qualities as distinct from the newly created meaning. The creative event itself is never qualitatively appreciated. Man cannot use and control it because the form of good it produces can never in its specific appearance be intended, desired, or sought by man. Nor can man know the kind and form of good it will produce. Its structure could not be intended by the human mind before it emerges either in imagination or in the order of actual events. It is impossible for human effort to achieve anything that the human mind cannot imagine; a greater imagination must be created in man would he do that which lies beyond the range of his present imagination. Nor can man seek a good that he is unable, at the time, to appreciate; to seek such a good, a greater appreciation must be developed in him. It is the creative event which creates both the greater imagination and the deeper appreciation needed. Its work is different in type from that of man; it creates the good of the world in a manner that is impossible for man. In this sense, it might be called supra-human. However, man can aid or obstruct the creative event, and hence hasten or delay its fulfillment, by either cooperating with or blocking its purpose--in his personal conduct, in the organization of society, in his physical or biological system. The creative event produces a far greater wealth of human good when man meets its demands.

Dr. Wiseman finds the creative event to be transcendent to the extent that it is creative of the appreciable world produced to date, the world which is subject to human control. Nevertheless, it is material existing in space and time, and can be discovered in this world by the proper analysis, he claims.

He defends creative good as absolute in every sense except the one of unlimited power. Creative good is good under all conditions and circumstances, being relative to neither time, place, person, race, class, need, hope, desire, or belief. Its goodness would continue even if all human beings should perish, and is identical even when working with minute cells before the emergence of any higher life. It is absolute in that its demands are unlimited because it is infinite in value. Its good supersedes that of any particular good it has already created. Therefore, it is always good to give oneself fully into its control to be changed in any way that it may demand. Creative good is absolute in that it is unqualified good. It remains unchanged and retains its identity equally from the worm's point of view or from man's, from the eternal or the temporal, from the beginning or the ending, judged from the cause or its results, and whether looked upon as means or end. It is wholly trustworthy. The results of its working always will be the best possible under the conditions even though its kind and form of good produced can not be known to man, or may seem to him hateful and fearful and the opposite of good already created. Even when minds and personalities are recreated by its functioning, it can be trusted always to produce good. It never fails life, and will continue to function when all else fails, will spring anew when all other good is destroyed. However, this ever-present creative good is not absolute in the sense of being almighty. It does not have the power to overrule all evil so that in the end everything will be perfect "no matter how long and how great the intervening evils may be."¹¹⁵ For that matter, nothing has that power, asserts Wieman.

115. Wieman, SHG, 81.

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Theory and purpose of the universe. According to Dr. Wieman, there is nothing in reality within reach of the human mind more fundamental than events and their qualities and relations.¹¹⁶

In terms of human action, the only world we have anything to do with, the only world that contributes to good and evil in any sense that bears upon what we do about it, is the world of events.¹¹⁷

He does not believe that the structure found in the world comes from mind or organism; in fact, he holds that both mind and organism are themselves "creations of that kind of energy having the structure of creativity."¹¹⁸ Personalists would not agree. For them, the structure of the world is mind. But mind is creative. Human minds are products of divine creative mind. Actual facts reveal that there is both conscious experience of purpose in man, and adaptation, fulfilment of man's experience in nature. Only a mind has purpose, and in spite of the fact that some events seem to show neither a good purpose nor a bad one, the universe on the whole is purposive. Those perverse events which lack purpose, or seem to, Dr. Brightman explains in his theory of The Given as due to factors not produced by any purposive will. It is Dr. Wieman's belief that structures are progressively created, and that each level of creation has both a unique structure of existence and structures of relevant possibility which had no trace of existence before this further creation. Possibility, for him, is not the same as necessity, and new possibilities can be created that had no prior being of any sort. Such

116. Wieman, SHG, 6.

117. Wieman, SHG, 72.

118. Wieman, SHG, 191.

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116. Wieman, *SHG*, 8.
117. Wieman, *SHG*, 72.
118. Wieman, *SHG*, 191.

a view, every personalist, for whom only a mind can create novelties, accepts whole heartedly.

The higher levels of existence spring from, rest upon, and are undergirded by the lower,¹¹⁹ and the primordial order intrinsic to the kind of energy which works creatively is the creative event. He does not claim to know if there ever was a time when this lowest level was all that existed. The order or structure of the creative event is not imposed upon it, but is intrinsic to its nature, and finds its source in the creative work of some lower order of creativity.

There is a determinate order of existence at any given level of creation. There is also a determinate order running through all levels. The latter is the minimal structure of creative energy, the former the structure of the world as created at that level. The primordial order, setting limits to all creation, is not matter or mind or organism or any disembodied primordial order (Whitehead) standing in its own right over and above events, but it is that structure which energy must have to be creative at all.¹²⁰

The creative event cannot transform the world in any way other than what conforms to its own nature, he stresses. Man's mind has the power to select and ignore, imagine and construct, intend and seek only within bounds of the already created structure of the world which he can appreciate. He teaches that in man's appreciable world, all energy, and every event, is quality. Therefore, quality, which is concrete, massive, ever abundant in its subsistent reality, is the substance of the world out of which all else is made. It (quality) is identical with the creative event as experienced by man. Always, it is intrinsic to the total situa-

119. Wieman, SHG, 8.

120. Wieman, SHG, 195.

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tion, being "in" and "constitutive of" the "total complex of components, which, by their togetherness in the structure of relatedness, yield the quality."¹²¹ Quality is ultimate reality, objective fact, which can be shaped into various structures. When it is diversified so, it produces all the different things found in man's appreciable world.

The good of all life, including the individual, society, and all history, is "to structure the world so that qualities will be more appreciable."¹²² In other words, the purpose of living is to conserve and increase the amount of value in the world. Every human being should search out the nature of creativity which retains its identity and its unity through all change in itself and in other things, and attempt to meet its demands, he advises. (Creativity is an abstraction; it is the character, the structure, or ~~the shape~~ which the event must have to be creative. The creative event itself is the concrete reality.) Only the creative event, when accepted as supreme over life, can actually direct and make possible the achievement of the good which man ought to seek, according to Dr. Wieman's view.

Man, he thinks, is free to the extent that he is "committed to the creative event, is continuously transformed by it, and strives to provide conditions releasing its power."¹²³ This creative event he looks upon as material if "matter" means a type of energy upon which the structure of time and space, together with all other existing or possible structures, is dependent. It is considered by him to be spiritual if the

121. Wieman, SHG, 303.

122. Wieman, SHG, 304.

123. Wieman, SHG, 300.

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term "spirit" refers to "(1) the continuous creator of ideals, aspiration, and value; (2) the supreme manifestation of freedom; and (3) the source and sustainer of human freedom."¹²⁴

Professor Wieman says that his metaphysics is a "materialism including what is spiritual" interpreting freedom as a "kind of determinism,"¹²⁵ and is the most useful metaphysics of all.

It is a spiritual metaphysics which is none the less material through and through. The creative event is changless, a unity, absolutely good and eternal in respect to creativity. But every concrete instance of this event also displays change, multiplicity, and temporality. These affirmations are not contradictory when their true meaning is seen in relation to one another and to the nature of the creative event.

We must say of this metaphysics, as we said of our interpretation of value, that it is not the only true one. There are several metaphysics, all of which are true, because a metaphysics is true if it selects some element necessarily involved in all human existence and explains everything in terms of it... A metaphysics must first meet the tests of truth before it can become a candidate for choice on grounds of utility.¹²⁶

This, of course, does not make sense. Wieman implies that mind is matter, yet describes his particular type of metaphysics as spiritual. He makes use of the eclectic technique in dealing with metaphysics just as he did with values. In stating that views other than that which he expounds are equally true, he jeopardizes his philosophical integrity. The truth does not contradict itself. If the universe is fundamentally mind, and all the evidence warrants such a belief, then it is not fundamentally matter. If one view is true, then

124. Wieman, SHG, 300.

125. Wieman, SHG, 301.

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the other is false.

His tests of truth are: observation, agreement between observers, and coherence. All three of these, he holds, apply to every proposition claiming to be true, whether it is in the field of common sense, philosophy, or faith. The order of truth, to his mind, is not built by or dependent upon, any mind; it is constructed by prior creation. For personalists, the order of truth is an expression of the supreme mind. Creativity never changes a substratum of the structure of truth so long as the human mind and its appreciable world continues to exist at all.

It is man's destiny, he believes, to be transformed into something different from what he is in order to carry creativity to a new level of existence beyond anything which is in the present world. Man despairs of achieving his purpose, but his conscience should spur him on toward fulfillments impossible in his present state. Through religious faith (including worship and prayer) man can find a power other than human which lifts and transforms him in the moment of deepest despair, the doctor feels confident. Those who cannot endure suffering, he comments, cannot endure the increase of human good. This is indeed true, and a fact with which all personalists agree. Dr. Brightman's God and Dr. Garvie's God, especially, suffer that the good might prevail.

He suggests that the truth man seeks with the mind he has, is as unattainable as the righteousness he seeks. However, as the moral man strives in despair, he may, by the grace of the creative event (God), reach a righteousness and a truth he could not arrive at otherwise. If he struggles (with faith in God) in despair of reaching the truth with his mind as it is now constructed, he may be reconstructed by a creativity

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not his own. He thinks that the combining of the search for truth with despair of finding it except that the mind be transformed may persist until human existence does change. In fact, according to him, it must change would man survive.

It is our faith that man must be transcended in this way or be destroyed; it is our faith that these alternate destinies await him--transformation or destruction. We hope for the transformation, but destruction will descend if we follow the guidance of our value-sense in disregard of the creative event. Meanwhile, we strive for a righteousness and a truth we cannot attain. Perhaps it is time for most earnest striving, for we may be nearer to the great transformation than we think.¹²⁷

Only the creative event, God, can cause such transformation.

His theory of God. The only creative God which Dr. Wieman recognizes is the creative event itself (discussed in previous pages), which is made up of four subevents working together. These subevents, each of which may occur without the others, but in such case is not creative, are: emerging awareness of qualitative meaning derived from other persons through communication; integrating these new meanings with others previously acquired; expanding the richness of quality in the appreciable world by enlarging its meaning; deepening the community among those who participate in this total creative event of intercommunication.¹²⁸

According to Professor Wieman, all value, all meaning, and all causal efficacy are to be found in this world of events and their possibilities. In thus identifying God as events having a definite form

127. Wieman, SHG, 52.

128. These subevents are discussed in Wieman, SHG, 58-69.

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127. Wieman, *SEG*, 52.
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with possibilities, he brings down the active God of Jewish tradition and the the traditional Greek Forms, into the material world of time and space.

He attacks the view of the neo-orthodox religions represented by Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr and others for interpreting the source of human good (God) as the shaper of events or the overruler of them, or the somehow generator of them, on the ground that science and technology cannot serve a so-called reality the demands of which they cannot find. They can work, he says, only in the world of events. He warns that unless man can find the source of human good in the form of an order of events, he is doomed, for science and technology, which are the shapers of history, will lead to utter destruction unless committed to the service of "God." He criticizes religious leaders who claim that the divine source transcends reason and cannot be observed, and concludes that if they are right, man's fate is determined.¹²⁹ Says he:

The desperate need of our time is for a faith that can direct man's commitment to the creative source of all human good as it works in the temporal world, open to rational-empirical search and to service by modern technology. This urgency of circumstance makes clarification and criticism necessary. When the atomic bomb engenders action cutting deep into the tissues of human existence, the cutting will kill or cure according as we know where the vital organs are and how they work. The vital organ in this case is the creative event which gives us our humanity, with all its potentialities of supreme fulfilment. This must be guarded, and only a faith that understands can serve this source of life intelligently with such a knife in hand. A faith that glories in transcending

129. Wieman, SHG, 32-33.

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reason in such a time as this is a deadly danger.¹³⁰

Likewise, he challenges the view, held by many religious leaders, that God transcends time, for the reason that such a belief makes man unwilling even to attempt to find the ultimate source of all good in this world of experience, because they deny it is here. Personalists would agree with him here. For them, all being is activity (B.P. Bowne). Personality, whether human or divine, is free, active, and purposive, each of these characteristics requiring time for its expression. Dr. Brightman, a worthy representative of personalism, explains that the personality of God, like that of man, is a unity of change and identity. God is changeless in his unfailing loyalty to truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness, yet ever changing in that every act of freedom is a change from a previous state.¹³¹

Dr. Wieman says that when creativity is used to identify God, one knows that God is working in actual events, and is not merely a construction of human linguistic devices set upon a cosmic throne.

The thin layer of structure characterizing events knowable to the human mind by way of linguistic specification is very thin indeed compared to that massive, infinitely complex structure of events, rich with quality, discriminated by the noncognitive feeling-reactions of associated organisms human and nonhuman. This infinitely complex structure of events composing this vast society of interacting organisms and their sustaining or destructive environment is like an ocean on which floats the thin layer of oil representing the structures man can know through intellectual formulation. These structures knowable to the human mind can have depth and richness of quality only if they continue conjunct and integral with this deep complex structure of quality built up through countless ages before even the human mind

130. Wieman, SHG, 34.

131. Brightman, Art. (1947), 257-265.

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Dr. Wieman claims that when God is truly known, He is known by perception. Also, in one sense, man can know God by intuition.¹³³ God is immediately accessible to human living and human feeling even though he is not accessible to the intellectual formulations of the human mind, just as no other concretely existing reality is. Truth about God, according to Wieman, is a structure of possibility which the human mind can formulate and use to guide man in his meaningful relations to the creative event (God).

Creative good, he holds, is the actual reality which has done the work, and played the part which Christianity has attributed to a God who is eternal, immaterial, and superhistorical. In denying that God is a person he says:

There is another important distinction that must be recognized between the traditional Christian representation of God and this creative event. God has generally been represented as a person. It is true that many theologians, when pressed, will admit that personality is only a symbol directing men to a reality which the concept of person cannot compass. Others, however, will insist that God is truly a person - in fact, the only true and complete person, human persons being only remote approximations to what God is in perfection. While this sounds very different from the first admission, it really comes to the same thing. The substance of this second concession is that

132. Wieman, SHG, 66.

133. Wieman, SHG, 186.

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Dr. Wieman claims that when God is truly known, He is known by perception. Also, in one sense, man can know God by intuition. 133 God is immediately accessible to human living and human feeling even though he is not accessible to the intellectual formulations of the human mind. Just as no other concretely existing reality is. Truth about God, according to Wieman, is a structure of possibility which the human mind can formulate and use to guide man in his meaningful relations to the creative event (God).

Creative Good, he holds, is the actual reality which has done the work, and played the part which Christianity has attributed to a God who is eternal, immaterial, and supernatural. In denying that God is a person he says:

There is another important distinction that must be recognized between the traditional Christian representation of God and this creative event. God has generally been represented as a person. It is true that many theologians, when pressed, will admit that personality is only a symbol directing men to a reality which the concept of person cannot compass. Others, however, will insist that God is truly a person - in fact, the only true and complete person, human persons being only remote approximations to what God is in perfection. While this sounds very different from the first admission, it really comes to the same thing. The substance of this second concession is that

132. Wieman, *SGO*, 88.
133. Wieman, *SGO*, 186.

God is very different from what we know as human persons - which grants all that is here contended. Another device to avoid the difficulty of attributing personality to God, while at the same time insisting that he is in some sense a person, is the Trinity. All these and other theological contrivances for upholding the popular demand for a personal God, while being forced to admit the inadequacy of the concept of personality as applied to the creative source of all value, need not detain us longer. They all testify to an inner contradiction which always emerges when vigorous thought undertakes to interpret the source of human good, while at the same time compromising with this demand of practical religious living.¹³⁴

In this passage, first of all, Dr. Wieman confuses human person and metaphysical person in speaking of "a reality which the concept of person cannot compass." Another fallacy in his thinking is evident in his assertion that the view (the personalistic view, by the way) which holds that human beings are "only remote approximations to what God is in perfection" grants all that he contends. This is not so. The personalistic view looks upon God as a person, a conscious person, and Dr. Wieman at no time admits that God is in any sense conscious.

The need to think of God as a person is psychological, he notes.¹³⁵ The truth is, it is very logical to think of God as a person and the world as an expression of his mind. Nature resembles mind. However, he points out that at the level most important for human living, the creative event always operates between persons. Also, persons are much more easily understood than the work of the creative event which is deep, and subtle, and mighty. He laments that the symbol of personality for God may be required even by those "who know through intellectual

134. Wieman, SHG, 265-66.

135. Wieman, SHG, 267.

analysis that a person is always a creature and that therefore personality cannot characterize the nature of the creator."¹³⁶

The creative power, he teaches, lies in the interaction taking place between individuals in the development of a mutual awareness and response towards the needs and interests of one another wherein each becomes transformed and lifted to a higher level. Morality, he maintains, requires that inquiry be made to find out what kind of relationship between human beings is most favorable to this creative event. He thinks that man must be attentive toward his fellowmen, honest and considerate, not too occupied with himself and his own good, generous, temperate, courageous, just, kind, and loving, to meet the requirements for interchange of interests, for integration of these interests in the life of each, for the expansion of the appreciable world, and for the deepening of community. The moral order is obligatory because the creative event in the life of man demands a certain order of interrelatedness among people, not because it (the moral law) is intrinsic, absolute or underived. Conduct held subservient to the demands of creative transformation is moral conduct. In other words, a man's morality is his effort to change conditions in such a way as to facilitate the transformations creative of value in human existence. With this, all personalists would agree.

What blocks the power of the creative event, according to him, is man's greater concern with human purpose. He warns that there is nothing so deadly as the noblest and most righteous human purpose given preference to the creative event. There is no way of salvation, he claims, other than the domination of the creative event over human purpose. Such

136. Wieman, SHG, 268.

other than the domination of the creative event over human purpose. Such preference to the creative event. There is no way of salvation, he claims, nothing so deadly as the noblest and most righteous human purpose given is man's greater concern with human purpose. He warns that there is what blocks the power of the creative event, according to him, of value in human existence. With this, all personalists would agree conditions in such a way as to facilitate the transformation creative moral conduct. In other words, a man's morality is his effort to change conduct held subservient to the demands of creative transformation is people, not because it (the moral law) is intrinsic, absolute or undivided. In the life of man demands a certain order of interestedness among of community. The moral order is obligatory because the creative event each, for the expansion of the appreciable world, and for the deepening change of interests, for integration of these interests in the life of courageous, just, kind, and loving, to meet the requirements for inter- not too occupied with himself and his own good, generous, temperate, that man must be attentive toward his fellowmen, honest and considerate, between human beings is most favorable to this creative event. He thinks requires that inquiry be made to find out what kind of relationship be- becomes transformed and lifted to a higher level. Morality, he maintains, response towards the needs and interests of one another wherein each place between individuals in the development of a mutual awareness and The creative power, he teaches, lies in the interaction taking cannot characterize the nature of the event." 136

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domination was exemplified in Christ over nineteen hundred years ago. Salvation, he teaches, is not the work of man, but of God, working through history to gain dominance in the life of man. If man commits himself to Christ rather than to the moral law, as his last strand and ultimate hope, then the way is open to forgiveness of sin and salvation. The man who has only the moral law has no redeemer when he fails morally. On the other hand, if he puts his faith in Christ (creative power made dominant in the life of man by the faith of a continuing fellowship made possible by the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus) he can be redeemed, forgiven, and saved despite his failure. This, almost all Christians would accept.

Worship, which "renders the whole personality more subject to the transformation involved in new creation,"¹³⁷ is defined by Dr. Wieman as "the practice of ritual which loosens the coercive grip of fears and desires obstructing the four-fold working of creative good,"¹³⁸ and prayer as "worship plus petition."¹³⁹ God transforms the world in answer to prayer if he is the creative event, and if the prayer asks anything within bounds of what can be created under existing conditions.

The answer to prayer is the re-creation of the one who prays, of his appreciable world, and of his association with others, so that the prayerful request is fulfilled in the new creation.¹⁴⁰

There is nothing here with which Dr. Brightman and other personalists would not agree.

137. Wieman, SHG, 285-86.

138. Wieman, SHG, 281.

139. Wieman, SHG, 282.

140. Wieman, SHG, 282.

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- 137. Wieman, SHG, 282-83.
- 138. Wieman, SHG, 281.
- 139. Wieman, SHG, 282.
- 140. Wieman, SHG, 282.

Dr. Wieman believes that "when history acquires Christ, creative power can save the world into everlasting life."¹⁴¹ History, to him, is the supreme achievement of the creative event, and has a creative power "to conquer and to save" by giving to all things, both mean and noble, a voice to speak from the depths of the past. In history, creative power wins the "tragic victory over time and matter and the evil ways of men."¹⁴²

His ideas about immortality. Dr. Wieman admits that nobody knows what happens to the individual after death which "stands at the end of the trail of observable life."¹⁴³ He does think that if death is conquered beyond man's reach of knowledge, it must be done by "creative transformation released to the utmost scope of its power by giving it supreme control through absolute commitment of faith."¹⁴⁴ Man should, accordingly, commit himself fully into the hands of creative power, which is the sustainer as well as the creator of all value, both in life and in death, to be transformed by it in any way it may demand, "moving with it through every transaction, through every disaster and fulfilment."¹⁴⁵ The only way to die, he holds, is the same as the only way to live (cf. views of Socrates), committed to the creative event.

Hence the only way to live and the only way to die are in the depth of the power and keeping of what generates all life, renews it from day to day, lifts it progressively to higher levels when conditions permit, transfigures the material world into significant events responsive to the human spirit with increase of meaning.¹⁴⁶

141. Wieman, SHG, 307.

142. Wieman, SHG, 307-9.

143. Wieman, SHG, 281.

144. Wieman, SHG, 280.

145. Wieman, SHG, 281.

146. Wieman, SHG, 281.

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141. Wieman, SHG, 307.
 142. Wieman, SHG, 307-8.
 143. Wieman, SHG, 281.
 144. Wieman, SHG, 280.
 145. Wieman, SHG, 281.
 146. Wieman, SHG, 281.

One thing Wieman can promise man, and that is that his "echoes roll from soul to soul" in the form of great art, the most important being the tragic and religious types. Thus, in an impersonal way, man is capable of achieving immortality. Individual immortality, however, is plausible but not certain.

His theory of evil. "We cannot fully understand the nature of good," says Dr. Wieman, "until we see it in silhouette against the fact of evil."¹⁴⁷ He finds evil to be definitely real, and to consist of two general types: destructive, which is opposed to and destroys created good, and obstructive, which is opposed to and obstructs creative good. This latter is by far the more deadly in that it opposes the only good which is ultimate and absolute. However, although creative good can be obstructed, it cannot be destroyed as can, and very often does and must, created good. There is no almighty evil any more than there is an almighty good; never is creativity so completely obstructed that it cannot operate at all, or never again. To be sure, the good which has been created can be destroyed but history bears evidence to the fact that always, when its higher levels were destroyed, creativity has sprung anew from lower levels, he asserts.

Just as creative good is absolute, he teaches, so also is its opposing evil. Obstructive evil is universal in that it is relative to neither time, place, person, interest, need, social situation or culture, but remains evil everywhere and under all circumstances; it is unqualified evil, existing as evil from every conceivable viewpoint; it is ultimate in

147. Wieman, SHG, 83.

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that it neither originated nor will end in any source of good. It may or may not go on forever; although it probably will, there is no necessity for such endurance. Finally, it is absolute in the sense of being unconfined. Its extent of confinement is dependent upon the success of the "great struggle," the dominance of creative power over other purposes. "Evil," he says, "is a wild thing; it wanders abroad because the creative power of good has not been able to confine it or to annihilate it."¹⁴⁸

Destructive evil, which destroys created good, is looked upon by him as relative. There are times and places, he holds, when it is not only good, but necessary, to destroy or at least transform, an already created good, in order to make possible a further, more complete one. Often, in life, that which is one man's gain is another man's loss, he points out, and so the same event is judged good or evil according to the particular point of view. Too, an evil which is destructive may be declared good when the perspective of the judge is widened or otherwise changed. So, while the term "destroy" seems worse than the term "obstruct" it is by far the less harmful when applied to evil, according to Wieman.

The difference between pain and suffering, Dr. Wieman considers of basic importance to his interpretation of good and evil. Suffering he finds to be not necessarily and intrinsically evil, but dependent for its classification upon the way it does or does not serve the creative event. It is good only when it becomes one integral part of creativity; it is evil when it opposes the creative event. Much is dependent upon the individual's treatment and reaction to it, the mature person seeking value

148. Wieman, SHG, 93.

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in its face, the less worthy running away by grasping wildly for the supposed security of a passed-its-use good.

He finds two kinds of suffering--the "relatively simple" kind, pain, and the "more complex" kind, mental suffering.¹⁴⁹ It is his belief that simple pain, which is merely an event or series of events, at times can be looked upon as instrumental good in that it may be a warning against greater evil. Also, as in the case of hunger, heat, and cold, it may stir the organism to new action out of which may develop qualitative meaning. However, generally, pain is an evil which not only destroys the already existing good of life, but obstructs the working of its source, in that it binds attentive awareness to itself, thus holding back the mind from maximum range and depth of meaning. Altogether too often, the professor thinks, pain, in this way, cuts man from the creativity which alone can save him.

He finds suffering (mental suffering) to be very different from pain in that, first of all, it is a meaning, or system of meanings, not merely an event. As a matter of fact, to the sufferer, it "may not be an event at all beyond that minimum event which serves as a sign."¹⁵⁰ It refers to the meaning of, rather than to the actual event itself, and, as meaning, can be communicated readily. Most art is concerned with suffering (which includes among others sorrow, regret, despair, sense of failure, shame, disillusionment, sense of loss, and humiliation), he thinks, as evidenced in legend, folklore and story, and recorded history

149. Wieman, SHG, 94.

150. Wieman, SHG, 95.

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Says Wieman:

It would seem that suffering, even more than happiness, leads to that kind of communication whereby creativity increases the good of life. Certainly, the inter-mixture of suffering and happiness rather than happiness without suffering is required for this. If great art teaches us anything about the nature of man and the good of life, it tells us that suffering is intrinsic and essential to the increase of qualitative meaning.¹⁵¹

This conclusion seems very pragmatic, and one with which Dr. Brightman and other spiritual leaders would be in accord.

Dr. Wieman is of the opinion that suffering is transmuted from an evil into a good if the sufferer holds to an undying faith in the creative good, which should be loved and served above all else--self, neighbor, country, race. In the sense that the more good that is produced in the life of man by creativity, the more evil is possible by the creature's turning against its creator, creativity produces evil, Wieman states.

Evils are further divided by the author under discussion into those which are not caused by man, but have their roots in the very nature of things, and those that have their source in human life. The former are called "inertias" and "protective hierarchies" by him, and the latter "sin," "immorality," and "demonry."¹⁵² The failure to achieve maximum efficiency, the tendency to "let things stay as they are" or even

151. Wieman, SHG, 96-7.

152. Wieman, SHG, 105.

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151. Wieman, *ibid.*, 30-7.
152. Wieman, *ibid.*, 105.

deteriorate is an example of inertia, and the acquisition of power by a small group at the top of a given society with those at the bottom losing the opportunity for constructive expression, regardless of ability, is an example of protective hierarchy.

By "inertia" he means two things--lack of the necessary sensitivity and responsiveness which makes one aware of the thought and feeling of others and enables him to understand and take his place in a complex community; and resistance to the re-creation of the individual organism and its appreciable world so as to increase qualitative meaning.¹⁵³

Inanimate matter such as cold and storm, dust and wind, earthquake and fire, up from which has come energy in forms available for human life, are permeated by inertia of sensitivity and unresponsiveness, he points out. Specialization, both biological and mental, he labels a kind of inertia.

He adheres to the theory that organisms specialize because the supply of energy (which is quickly exhausted in vital use) for one individual is so limited that, lacking the energy to do everything, they turn their supply into a single channel where it can have more concentrated power. Creativity could do much more with life, he holds, were energy less exhaustible. When weary, the human organism, which escaped the inertia of biological specialization only to be caught in the more choking web of "specialization of the mind at higher levels of civilization, where men cannot communicate creatively with freedom and fullness across narrowing lines of concern,"¹⁵⁴ is inert and unresponsive, and it is im-

¹⁵³. Wieman, SHG, 105.

¹⁵⁴. Wieman, SHG, 106-107.

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153. Wiseman, SBC, 105.
154. Wiseman, SBC, 106-107.

possible for it to undergo the transformations necessary to a new creation.

"Anything is evil," he teaches, "which drains the previous and limited supply of energy for life, so painfully and slowly stored in forms available for creative living."¹⁵⁵ For the reason that it wastes from this store of energy accumulated by many past ages, he looks upon many types of pleasure which otherwise seem harmless, as dissipation.

He lists routine habit as a form of inertia due to a limited supply of oxygen, although he recognizes that certain types of habit actually serve the creative good by releasing the mind to gather in further qualitative meaning. Old age and death, to him, are examples of inertia caused by the running-down of an individual's supply of energy. He notes that any cultural group, when out of communication with other groups, has a tendency to drift toward uniformity and inertia. Evidence seems to back the supposition that every form of life, when not spurred on by pain, suffering and danger, is met by the same fate, he maintains. Another form of inertia is attributed by him to the canceling-out process, brought about by the good of one group's frustrating the good of others, and the striving of one's canceling out the affects of the striving of others. He offers the great economic depressions as examples.

Worst of all inertias, and perhaps the most deadly threat in to-day's society, it is his opinion, comes from the kind of tolerance which looks upon tolerance rather than the creative event as the sovereign good. He warns that tolerance becomes triviality when it denies that any value is great enough to dominate all human living and that men, who must

155. Wieman, SHG, 107.

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find greatness somewhere, will turn to war or revolution or any other fury that will end such triviality. He holds that the first half of the greatest evil of today is the abolishment of the absolute from man's temporal existence.

It is our inability to distinguish anything as sovereign over all of human history by right of its absolute goodness, rationally and empirically demonstrated so to be. Or again it is the great betrayal perpetrated by attributing absolute worth to some tradition, Christian or other, or to some group or culture or race or state or doctrine, without the long labor and search for rational and empirical evidence whereby arbitrated choice may be corrected. Hence we swing from periods of inane toleration to periods of fiery war and revolution, and then back again to the inane.¹⁵⁶

The second half of this greatest evil, he thinks, is man's feeling of insecurity, his sense of the futility of effort, his fear that after all there is no real meaning to life. This feeling is caused by the constant shattering of man's hopes, plans and dreams. Wieman's solution is that man, in such predicament, give himself unreservedly to the only power that never will be broken, of whose god man is unaware until it becomes visible from some future perspective.

Dr. Wieman finds the evil of hierarchy a necessary result of the evils of inertia. Due to the graded levels of sensitivity and capacity to become creatively transformed, there is a hierarchy of sensitivity inflicted upon existence in which only the few at the top can serve as intermediaries for the creative event's fullest work, he holds.¹⁵⁷ The evil lies in the fact that some forms of life are obliged to support other

156. Wieman, SHG, 113.

157. Wieman, SHG, 117.

find greatness somewhere, will turn to war or revolution or any other fury that will end such triviality. He holds that the first half of the greatest evil of today is the abolishment of the absolute from man's temporal existence.

It is our inability to distinguish anything as sovereign over all of human history by right of its absolute goodness, rationally and empirically demonstrated as to be. Or again it is the great betrayal perpetrated by attributing absolute worth to some tradition, Christian or other, or to some group or culture or race or state or doctrine, without the long labor and search for rational and empirical evidence whereby arbitrated choice may be corrected. Hence we swing from periods of insane toleration to periods of fiery war and revolution, and then back again to the insane.¹⁵⁶

The second half of this greatest evil, he thinks, is man's feeling of insecurity, his sense of the futility of effort, his fear that after all there is no real meaning to life. This feeling is caused by the constant eluding of man's hopes, plans and dreams. Woman's solution is that man, in such predicament, give himself unreservedly to the only power that never will be broken, of whose god man is unaware until it becomes visible from some future perspective.

Dr. Wieman finds the evil of hierarchy a necessary result of the evils of inertia. Due to the graded levels of sensitivity and capacity to become creatively transformed, there is a hierarchy of sensitivity instituted upon existence in which only the few at the top can serve as intermediaries for the creative event's fullest work, he holds.¹⁵⁷ The evil lies in the fact that some forms of life are obliged to support other

156. Wieman, *SHG*, 113.
157. Wieman, *SHG*, 117.

forms by suffering hardships that make them less responsive as well as less sensitive. He suggests that in the future the inertia that comes from possession of disproportionate wealth may be unnecessary, but fears that arrogance in the high places and frivolity in the low may be the inertias crippling man's future society. In labeling the hierarchy of sensitivity both a necessity and an evil, he writes:

It is necessary to enable the creative event to produce the richest fulfilment of value with those most capable of engaging in that kind of communication. It is evil because it imposes upon many an undue protection from pain and discomfort; upon some an undue fatigue from hard labor; upon others impoverished organisms; upon still others the irresponsible existence which puts on the throne of life what they happen to like, without demonstrating by any reliable method that it is truly most important.¹⁵⁸

According to him, the high peak of creative transformation will continue to rise far above the masses of the people with only the top few participating in life's fullest meanings. However, the hierarchies "are necessary to lift beyond the reach of the great inertias some few individuals with whom creativity can produce the greatest good."¹⁵⁹

Sin, immorality, and demonry are the three kinds of evil which Wieman attributes to man's will. He looks upon any resistance to creativity for which man is responsible, whether he is consciously aware of it or not, as sin. Unconscious resistance is sin, he holds, in that it is the result of many past decisions for which man is responsible. Much of the resistance in the individual man not intended by him, Wieman traces to choices made by other human beings. He recognizes a collective responsib-

158. Wieman, SHG, 119-20.

159. Wieman, SHG, 125.

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ility, in many cases, for which the individual can not be held so solely responsible as would be the case were he living in isolation from others. Sin is always social in Wieman's view, even when an individual must accept primary responsibility. It is social because creativity itself is intrinsically social. Man sins, according to Wieman, when he, with his society, culture, and ideals (all of which are created goods), refuses to meet the demands made upon him by the creative event.

Moreover, the man who does not hold his conduct subservient to the demands of creative transformation is immoral.

Genuine morality is the struggle to re-shape the actual physical, biological, and social conditions of this world so that individuals shall be impelled to live sensitively and responsively to each other, undergoing creative transformation of individual personality and social structure.¹⁶⁰

When man resists creative transformation for the sake of a vision of human good, he is guilty of the sin of demonry. To Dr. Wieman, it is the most subtle, dangerous, and obstructive sin that man can commit. He warns that no vision of any man, race, or culture can at any time be lifted up and made supreme against creativity, the sole source of not only human, but all good.

Comparison of Dr. Wieman's views with those of Dr. Brightman.

Dr. Wieman defines value as "events meaningfully connected"¹⁶¹ in his latest book, and as "any fulfilment of interest"¹⁶² in an earlier volume.

160. Wieman, SHG, 230.

161. Wieman, SHG, 54.

162. Wieman, WRT, 160.

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Dr. Wieman defines value as "events meaningfully connected" ¹⁸¹ in his latest book, and as "any fulfillment of interest" ¹⁸² in an earlier volume.

180. Wieman, SHG, 230.
181. Wieman, SHG, 24.
182. Wieman, WRT, 100.

These interests may be conscious or unconscious, and more or less inclusive. The more inclusive the interest, the higher its rating on his scale of values. Value, for him, is objective in that:

....It is "out there" just as much as anything else is "out there," although it cannot be unrelated to human living any more than the rest of the universe can be unrelated to human living.... Every human interest is a process of interaction between a human being (or human beings) and extra-human conditions. These extra-human conditions include the ultimate condition, namely, that structure of the totality of all being by virtue of which the environment so interacts with the human as to constitute interest. Therefore value is not only a feature of human nature, not merely a characteristic of human living, although it is all that. But value is, furthermore, a characteristic pertaining to all the universe and to metaphysical reality. It is a character pertaining to the ultimate cause.¹⁶³

For Dr. Brightman the term value means "whatever is actually liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved or enjoyed by anyone at any time."¹⁶⁴ This definition assigns a broader scope to the term value.

There are many events which have much value, yet do not necessarily fulfil any interest. An example of such is walking along a country road with a gentle mist in one's face. Such a happening provides much enjoyment, yet hardly could be called "fulfilment of interest." Value always involves choice and is itself subjective, existing only in and for persons. Values are but forms of personal experience. He distinguishes between values, ideals, and norms. All value is actual experience. An ideal is simply a definition of value. It tells one the kind of thing that has to

163. Wieman, WRT, 163.

164. Brightman, FOR, 88.

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183. Whelan, WRT, 183.
184. Brightman, FOR, 88.

be done to get something one likes. In other words, it is a plan of action. A norm is a coherent ideal which defines a true value. It is a plan of rational action. Dr. Brightman thinks it is reasonable to say that norms are objective in that any mind can have another's norm, though not its value. But, he points out, there is no meaning in saying there is an objective norm if there is not a mind to interpret it. For him, coherent thinking about the relation between things and values requires a cosmic mind as the consciousness that is aware of the ideal norm.

Thus, both thinkers recognize the objectivity of value, but on different grounds. Dr. Brightman's grounds seem more acceptable to reason. It is difficult to imagine a universe which is mere personal force valuing anything, as Dr. Wieman's explanation of the objectivity of value implies.

Both professors make a distinction between intrinsic and instrumental goods. By intrinsic good Dr. Brightman means "whatever is desired or enjoyed for its own sake, as an end in itself," and by instrumental "any fact whatever, whether in my experience or out of it, which tends to produce the experience of intrinsic value."¹⁶⁵ For Dr. Wieman, intrinsic good, as stated before, means "a structure of events endowing each happening as it occurs with qualities derived from other events in the structure."¹⁶⁶ and instrumental "a structure of events meaningfully connected wherein the quality of the events is either negligible or irrelevant to their positive value."¹⁶⁷

165. Brightman, POR, 89.

166. Wieman, SHG, 55.

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187. Brighman, *POB*, 89.
188. Wieman, *SHG*, 35.
189. Wieman, *SHG*, 34.

However, neither one of these religious leaders looks upon the distinction between means and ends as absolute. For Dr. Wieman, the same system of events may be instrumental or intrinsic according to its reference. For Dr. Brightman, intrinsic values are always instrumental in that they support other values belonging to the system of which they form a part, and many instrumental values are also intrinsic. It may be well at this point to expound briefly Dr. Brightman's classification of intrinsic values. He divides them (intrinsic values) into a lower and a higher realm, conceding that these realms may and often do, overlap. The lower consists of recreational, bodily and social values, and the higher of intellectual, aesthetic, character and religious values. Each value on the scale embraces all the other values below it, and so is intimately related to them. According to him, the realization of all other values is dependent upon character values. No intrinsic value, then, ever stands alone. This is in perfect accord with Dr. Wieman's view that intrinsic goods are qualitatively related to other goods. Religious value is the highest type of all, because it is most inclusive.

Dr. Wieman speaks of created and creative goods, while Dr. Brightman talks about value-claims and true values. Value claims are goods which are felt to be true, but have not been tested by the "supreme court of the mind,"¹⁶⁸ reason. True values are those which man still upholds after having adhered to the norms of reason to:

- Be consistent (eliminate all contradictions).
- Be systematic (discover all relevant relations).

¹⁶⁸. This is a term used by E. S. Brightman.

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Be consistent (eliminate all contradictions).
Be systematic (discover all relevant relations).

188. This is a term used by E. S. Brighman.

- Be inclusive (weigh all available experiences).
- Be analytic (consider all the elements of which every complex consists).
- Be synoptic (relate all the elements of any whole to its properties as a whole).
- Be active (use experimental method).
- Be open to alternatives (consider many possible hypotheses).
- Be critical (test and verify or falsify hypotheses).
- Be decisive (be committed to the best available hypothesis).¹⁶⁹

These true values have the advantage of a high degree of permanency which is lacking in Dr. Wieman's creative good.

Dr. Wieman believes that the universe may be explained best in terms of energy which, for human experience, means physical quality. Wherever energy is experienced by the human organism, he holds, it is in the form of quality or a complex of qualities. Quality is ultimate reality, the substance out of which all else in the world is made. Examples of qualities experienced as events are: red, green, bright, dull, soft, hard, fragrant, painful, joyous, and the like. All that exists or ever can exist is in the form of a structure of events; good is a structure of events, as is also, evil; God is an event, as is also, man. Here he is in direct contradiction to Dr. Brightman's and the personalistic view which explains the universe in terms of mind. He refuses to separate God from nature, or to distinguish between the realms of value and of fact, thus denying the ultimate validity of ideals. He condemns a certain type of idealist for holding that:

Concepts, ideals, all universals, are present, objective beings, which are quite independent of our thinking; which may be discovered, cherished, adored, sought, by us, but are by no means merely creatures of our own minds.¹⁷⁰

169. Brightman, NV, 106.

170. Wieman, RES, 272.

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For Dr. Wieman these have no independent existence apart from the process of thinking. They are intellectual devices instrumental in enabling man to do a number of things among which are the attainment of truth and knowledge. As such they may have great value. On the other hand, they are often the cause of great error in thinking, and as such are detrimental to man.

Dr. Brightman, a personal idealist, agrees with Dr. Wieman. He does not consider an ideal to be of any intrinsic value until it is realized in personal-social experience. Nor does he hold that all ideals are necessarily true or valid. He points out that man may err in judgments about ideals in the world of value just as he may err in scientific judgments about the world of nature. This, however, is no reason for abandoning the search for truth. True ideals may be distinguished from false ones by submitting them to the tests of reason (coherence) and love, he believes. He proposes the term "norm" to designate a true ideal. He contends that there are some beliefs so fundamental that were they supposed to be false, all meaning would disappear from life. "If reason is not a true norm, all science is impossible," he claims, and "if love is not a true norm, all value is wiped out, for all value is personal experience that is respected."¹⁷¹ He insists that, although no human being is fully reasonable or loving, humanity must move forever in the fixed directions of reason and love if it is not to destroy itself. The characteristic forms which reason-love takes in universal human thinking, he holds, are the norms of truth, morality, the aesthetic and the holy, and when they

171. Brightman, NV, 74.

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are realized in experience these norms "generate actual knowledge, actual goodness, actual beauty, actual worship."¹⁷² He offers the famous "Four Freedoms" of World War II as an example of a table of norms for humanity.

Here indeed is a set of true ideals: true, but not yet realized, even if printed on one-cent postage stamps. The difference between these freedoms as proposed goals and a world in which they are principles of life for every individual and every society reveals vividly the vast chasm between ideal norms and actual values. It also sheds light on the intellectual and practical task imposed on religious and secular educators; legislators, executive and judicial authorities, and citizens of every land.¹⁷³

For Dr. Brightman, reality is explained best in terms of consciousness, the only immediately available truth. Although consciousness is in continual interrelation with nature, it is not in the physical order and therefore can not be explained away in terms of matter, he reasons, in direct contradiction to Wieman. On the other hand, space exists in the mind as a concept, and matter can be, and is, explained in terms of consciousness for him, by his theory that

the universe is a society of conscious beings, the energy which physicists describe is God's will in action, . . . there is no wholly unconscious or impersonal being. Everything that is, is a conscious mind or some phase or aspect of a conscious mind. To speak religiously, the universe consists of God and his family. Nature is divine experience.¹⁷⁴

All the evidence for the existence of Dr. Wieman's world of events, Dr. Brightman thinks can be found only in the conscious experience of persons, since "the only evidence for 'physical energy' is to be found in certain observed changes of the patterns of conscious personal experience."¹⁷⁵ It is very probable, he thinks, that "the energy which always

172. Brightman, NV, 83-4.

173. Brightman, NV, 75.

174. Brightman, NV, 114.

175. Brightman, NV, 119-20.

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172. Brightman, W., 118-20.

173. Brightman, W., 83-4.

174. Brightman, W., 75.

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reveals itself in conscious and personal effects is itself a conscious and personal cause."¹⁷⁶ In other words, he believes that "all the energies of nature are activities of a cosmic mind--the mind that our value experiences reveal to be the eternal God."¹⁷⁷ For him, every law of nature is a law of God, and every energy of nature a deed of God. Nature is in the Divine Mind. It is God's working, his activity, his experience. Therefore, it cannot be external to him, neither a place wherein he dwells nor a thing on which he acts. Man's mind is his own personal consciousness, dependent upon and in interaction with his body which, as a part of nature, is God in action. To express it differently, the human personality interacts with, and is dependent upon, Divine Personality. So, although mind is not in nature, nature in the Divine Mind is God's way of creating human mind.¹⁷⁸

Says Professor Brightman:

If nature is God in action, we have grounds for the reasonable faith that personal values are the goal of God and that even if nature were to perish and God were to act in totally different ways, personality and value would survive. Love is "creation's final law."¹⁷⁹

Dr. Brightman's concept of personality, in and for whom alone values exist, seems to have many of the same qualities of good, as Dr. Wieman's creative event. It is interesting to compare Professor Brightman's reference to love as "creation's final law" to Professor Wieman's contention that

love, at its best, is the most inclusive of all interests, for it provides the most complete integration of the greatest number and diversity of interests

176. Brightman, NV, 120.

177. Brightman, NV, 120.

178. Brightman, NV, 124-25.

179. Brightman, NV, 120.

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- 178. Brightman, IV, 120.
- 177. Brightman, IV, 120.
- 176. Brightman, IV, 124-25.
- 179. Brightman, IV, 120.

of the individual and of associated individuals. The supreme good is fulfilment of the most inclusive interest, or, if one prefers the phrase, of the most inclusive system of interests.¹⁸⁰

It is Professor Brightman's belief that no scientific law or method has to be modified if nature is God in action. He offers to man, in explanation of the fact that the life of value is a life of conflict, a God who, like Professor Wieman's God, is limited in power, struggles with, but is never overcome by evil, and is the source of all value. Moreover, Dr. Brightman thinks worship and prayer directed to such a friend more soul-satisfying and essentially reasonable than when directed to an unconscious system of nature. For him:

God is a conscious Person of perfect good will. He is the source of all value and so is worthy of worship and devotion. He is the creator of all other persons and gives them the power of free choice. Therefore his purpose controls the outcome of the universe. His purpose and his nature must be inferred from the way in which experience reveals them, namely, as being gradually attained through effort, difficulty, and suffering. Hence there is in God's very nature something which makes the effort and pain of life necessary. There is within him, in addition to his reason and his active creative will, a passive element which enters into every one of his conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem for him. This element we call The Given. The evils of life and the delays in the attainment of value, in so far as they come from God and not from human freedom, are thus due to his nature, yet not wholly to his deliberate choice. His will and reason acting on The Given produce the world and achieve value in it.¹⁸¹

Dr. Wieman thinks that knowledge of God is available through immediate perception. Man experiences God, he claims, in the same fashion in which he experiences the roundness of the earth, the structure of the

180. Wieman, WRT, 160.

181. Brightman, POG, 113.

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culty, and suffering. Hence there is in God's very nature
something which makes the effort and pain of life necessary.
There is within him, in addition to his reason and his active
creative will a passive element which enters into every one
of his conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and im-
pulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem for him.
This element we call the Given. The evils of life and the
delays in the attainment of value, in so far as they come
from God and not from human freedom, are thus due to his
nature, yet not wholly to his deliberate choice. His will
and reason acting on the Given produce the world and achieve
value in it. 181

Dr. Wiseman thinks that knowledge of God is available through
immediate perception. Men experience God, he claims, in the same fashion
in which we experience the roundness of the earth, the structure of the

atom, and the weight of the sun, through the senses.¹⁸² A necessary requisite to the perception of God is the formation of necessary habits. He argues that if God affects man's senses in any way, and he does, since he is the undefined, undiscriminated, but stimulating totality in response to which man may develop various sorts of interest,¹⁸³ then he may be perceived when the necessary habits are formed.

Does God affect our senses? We scarcely see how anyone can deny it. The weight of the sun affects our senses and so does the atom, and so do the chemical components of the remote stars. Otherwise we would never know these objects existed. Surely any object that sustains human life must affect our senses. Since God is that object that sustains human life he sustains the senses and hence affects the senses.... But anything that affects the senses is an object that may be perceived when men learn to note and interpret its sensuous effect. Hence God is an object to be perceived through sense experience. We do not mean that we can rub our hands against him any more than we can rub our hands against an atom or one of the remote stars. But we do mean that there may be ways of apprehending sense experience which would reveal to a competent observer the presence and character of that Something upon which human life is ultimately dependent for its maximum security and abundance. When this way of apprehending becomes established as a form of habitual reaction rendered accurate through experimental tests, we perceive God.¹⁸⁴

Dr. Brightman, on the other hand, claims that knowledge of God can never be immediate;¹⁸⁵ consciousness alone is so experienced. However, God can be known by inference, the only way in which any object other than present consciousness may be known. Such knowledge is subject to correction and expansion in the light of new-found truths, both

182. Wieman, WRT, 83-97.

183. Wieman, WRT, 172.

184. Wieman, WRT, 94-5.

185. Brightman, POR, 162-95.

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182. Wiseman, WRT, 88-97.
183. Wiseman, WRT, 172.
184. Wiseman, WRT, 94-5.
185. Brightman, FOR, 162-65.

scientific and philosophical. In spite of human choice (voluntary evil).

When we are concerned.....with the knowledge of God, it is especially important to make clear from the start that there are special reasons for emphasizing the incompleteness and the (logical) uncertainty of any possible knowledge of God. If God is what theism takes him to be, the cosmic source of all nature and of all value experience, then complete and adequate knowledge of God would mean complete knowledge of all the evidence for belief both in nature and in values and also complete rational understanding of their relations. Such knowledge is beyond us, although the lack of logical certainty does not prevent sincere devotion and even assurance about the religious referent.¹⁸⁶

Certainty (other than present self-consciousness) exists for him only in the mind of God which is, and ever will remain, distinct from, although in constant traffic with, that of man.¹⁸⁷ He does find inferred evidence for God in the evidence of the rationality of the universe and other evidences listed on page thirty-four of this thesis.¹⁸⁸ Also, he finds inferred evidence, in the type of conflict existing in the life of value, that God is limited in power. Both values and disvalues seem to be inherent in personality and its relation to nature.¹⁸⁹

The joy of knowledge is confronted by the pains of ignorance and error; man is a mixture of goodness and moral evil; the fulfilled purposes of beauty are accompanied by frustrations which we call ugliness; and the same humanity that worships also indulges in irreverence and blasphemy.¹⁹⁰

Although voluntary evil (evil which results from man's choice) can be explained by the doctrine of free will, there is, he holds, much

186. Brightman, POR, 166-67.

187. Brightman, ITP, 338-39.

188. Brightman, POG, 139-66.

189. Brightman, POR, 305-41.

190. Brightman, NV, 84.

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- 188. Brightman, FOR, 100-87.
 - 187. Brightman, ITR, 358-59.
 - 186. Brightman, FOR, 139-86.
 - 185. Brightman, FOR, 345-41.
 - 190. Brightman, NY, 84.

evil which arises without, or in spite of human choice (involuntary evil).

Much of man's ignorance and error is due to circumstances beyond his control. Much ugliness exists in the order of nature apart from man. Worship is as much a matter of education and tradition as it is of choice, and irreverence and blasphemy may often be socially conditioned rather than freely chosen attitudes. Experiences of sorrow, pain, frustration, and chaos seem to arise from the nature of things.¹⁹¹

This world embracing involuntary evil as the creation of a God infinite in goodness may be explained best, Dr. Brightman believes, by supposing that it is brought into being by a will which is limited both by reason and by nonrational content. So, when man, who with nature is part of God's activity, is created, the same constituents that exist eternally in God enter into his being.¹⁹²

Neither man nor God can rightly call evil good. A wise finite God could not possibly judge the evils to be justifiable. He judges them to be unjustifiable as well as unavoidable.....To create evils unnecessarily would be monstrous. The creation of persons whose lives must contain unjustifiable evils is nevertheless justified if redemption is possible..... But the fact that evil must enter into any possible creation does not mean that the act of creation is evil. Creation means only that God is responsible for exercising redemptive love; it does not mean that he is either responsible for, or acquiescent in the evils which his will does not create, but finds.... The hypothesis of a finite God makes a rational open-eyed faith possible. (It makes possible a rational solution of the problem of evil in creation.)¹⁹³

Thus, Professor Brightman gives a coherent explanation of the baffling problem confronting man in his quest for a better world. It is a personalistic view which is qualitatively monistic, quantitatively

191. Brightman, NV, 84.

192. Brightman, POR, 333.

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191. Brightman, *NV*, 84.
192. Brightman, *FOR*, 333.
193. Brightman, *FOR*, 334.

pluralistic, and epistemologically dualistic. To qualify these terms respectively, evil as well as good and all other objects of investigation are of the nature of mind, and exist only in and for persons; the universe is a society of persons with one Supreme Person who is creator of and in constant interaction with, all other persons, each of which is a separate entity; the mind knows only its own consciousness immediately, all other objects being known by reference. His God, creator of all that is, is a Divine Person tenderly suffering with his charge toward attainment of perfection.

The God which Dr. Wieman thinks man perceives through the senses did not choose evil, either, but confronts it, struggles with it, and whenever possible converts it into the good, even as does Dr. Brightman's God.

...Evil is antagonistic to that principle which makes existence possible. It is destructive of concrete existence...

The more good is built up, the more good there is to tear down; hence the more opportunity for evil. Since evil is the destruction of good there can be no evil unless there is first good. The opposite, however, does not hold. Good is not dependent on evil. Evil is not required in order to provide for the increase of good, although good may and does turn evil to good account.

Evil, then, is parasitic. It cannot stand on its own feet. It can thrive and flourish only when there is good to sustain it. The world is based on good. Good and concrete existence are identical. The concrete order of the world is good. Evil tends to destroy and break down this concrete order.....But as a fact evil can not attack the universe as a whole.....

Pain, mental anguish, misery and suffering in all its forms are the struggle of the concrete good to maintain itself at some level....or attain some higher level, in opposition to the disintegrating ferment of evil...

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Pain, mental anguish, misery and suffering in all its forms are the struggle of the concrete good to maintain itself at some level.... or attain some higher level, in opposition to the disintegrating forward of evil...

...It is to be noted that evil is something positive and aggressive, not merely the lack or absence of something. But God is not evil and there is no confusion of good and evil. Evil is the destruction of that which is sustained and constituted of God. God does not create evil nor sustain evil, except as a parasite is sustained. Evil could not exist without God's good to provide for it a standing ground; but the good alone is of God.¹⁹⁴

In contrast to Professor Brightman, Professor Wieman offers, to what he considers a pseudo-problem,¹⁹⁵ a naturalistic explanation which is qualitatively monistic, quantitatively pluralistic, and epistemologically monistic. To explain these descriptions in order: all that exists is of the nature of energy in the form of events; events occur in many types of structure, good being one type, evil another, God still another, and man another yet; direct knowledge of an object is possible, in Dr. Wieman's case, if the tests of observation, agreement between observers, and coherence are met. Dr. Wieman's God, creator of all the good in the world (but not of the evil!), is an impersonal force among other forces of nature, pushing the universe in the direction of the good.

Dr. Brightman's view is much more acceptable in that it is more consistent with the facts as man knows them. Only a person experiences value. It seems ridiculous to think of an impersonal force pushing the universe toward perfection. How would an impersonal force know that perfection is desirable? How would it know in which direction perfection lies? How can something which does not experience value itself produce and allot value to other objects? This association of value with impersonal force seems the weakest point in Dr. Wieman's theory.

194. Wieman, WRT, 200-201.

195. Wieman, SHG, 87.

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194. Wieman, WRT, 200-201.
195. Wieman, SHG, 27.

Both thinkers believe that love is a principal factor in the fight against evil. Wieman thinks that "there is a strange transmuting power in love."¹⁹⁶ It (love) "passes its fingers over all the objects of the world and transfigures them."¹⁹⁷ Hence, out of the deepest suffering there may blossom beauty and joy if there be love, he believes. He thinks that the greatest message of Easter, and the deepest meaning of the Resurrection, is the triumph of love over suffering and death. He suggests:

May not this transmuting power of love, and atonement through suffering love, be the true solution of the problem of evil and sin in a world ruled by an almighty good God? To enter into the love of God is not to abolish evil but to transmute it and triumph over it. And sin can be conquered only through suffering love. Is love, after all, the only way to triumph over sin and evil as, perhaps, God does eternally? And we can enter with Him at any time into His triumph not by might nor by power but simply by love.

Thus love becomes the way of salvation and the meaning of religion. To be even one of the very littlest ones in the Kingdom of Heaven is to be unquarably blessed, for love transmutes all pain into sweetness and death into life and shame into good. To enter into the Christian Way of life is "to fall in love with the universe" and to find that God Himself is love. To know God is to know love. In the Christian way of life there may well be pain and death and shame, but they are transmuted. Pride, that suffers the gnawing tooth of envy, and wounded vanity, cannot live with love.¹⁹⁸

Here Dr. Wieman and Dr. Brightman are in complete agreement, and their views cohere with the facts of religious experience. One wonders why statesmen are not aware of this pragmatic truth by now.

196. Wieman, RES, 105.

197. Wieman, RES, 107.

198. Wieman, RES, 108-9.

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196. Wieman, *RSS*, 106.
197. Wieman, *RSS*, 107.
198. Wieman, *RSS*, 108-9.

Plato suggested that philosophers be kings. Is there no middle road? Is it not desirable that philosophers "whisper into the ears" of kings? It seems that communication between statesmen and great spiritual leaders is an urgent necessity in this age of crisis. Guns and bombs have failed miserably to obtain a lasting peace. There still remains sacrificial love. Are there enough unbiased spiritual leaders in the world to create the stimulus which will bring about positive and loving results? Why has education failed to open the minds of its followers to the power of love, love that is willing to sacrifice when and if necessary? Whatever the reason, it seems necessary to remedy the situation immediately. With proper universal education, is it not possible to create a world in which Dr. Brightman's "reasonable love" will reign?

For Dr. Brightman, God is man's Suffering Servant as well as his mighty, although not omnipotent, loving Father. He is love, but a suffering love that redeems through a cross.¹⁹⁹ Dr. Brightman looks upon every ideal as a principle of love.²⁰⁰ Those ideals that survive after having been submitted to the laws of reason, become norms. Democracy, Christianity, and the future of the world, he teaches, rest on an appeal to universal norms, by application of which all men may realize values.

The world of values, it is true, lies in the distant future; but the world of norms may to some extent be grasped by every normal human being. The hope for the future lies in an increasing agreement about universal norms, and about their application.²⁰¹

199. Brightman, POG, 189.

200. Brightman, POI, 74.

201. Brightman, NV, 86.

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199. Brightman, *FOG*, 199.
200. Brightman, *FOI*, 74.
201. Brightman, *WV*, 82.

For Dr. Wieman, anything and everything in one's personality which is obstructive to creative transformation, so far as one ("one" refers to the individual or his society) is responsible for the obstruction, consciously or unconsciously, is sin. Forgiveness of sin is accomplished by the creative power itself when it dominates over and penetrates beneath the obstructions to its own working within the personality itself.

For Dr. Brightman, only evil which is chosen, consciously by man in preference to good, is sin. Redemption from sin is accomplished through suffering caused by the presence of reason-love.

Although neither Dr. Brightman nor Dr. Wieman professes to know certainly whether man continues to live in a future existence after death closes the door of this life, Dr. Wieman thinks it plausible, and Dr. Brightman thinks it very probable. Dr. Wieman does claim to know that:

Whenever life has met an impassable barrier or destroyer, creative transformation alone has been able to circumvent it by reconstructing the order of life, sometimes lifting it to a higher level of abundance. Whenever in his history man has encountered what seemed to be the blank end of all, and yet has been led around it or through it, the miracle happened by the emerging of some new perspective previously beyond his imagination or the creation of some new power of mind and personality by the integrating of meanings or the looming of wider horizons revealing an appreciable world more ample than he had known or the increase of fellowship folding him more securely in the depths of community and mutual aid, or a combination of all of these. These are the working of the creative event.

With faith in this creator and sustainer, we know all we need to know to face triumphantly the great destroyer. ...Commit ourselves absolutely into the keeping of this creative power. We could not do more than this if we knew with complete certainty everything that might happen

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to the individual after death. If death is conquered beyond our reach of knowledge, it must be done by creative transformation released to the utmost scope of its power by giving it supreme control through absolute commitment of faith. There is no other way, and there is nothing else to be done.²⁰²

Dr. Brightman thinks it seems reasonable to believe that the creator and sustainer of personalities (experiencers of values) in this world has resources sufficient to continue their existence in another order,²⁰³ and suggests that "those persons are immortal whom God judges to be capable of developing worthily at any time in their future existence."²⁰⁴ By developing worthily he means choosing and realizing ideal values, individually and socially. He thinks:

It may be that some conscious beings born of human parents--some imbeciles, for example--may be hopelessly unable to appreciate ideal values. On the other hand, perhaps some "subhuman" animals may be gifted with conscious powers so great that, given immortality, they might undergo a lofty spiritual evolution in the course of eons. Again it is conceivable that some human individuals, once responsive to the divine impulse, may become so vicious that even God may despair of arousing them to any higher aspirations.²⁰⁵

This hypothesis, then, is one of conditional immortality. That is, immortality is not "inherent in every person or every human being as such, but is conditional on the presence in the person of genuine potentialities for spiritual development."²⁰⁶

Such a view fills an empty space in man's heart (longings) made by the necessary pragmatic conclusion that this world is not wholly

202. Wieman, SHG, 279-80.

203. Brightman, POR, 407.

204. Brightman, POR, 408.

205. Brightman, POR, 408.

206. Brightman, POR, 408.

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302. Wieman, SHG, 278-80.
303. Brightman, FOR, 407.
304. Brightman, FOR, 408.
305. Brightman, FOR, 408.
306. Brightman, FOR, 408.

rational. If God is perfect in his love, and sufficiently potent to care for his creatures, then conditional immortality such as Dr. Brightman suggests compensates for the seeming injustices of this world which occur in spite of God's goodness and man's effort.

Criticism of Dr. Wieman's views. On pages 206-9 of The Source of Human Good, Dr. Wieman states that there are many equally good ways of interpreting experience (among them, mind, matter, form or structure, event and quality), and that he has chosen "the event" as the basis of interpretation for the reason that it "will be most practically useful in dealing with the issues determining human destiny for good or for ill." On page 168 of the same volume he concludes that "truth is never the whole of any concrete embodiment of value," but is always "one abstract feature ingredient in concrete value as experienced by human beings." It is true indeed that parts of his theory of value are useful (although it is questionable that they are more useful than other interpretations) in making the present world a more endurable-to-some field wherein the mind may function. However, as a whole, taken as a guide to human conduct, his interpretation would lead to more negative than positive results, it seems, in that man would be confused and full of indecisions. Dr. Wieman has offered no way for man to distinguish the (creative) good he must serve from the (created) good he must abandon other than experiment, and even then time is a necessary determiner. Yet, he warns that unless man serve this elusive, yet only conducive good, he must perish. Were man to accept wholly such guidance, he would surely perish, according to all the available evidence. He would be undecided, constantly, as to whether a

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seeming good were his savior or his doom. Laboratory rats can be caused to have a nervous breakdown by creating too much indecision--as by constantly changing their paths and rewards, so they can not decide which way to go. Thus, in so far as an analogy is at all valid, from the standpoint of mental hygiene, his theory is, for the greater part, more damaging than ameliorative, pragmatically.

On the other hand, it is beneficial in one way. Just as the old religious beliefs, which he so emphatically condemns, serve to relieve man of a sense of responsibility in times of despair by positing God as the shaper of events, so his belief that creative good will somehow push through in spite of man, leads to a feeling of "everything will turn out for the best, anyhow." The value of this attitude lies in the fact that it steadies man long enough to get a further grip on life. However, it has just as many possibilities of causing torpor as has the old religious belief. As a matter of fact, pragmatically, the old religious belief offers more inducement to effort in that it provides guiding principles to which man may cling when he feels himself sinking.

No architect worthy of the name sets out to build a skyscraper without the best blue print he can find. Neither can man, whose task it is to build a spiritual steeple higher than the towers of Democracy, wider than the plains of Communism, and more solid than the Rock of Peter, construct even so much as a firm enough foundation, without some plan of action, some true guiding ideals. Without the norms of truth, and goodness, and beauty, and holiness (concisely, reason and love) to serve as beams to support a spiritual structure so mighty that the atom bomb shall not prevail against it, well indeed is man's fate determined. Yet Dr. Wieman

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On the other hand, it is beneficial in one way. Just as the old religious beliefs, which he so emphatically condemns, serve to relieve man of a sense of responsibility in times of despair by positing God as the shaper of events, so his belief that creative good will somehow push through in spite of man, leads to a feeling of "everything will turn out for the best, anyhow." The value of this attitude lies in the fact that it steadies men long enough to get a further grip on life. However, it has just as many possibilities of causing torpor as has the old religious belief. As a matter of fact, practically, the old religious belief offers more inducement to effort in that it provides guiding principles to which men may cling when he feels himself sinking.

No architect worthy of the name sets out to build a skyscraper without the best blue print he can find. Neither can man, whose task it is to build a spiritual skyscraper higher than the towers of Babel, wider than the plains of Communism, and more solid than the Rock of Peter, construct even so much as a firm enough foundation, without some plan of action, some true guiding ideals. Without the norms of truth, and goodness, and beauty, and holiness (compassion, reason and love) to serve as beams to support a spiritual structure so mighty that the atom bomb shall not prevail against it, well indeed is man's fate determined. Yet Dr. Wieman

advocates that man abandon ideals in preference to a "not readily accessible to awareness" good.²⁰⁷ In this age, man can not take chances. Time is important. Man must make use of important past experiments written by the blood of martyrs, victims of the trial and error method. Man's most outstanding characteristic, that of personality, enables him to connect the past with the present, meaningfully, and to plan for the future.²⁰⁸ Man knows now, by inference, what type of response is most probable to a given stimulus. It is possible, guided by love and reason, for him to build the stimulus which would result in world order. It is no longer necessary to grope in the darkness of doubt; certain ideals have been proved worthy beacons in the world of values.

It seems possible that, would Dr. Wieman pause long enough to grasp the full significance of personality, he would, with Heraclitus of old, recognize the value of permanence in a world of change. For Heraclitus, all was change except the principle of change itself. That was permanent.

Dr. Wieman, whose account of values is mainly social, gives no adequate account of the origin of consciousness, the very fact that makes possible his or any other theory of values. This is very important, for consciousness is the starting point of all knowledge. It is the effect which an object has on consciousness which makes it (the object) good or bad. Without a consciousness to measure and interpret data there would be no science. All the evidence for any theory lies in some consciousness.

207. Wieman, SHG, 77.

208. See Brightman, ITP, 189-201.

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307. Wieman, SHG, IV.
308. See Brightman, ITP, 189-201.

Yet the only explanation Dr. Wieman offers for this most necessary object in man's universe is that "the creative process makes qualities more appreciable by creating sensitive organisms; by making them progressively more sensitive; by generating signs with meanings and thus producing mind."²⁰⁹ It is contradictory to think that values are real, yet assume that the highest value of all, that of personality, is a product of mere chance, the result of an unconscious process.

Another thing-- where do values come from? He does say that God (the tendency in nature to produce value) is the source of all value, but if God is merely a process, when, where and how did "it" become "inherited by" value? Also, how can anything other than an experiencer of value produce or increase that object? To recognize God as a person who experiences value would solve his problem, it seems. One of the reasons why he objects to such recognition is that "a person is always a creature.. therefore personality cannot characterize the nature of the creator."²¹⁰

One wonders why, as a critic of Personalism, he is not more familiar with some of its definitions.²¹¹ Dr. Brightman, perhaps the leading Personalist in America, defines a person as "a self that is potentially self-conscious, rational, and ideal," and the term self he uses for "any and every consciousness, however simple or complex it may be." It is "any conscious situation experienced as a whole."²¹² There is nothing in this definition of a person to invalidate its application to God as a

209. Wieman, SHG, 307.

210. Wieman, SHG, 268.

211. In The Personalist, XXVII, 4, 365-373, there are some excellent definitions contributed by E. S. Brightman.

212. Brightman, POR, 350.

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209. Wismar, *SHG*, 207.
 210. Wismar, *SHG*, 228.
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 212. Brightman, *FOR*, 280.

creator. A God who is self-conscious, rational, and ideal seems a much more worthy object of worship than an unpredictable, fleeting, impersonal force.

Dr. Wieman's God does not seem to be thrifty enough with values. Rational man respects a God who is the preserver as well as creator of good. Fundamental to all life, is the law of self-preservation. The highest value, personality, cannot be preserved unless its under-pinnings, true ideals, can be left to support its weight. The ideals which have withstood the test of reason and love must not be destroyed to make way for unknown suspected goods. Neither God nor man has any right to destroy those truths for which suffering humanity and Christ have paid with their lives. Rather, these ideals must light the way to further spiritual progress.

Dr. Wieman's God lacks unity. It is difficult to decide whether Dr. Wieman thinks that God is one process or many processes. One finally gathers that God is the togetherness of processes. Also, at times he seems to describe it (God) as the creative event itself, and at other times as the power to produce good in the creative event. This, too, is confusing. He says that God is distinct from evil which, too, is a process, a definite structure of events. Is, or is not, evil an aspect of creativity, one wonders? If it is distinct from God, and if "creativity" is God's function--then, from where did evil come? It is impossible to accept the fact that it "just grew." Is there a source of human evil as well as of human good? Evil is a fact, and cannot be ignored as a mere obstructor of the good. It must be attacked, and Dr. Wieman offers no

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definite method of approaching the fact, not to mention attacking it.

The most helpful quality of his view is that it alerts man to the realization that he is living in a world of perpetual growth, and, as part of that world, must continue to grow himself, both spiritually and mentally, in order to survive as a fit and worthy inhabitant therein.

IV. EVIL AS INTERPRETED BY AN ABSOLUTISTIC PERSONALISTIC IDEALIST AND BY A FINITISTIC THEISTIC REALIST

This section will present the interpretations of evil offered by Dr. Albert C. Knudson, who interprets all reality in terms of personal consciousness, and Professor William P. Montague, who finds the world ground to be matter permeated with consciousness. These views will be compared as to possible outcome, and criticized.

Dr. Knudson's explanation of evil. Dr. Knudson, attempting to defend his orthodox Christian belief in an eternal personal God, infinite in power as well as goodness, against overwhelming evidence to the contrary (the presence of a tremendous amount of inexplicable suffering, pain and ugliness), chooses to look upon the metaphysical problem of evil as humanly insoluble due to man's limited vision (ignorance), and to concern himself with what he calls emotional and moral evil. He thinks that metaphysical imperfection is undoubtedly a rational necessity in a world of finite beings, but that "imperfection of this kind creates no difficulty
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any way the divine power or the divine goodness. It is merely the material which provides for the abstract possibility of natural and moral evil.

The religious problem of evil, he teaches, is personal in character and cannot be solved ultimately by the idea of a necessary evil (such as E. S. Brightman's "Given") or by deterministic conceptions of God and man (such as H. N. Wieman's "Structure of Events"). The concrete evils of life are all contingent, and no necessity of thought would be violated in their absence. The bare necessity of evil, no matter how or where it may be grounded, he holds, throws no light on the actual evils that confront man, a free being, who stands apart from nature in a personal relationship to God as an end in himself, and treated as such. What makes evil a problem at all is the belief that it is the experience of a free moral agent. No necessity, rational or irrational, can explain its (evil's) necessity, he insists. The only thing that reason clearly requires in connection with evil is the possibility of sin in a free system. If the unique worth and freedom of man were surrendered, there would be no longer any real moral evil, and pain would become a brute fact. What religion is concerned with, he points out, is victory over evil, the experience of which must be personal, and within the realm of spirit, rather than an explanation of it (evil).

Dr. Knudson distinguishes between natural and moral evil. He thinks that the physical world exists for the sole purpose of serving the divine plan, and as such is of instrumental rather than intrinsic good. In a relative sense, it is evil in two aspects: by way of contrast with the Absolute, and from man's finite view.

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Most people, he laments, view the natural evils of the world from a hedonistic standpoint, looking upon the passive pleasures rather than formation of character, as life's chief good. The goal of life is ethical, he teaches, and lies in the development of character. Viewed in this light, much human suffering ceases to be pure evil and becomes instrumental toward a higher good.

Again, it is common for man to view the world solely as an instrument of his own purpose, overlooking the possibility of its service to other than human ends, a necessary consideration in any fair judgment of dysteleological facts. Another consideration he thinks man should allow is the probability that suffering does not mean the same to animals as it does to human beings.

He looks upon certain types of pain as instrumental goods. One such is the kind which warns of immanent danger and thus aids in the preservation of life. Indeed, pain has been a contributing stimulus to the survival and progress of the human race, he feels. Another type of evil which he regards as instrumental good is pain. As a contrast to enjoyment, pain lends enhancement to health, aesthetic pleasure, and other intrinsic goods, according to him. However, in spite of these and other instances of its possible psychological necessity as a stimulant to action (mental, physical or spiritual), there is no way, he holds, of deducing pain from the necessary truths of reason. It is man's sin which is responsible, directly or indirectly, for much of it.

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doing provides the type of environment necessary to the development of moral character, God's set goal for man. But this human world is evil on its own account, too, he says, in that it is a world of sin, the sole cause of spiritual and personal evils, as well as the greatest cause of the misery and suffering of the natural world.

He sees neither goodness nor evil apart from the individual will. Evil becomes sin (moral evil) only when it is wrought freely and might have been avoided. Man's finite, animalistic inheritance is morally neutral, capable of being transformed either into good or evil. Although it may provide the material for sin, it actually becomes sin only when the will yields, releasing its check on wayward impulses and giving them right of way in the choice of lesser as over against higher good. To treat sin as an indispensable element in the world's moral training is to contradict the nature of God, he warns. If man is to achieve moral character, it must be possible for him to go astray, he grants, but freedom involves no necessity for moral evil. He thinks it is very probable that God foresaw man's fall,²¹⁴ but created the world in spite of this fact because of faith in the power of his redemptive agency. Man is endowed with a deeper capacity for response to divine love than to animal impulses.

No sin can be committed in ignorance, he maintains; it always involves to some extent the conscious awareness that reason-love has been subordinated to irrational impulses. All sin involves guilt, the feeling that one has departed from the moral law or ideal.

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The moral ideal is not a fixed, objective standard in his view, but varies in respect to an individual's particular age and circumstances. It is the obligation to conform to one's own standard of right, whatever it may be, that is absolute, and it is this universal duty to conform which constitutes the norm of moral responsibility.

He finds three distinguishable factors in man's moral life: his relation to God, his relation to his fellowmen, and his relation to his own norms. It is the personal will which underlies all three factors, thereby constituting a unity. The proper attitude in each relationship is one of love. Moral perfection is an attitude of will, a set determination to adhere to one's moral norm. The improper attitude is unbelief when directed toward God, selfishness when toward fellowmen, and disloyalty when toward one's true self. Sin is an attitude of the will to ignore the right, and since the will is metaphysically real, sin cannot be dismissed as a mere negation or privation, according to him. Sin is real, is due to man's will, and is repugnant to the divine nature in whose purpose it holds no place.

Man sins and suffers, and because he cannot redeem himself from his sin and suffering by the mere exercise of power, God, solely out of love for the creature he made and feels obligated to save, suffers willingly with him.

The suffering love of God awakens an answering love in the hearts of men; and thus they are redeemed in the only way that anyone can be redeemed, namely, by moral transformation.²¹⁵

215. Knudson, DR, 378.

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The suffering love of God awakens an answering love in the hearts of men; and thus they are redeemed in the only way that anyone can be redeemed, namely, by moral transformation.

Such self-imposed suffering is due to God's very nature (love) rather than to any necessity which is independent of his will, either from within or external to his own personality.

So, Dr. Knudson preserves a faith in an omnipotent as well as infinitely good God by attributing all the real evil of the world to man's misuse of a virtue (freedom), and by dismissing all other evils as merely apparent evils which are in reality goods beyond the range of man's vision.

Professor Montague's explanation of evil. Professor Montague feels faced with the task of reconciling either the amount of evil and lack of purpose in this world with the existence of God, or the amount of good here with a purely mechanical system. He chooses the first because he thinks it is more possible of fulfilment. There is too, too much good in this world to be the result of mere chance, he observes.

Material nature makes altogether too many winning throws at us not to suspect that she is playing with dice that are loaded, loaded with life, and mind, and purpose.²¹⁶

He thinks that the problem of evil is less pronounced only than that of good. In view of the real existence of evil in the world, he feels obliged to challenge God's traditional attributes of infinite power and goodness. One must be altered to allow for the existence of the other, he insists. He reasons that if God does not abolish evil, it must be either because he cannot, in which case his power is limited, or because he will not, which detracts from his goodness. In attacking those who insist upon God's omnipotence to the extent of declaring evil an illusion

216. Montague, BU, 73-4.

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(mere lack of good), or good in disguise, or a wholesome punishment or educator, he argues that, if evil is merely an illusion, a lack of good, then the experience of the illusion or negation is itself an evil; if evil is really nothing, then it is nothing to be avoided; if it is disguised good, then it is man's duty to cultivate rather than oppose it; if God's purposes are other than what man calls good, then his nature is other than what man means by good. "As for the portion of the world's evil that serves as a wholesome lesson or punishment for anyone," he says, "it is but an infinitesimal fraction of the total of the world's misery."²¹⁷

Value, for Dr. Montague, means the actualization of potentiality. Sentience is the ultimate potentiality of matter, consciousness of sentience, mind of consciousness, and personality or spirit, of mind. He judges retreat and other negative desires to be moral evils in that they hold up life's progress (realization of further potentialities).

"For better or for worse," he says, "life is utterly committed to going forward. It is too late to retreat."²¹⁸

No purely affirmative desire is bad, for him, but sin consists in preferring the lesser to the greater good. Approval (of one's own conscience) is the determining factor in distinguishing goods. Growth, enrichment of the personality to the utmost, is the goal of life. Therefore, he thinks the rule of temperance or the golden mean in matters of enjoyment (actualization of potentiality) is folly rather than wisdom.

217. Montague, BU, 69.

218. Montague, BU, 63.

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²¹⁷ Montague, BU, 89.
²¹⁸ Montague, BU, 83.

The rewards of "plunging," "going the limit," "draining the cup to the last drop," etc., are out of all proportion greater than those of safe half-hearted dabbling on the principle of nothing too much. We should use temperance in our sins and sorrows, but when we are seeking not to escape from unhappiness but to achieve happiness for ourselves or others, enthusiasm in the sense of abandon or concentrated intensity should replace temperance as the rule of virtue and true wisdom.²¹⁹

He finds goods to be relative, variable, and growing, new values being generated by the old; yet the form of good remains static throughout all eternity,²²⁰ embracing always the virtues of intensive enthusiasm, evidenced in the desire to improve one's self, and extensive love, meaning love for the whole universe.

The prevalence of actual evil in a world which abounds as well as grows in goodness, and a firm conviction that matter permeated with mind is the ground of all reality, drive Professor Montague to a belief in:

A God, or something very like a God, that exists, not as an omnipotent monarch, a giver of laws and punishments, but as an ascending force, a *nisus*, a thrust toward concentration, organization, and life. This power appears to labor slowly and under difficulties. We can liken it to a yeast that, through the aeons, pervades the chaos of matter and slowly leavens it with spirit.²²¹

God, for him, is a person. Since a person must have some environment on which to act in order to cause development of potentialities to the utmost, and there is nothing external to God, he posits the world itself as God's internal environment upon which he works. This internal

219. Montague, BU, 62.

220. The form holds for all life, absolute or finite.

221. Montague, BU, 74.

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219. Montague, BU, 62.
 220. The form holds for all life, absolute or finite.
 221. Montague, BU, 74.

environment consists of finite existences, energies, or particles. The things in this environment (the real world) are things in their own right. They are "that in God which is not God." They are alive, unruly entities, forming a sort of mechanism which, in relation to values, is in a chaotic state. This chaos, he thinks, is undergoing an improvement, though painfully slow, and the "yeast" that works on it and brings about its evolution he calls the finite God. Personality, for Montague, is mind become spirit. The relation of the personal yet infinite cosmic consciousness to the finite God is that of a mind to its will

....of finite power working within the confines of an infinitely extended and all-inclusive mind. God, as thus conceived, is a self struggling to inform and assimilate the recalcitrant thoughts of his own intellect. For each organic member of each constituent thought has a being and life of its own, like that of the whole of which it is part. The purpose and value sought by the Great Life is the same as that of the lesser lives within; no fixed telos or end, but a maximum increase of life itself. Not merely or primarily an increase in the number of all lives, but rather a greater enrichment, enhancement, and expansion of each life.²²²

He thinks that the holy spirit of God, which "sweeps like a wind through chaos, and forms all material structures,"²²³ could one but feel it, would be not only courage to hearten man in weakness, and solace to comfort him in sorrow, but power and glory beyond what he has already. "And," says he,

...if there is a kind of stillness and if one can contrive a queer little turn of the heart away from what one knows to be mean, there is a chance, however small, that a union with the holy spirit of this Promethean God will be attained, and that by such

222. Montague, BU, 84-5.

223. Montague, BU, 91-2.

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222. Montague, BU, 84-8.
223. Montague, BU, 81-2.

union, one's world will be made more radiant, and one's life become a high romance.²²⁴

So Dr. Montague offers as an explanation of the world's necessary, but perhaps possible-to-overcome-in-time evil, a God who is:

An infinite, all inclusive cosmic life, whose will to good is single, pure, and finite, one force among many in that chaos of existence which God finds within himself and which is the world he would perfect.²²⁵

Comparison and criticism of Dr. Knudson's and Dr. Montague's views. Although both Dr. Knudson and Dr. Montague recognize the present personality of God, Dr. Knudson's explanation of him as an eternal person, is more acceptable intellectually than Dr. Montague's account of his presence in our midst. Dr. Montague wants his readers to believe that God, as well as all other minds, has evolved, somehow, from what is fundamentally matter, physical energy.²²⁶ There are possible indications of his own doubts (albeit, unconscious ones) as to the validity of such possibilities, evidenced in his insistence that the matter from which all else evolves is permeated from the beginning, with mind. Matter is static unless acted upon by mind. Since this is a world of change, and since personality is an undeniable fact herein, he deduces that, from the beginning, mind has been an active force resulting eventually in life. His arguments seem to make even more clear only one point, namely, that fundamentally, energy is of the nature of mind. Mind cannot be measured, yet it is the immaterial force which is responsible for physical force or energy. Without at least some degree of enthusiasm (to make use of his fundamental

224. Montague, BU, 98.

225. Montague, BU, 98.

226. Montague, BU, 75-79.

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virtue), which is merely an attribute of will, there would exist no change whatever, he admits. His chief error, as well as that of naturalists, seems to lie in the identification of a function or purpose of an object as its source. To speak in physical, less reverent terms, he puts the cart before the horse. For this reason, Dr. Knudson's view of God as the cosmic mind of whose will the physical world is a result, is more acceptable to reason in an age that is dubious of miracles.

On the other hand, once the eternity of God's personality is established, it is Dr. Montague's theory which is more compatible with the facts of experience. Both thinkers believe that man is made in the image and likeness of God. If this theory is valid, then Dr. Knudson's theory of an eternally omnipotent as well as infinitely good God is not (valid). Granted that man is responsible for the suffering and deprivation resulting from his own sins, what about the overwhelming amount of evil which can, in no way, be traced to man's choice, without thinking of God as a God of vengeance and wrath, more bent on punishing than saving the creature for whose fate he is responsible? Man has no control over such forces of nature as hurricanes, earthquakes, and random storms. Even the evils he may be indirectly responsible for sometimes have results out of all proportion to the amount of punishment needed for disciplinary measures. Also, these evils befall the innocent as well and sometimes more than, the guilty, in a manner hardly compatible with the nature of a God of justice. Nor can such uncontrollable causes of much mental and physical as well as (indirectly) moral suffering be justified as goods in disguise or goods from the point of view of the whole, such as the argument that the universe serves other than human ends upholds. If man is an end

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If man is made in God's image and likeness, and both thinkers grant that he is, then his (man's), struggle seems worth its tears, and he can rise, enthusiastically, though he fall a million times, confident in his eventual triumph. Both agree that suffering is an attribute of God, and this fact is consistent with the facts of experience. To know a person truly (to know all the facts) is to know a sufferer, no matter what may be the outer personality. From this agreement on, Professor Montague's God who struggles with recalcitrant factors within his own person is much more consistent with the facts of experience bound to a likeness-to-God belief of man. All the evidence in human personality points to a God who struggles and suffers, yet loves. The healthy man loves life no matter what its trials, feels of each sorrow, "This too, will pass," and strives on toward a greater-than-before goal. Acceptance of Professor Montague's theory of God (with the exception of God's source) would enable more men to accept their limitations, yet fight to transform or overcome them, strengthened by the belief that their creator, too, struggles even as he has from the beginning, but has succeeded and continues to succeed, in wringing good from evil, slow and interrupted though the transforming process be at times, Hope in victory, faith in

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the power of the aggressor, is half the battle in the good man's attack on evil.

Another thing in Professor Montague's favor is that man has greater respect for himself when he feels like the aggressor against the forces of evil than when he feels like the resister of good. (For Dr. Knudson, sin, the only cause of real evil, is a conscious attitude of the will to reject the good.) Before man can love or respect God, or any other person, he must respect himself. Professor Montague's theory allows for the necessary respect. Dr. Knudson defines good in terms of love for God, fellowman and self. Who wants to love a self, even though it be his own, who consciously resists the good, the very thing for which man struggles? Resister of the good and defender of the ideal self are incompatible terms. In defining all real evil as sin, Dr. Knudson causes unnecessary despair. Man is no fool. He knows he is not responsible for the existence of surd and other physical evils, and has a right to feel the fight useless under irrational conditions. Man is not so ignorant that he cannot reason to a God; the same lack of ignorance should be valid in judgment of values. Except for the nature of God's origin, Professor Montague's explanation of evil violates none of the laws of coherence which, in this thesis, is the accepted final criterion of truth.

However, there is one way in which Professor Montague's views might lead to further chaos than Dr. Knudson's were they to serve as man's unqualified guide to greater perfection. It is his seeming subordination of all other virtues to that of enthusiasm. To be sure, any virtue without enthusiasm is useless, since it is impossible of realization. It is very

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probable that the world's abundance of good would be increased tremendously could many of man's greatest spiritual thinkers but generate the amount of enthusiasm necessary to put across their views. However, to drink "even unto the last drop" of a preferred good that it may be assimilated in its entirety might be the flood that washes away other just-as-necessary virtues from the total structure, thus resulting in an unbalanced personality. It could be argued that such consummation might result in deprivation for other worthy would-be recipients. Apropos of that possibility, to be sure, he lists love as enthusiasm's mate in the production of good, but it is to be remembered that, for him, the individual conscience is the sole judge of value. If conscience is the product of habitual beliefs of right and wrong (as naturalists, above all, should grant), then it is very possible that man's conscience might be in error, especially if it has not been subjected to the "supreme court of the mind," reason. If such be the case, the golden mean of: not too much, not too little; not too self-less, not too selfish; seems more conducive to rational living.

Transition to the next chapter. This chapter has presented six of a larger number of worthy explanations to the problem of evil, the gravest threat to rational man's acceptance of a personal God who is conscious of the dignity of man. Some of these views seem more probably true than others. Especially worthy of discussion, yet neglected in the main form of this thesis, are the views of: Nikolai A. Berdiaev, Peter A. Bertocci, John E. Boodin, William E. De Burgh, Vergilius Ferm, Ralph T. Flewelling, Unamuno y Jago, Cyril E. Joad, E. Stanley Jones, Douglas C. Macintosh, Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison), Frederick R. Tennant,

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In the next chapter, the views discussed on previous pages will be evaluated, and either rejected or preserved in their original or a modified form to provide for the main conclusions of this thesis.

Coherence will be the measure of a theory's worth.

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CHAPTER VI

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THESE FINDINGS

Surely. . . . knowledge is the food of the soul; those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike; and I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. . . . If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one; but if not then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. . . . when you buy the wares of knowledge. . . . you must take them into the soul and go your way either greatly harmed or greatly benefited by the lesson. . . .¹

Although it is unnecessary to challenge the authenticity of the "wares" offered in the preceding chapter, for their salesmen are proven "physicians of the soul," one must choose discriminately between those interpretations which may work for a specific purpose and those which work in all circumstances. For instance, the belief in the omnipotence of God may work for the purpose of elevating the spirit, yet not work at all for the purpose of explaining concrete evils in the world. Only those beliefs which work in every situation pertaining to man's rational development will be retained, in this chapter, as probably true.

1. Plato, Pro. in Jowett, WP, 141-42.

I. POINT OF VIEW

Positing coherence as its criterion, the truth about the problem of evil will be sought in this chapter by evaluating the main conclusions of the interpretations discussed in Chapter V in the light of a personal idealistic lamp, the ray of which is reinforced on the right by an inherited though active allegiance to many of the truth-claims of scholasticism, and on the left by a bent toward naturalism. This beam will seek to show coherent or incoherent implications that they may be credited or discredited respectively without regard to the philosophical brand of their finders.

II. ESTIMATION OF CONCLUSIONS

After having found the points upon which most of these thinkers agree, these theories will be judged in the light of practical experience. If the concrete facts of experience fit properly into the structure of a common theory, then that theory will be supposed probably true. It is the shape of concrete events which will determine ultimately, the structure of truth, not any one or group of thinkers' theories.

Validity of the problem. The first question to be acted upon refers to the validity of the problem of evil. Dr. Wieman, although admitting that evil is real, declares it to be a mere pseudo problem. All of the other views discussed recognize at least some aspect of evil as a real problem. The very fact that Dr. Wieman himself as well as other great spiritual leaders, all men of intelligence for whom time is limited, have spent many of their most productive years seeking a solution to this

I. POINT OF VIEW

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grave threat to modern theism indicates that evil exists as a genuine problem.

Scope of the problem. Which aspects of evil are problematic?

Dr. Knudson insists that only sin, moral evil for which, ultimately, man is consciously responsible, presents a problem; and one gathers that he thinks the solution lies in proper direction and education of man's will and intellect. In dismissing all other evils as apparent ones, he declares that were man more enlightened (less ignorant) he would recognize them (apparent evils) as values. Man is endowed with insufficient reasoning power to discern values apparent to purposes other than his own, he teaches. Dr. Garvie, like Dr. Knudson, recognizes only moral evil as religiously problematic. He, too, holds that all evil other than that which is caused by man is merely apparent evil. Not so with Dr. Brightman and Dr. Montague, who, with Dr. Rashdall, look upon natural evil as the greatest threat to modern man's belief in God because it comes from God himself, if there be a God. Say Drs. Brightman and Montague, "If evil (other than moral) is only apparent, then that grave error itself is evil." They are right. Man acts as if natural evil beyond his control were real, and so far as man is concerned, that to which he reacts has real being. So convinced is Dr. Rashdall of the serious threat of dysteleological evil to a rational belief in a God of justice, that he posits immortality as a necessary corollary to theism.

The facts of experience back the last three thinkers' views that all evil is real, and that nonmoral evil presents an even greater threat to the rational man's belief in God than does moral evil, hence

grave threat to modern theism indicates that evil exists as a genuine problem.

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Dr. Knudson insists that only sin, moral evil for which, ultimately, man is consciously responsible, presents a problem; and one further that he thinks the solution lies in proper direction and education of man's will and intellect. In dismissing all other evils as apparent ones, he declares that were man more enlightened (less ignorant) he would recognize them (apparent evils) as values. Man is endowed with insufficient reasoning power to discern values apparent to purposes other than his own, he teaches. Dr. Garvie, like Dr. Knudson, recognizes only moral evil as religiously problematic. He, too, holds that all evil other than that which is caused by man is merely apparent evil. Not so with Dr. Brightman and Dr. Montague, who, with Dr. Rashdall, look upon natural evil as the greatest threat to modern man's belief in God because it comes from God himself. If there be a God, say Drs. Brightman and Montague, "if evil (other than moral) is only apparent, then that grave error itself is evil." They are right. Man acts as if natural evil beyond his control were real, and so far as man is concerned, that to which he reacts has real being. So convinced is Dr. Rashdall of the serious threat of dytheological evil to a rational belief in a God of justice, that he posits theodicy as a necessary corollary to theism.

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offering the greater problem from the religious point of view, although moral evil is of greater practical moment to man.

To say that there is no problem, because no one knows what is good or evil, is an evasion. Not to know good or evil in itself would be a problem. Not only is that very ignorance an evil, but also to deem man's reasoning incapable of distinguishing the good from the evil is a hardly fair condemnation of that very characteristic which has enabled man to understand and master nature as has no other creature. Man's reason is sufficient to have discovered a means of harnessing atomic energy. Likewise, man is capable of discerning and making value judgments as valid as are all other judgments derived from reason. That question was settled a century ago, during the Period of The Enlightenment. Contrary to Dr. Knudson's and Dr. Garvie's beliefs, it is these so-called "apparent evils" which most try man's soul. Rational man, even though he may wince at life's counter, pays the price demanded for his sins without questioning the justice or existence of God. He even bravely accepts a certain amount of more-than-deserved punishment as a sort of compound interest demand. But, given one dose of suffering after another, without regard to merit, compensation, or order, man begins to wonder whether all is not irrational. Evidences of irrationality are everywhere. All around he sees maimed bodies sick minds, homes washed away in tidewaters; broken spirits, false demigods, strife in a world of plenty. These and numerous other examples of dysteleological evil are seen befalling the innocent and guilty alike. Because the innocent are frequent victims, man's reason demands an explanation of evil which will cover its whole ground, not merely the territory attributed to man's abuse of freedom. Yes, all evil

is real, and unless adequately accounted for, presents a dire threat to modern man's belief in God.

Does there exist a God in spite of evil? Is the actual presence in the world of much evil which is not due to man's abuse of freedom compatible with a rational man's belief in God? All six philosophers whose views are under consideration are led to a firm belief in God as the source and sustainer of all value. The evidence backs Dr. Brightman's and Dr. Montague's contention that the good presents as great a problem in a purely mechanistic universe as does evil in a world designed by God. There is too much good in the world to think that man and all his environment are products of mere chance. In spite of all the evil that rational man encounters, he reflects upon his blessings, and finds life worth its strife. The roaring of a billowy sea, the silence of a snow-capped peak; the wonder of a noble man, the splendor of the starry skies: these and other glories man muses upon, and at least once in awhile there bursts the cry, "The place wherein thy glory dwelleth!" Yes, man reasons that there is a God, and his purpose is good. How, then, reconcile a good God with the existence of nonmoral evil for which God seems to be responsible?

To what extent is God infinite? Since Dr. Knudson recognizes only man's abuse of freedom as real evil, he finds no difficulty in retaining a God who is infinite in power as well as goodness. But his theory that evil not due to man's sins is only apparent evil has been rejected as repugnant to man's intellect.

All of the thinkers considered recognize the freedom of man's will as one cause of evil. Since most people can see this fact readily,

freedom of the will presents no problem in itself except for strict determinists who deny that the will is free. Freedom is the only soil in which moral beings may grow.

Because of the prevalence of other than moral evil (for Dr. Garvie, suffering), the philosophers left for consideration find it necessary to view God as limited. Finding too much evidence in favor of God's goodness to doubt that attribute for long, they choose, rationally, to look upon his power as limited. This limitation varies in quantity according to different thinkers with Dr. Garvie viewing God's power as limited by the direction determined by his perfection, and Dr. Rashdall finding it limited by the laws of reason, conformity to the nature of things. For instance, God cannot make a square circle, cannot change the past, and cannot determine the free actions of man. These conceptions are in their very nature impossible. Dr. Wieman's God, which is the ameliorative process in nature, is obstructed in its course by man's placement of "false gods" before "It" (God). As a natural process, God can accomplish only that which is causally possible. Dr. Montague finds a God who is a person, yet the result of a process. This person grapples with recalcitrant factors within his own nature. In Dr. Montague's view, in spite of set-backs, God continues to transform evil into good throughout all time. Dr. Brightman advances the idea of a God who is perfect in goodness (love and will), but limited by what he calls "The Given," which consists of the laws of reason and "brute facts" within God's own personality. These brute facts resemble the recalcitrant factors present in Dr. Montague's God. According to Dr. Brightman, God did not choose these brute facts within The Given, but continuously struggles to change

their chaotic state to one of order. Thus, for him, God is perfect in will and constantly growing toward a greater perfection. He is never overcome by the facts he seeks to perfect. Dr. Brightman calls this process "The Perfectibility of God," and describes it as infinite because inexhaustible.

If God has revealed his own personality through that of ideal man, then the evidence produced by human personality calls for a God limited in power, as Dr. Brightman, Dr. Montague and Dr. Wieman suggest. It is an undisputed fact, because observable, that man may be morally perfect (of perfect will) and act reasonably, yet encounter much suffering and temporal defeat in life. What of the life of Christ Jesus? Yet Gethsemane and even Calvary were exponents of it. Man's intellect looks beyond the mere limitations of freedom of the will and conformity to the laws of reason to account for evil.

Man is born into the world with a certain reasoning capacity, and with certain inherited tendencies. He is born into a particular type of society, as a member of a particular race. These external environmental conditions as well as his internal structure are "given" him at birth. He has no choice in either case.

It is dependent upon the individual's will whether he will rise above any original deficiencies, yet will power alone cannot give rise to a desired elevation. The desired change must be possible, within the bounds of reason. No matter how strong man's desire to rise, he is handicapped by actual circumstances (empirical facts). It is his task to alter these circumstances in their relationship to his status. This involves struggle, and suffering, and pain, oftentimes to others as well as to himself.

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It is a struggle that lasts with the rational man until the end of time, for it is the nature of man that when he becomes what he once believed to be ideal, his ideal has grown to greater stature. In his struggle toward perfectibility, ideal man is conscious of the struggle of others. Each personality, by existing and becoming known to him, creates further needs and obligations, both of which lead to some form of struggle or suffering.

The healthy man falls under strain, but only to rise with renewed vigor. The more perfect the man, the greater the struggle from under which he can eventually rise in spite of temporary defeat. There are many who disintegrate under but slight pressure. (Dr. Wieman says that those who are unwilling to accept suffering are unwilling to accept God.)

Since this struggle is constant, even more so in the man of good will than in others, rational man is led (after some spiritual genius has lighted the way) to believe that the God whom he resembles must be a continuously struggling entity, aware of the suffering of others, and willing to sacrifice that others' burdens may become lightened. As man sacrifices for his family, so God must sacrifice for his family which includes the whole human race without regard to color, creed or nationality.

Out of consideration for the prevalence of nonmoral evil in the world, it seems reasonable, then, to maintain God's infinite goodness at the cost of his omnipotence. Dr. Brightman's God who struggles with The Given and continues to grow toward perfection, Dr. Montague's God who struggles to control his (God's) recalcitrant factors and grows in value, and Dr. Wieman's God, an impersonal force for good which struggles against

resisting forces and continues to increase in value, violate none of the laws of natural or social science, and thus far seem acceptable interpretations as to the nature of God. However, each of these seemingly acceptable views differs in regard to the degree of personality attributed to God. Is God a person, an impersonal force, or a person derived from force?

Is God a person or a force? Dr. Wieman thinks that God is beyond personality, an impersonal force, the ameliorative process in nature. He is willing to call this force God. This view works for the purpose of explaining the changes which man witnesses all about him, but it does not work at all in accounting adequately for an experiencer of evil or good. It seems inconsistent to posit an impersonal force as the source of a strictly personal event. This inconsistency, enforced by the aesthetic fact that it is well nigh impossible for rational man to develop a feeling of reverence or worship toward mere force, even though that force seems bent toward the good, eliminates Dr. Wieman's total view of God as inadequate for the satisfaction of man's total personality.

The views of Dr. Brightman and Dr. Montague have thus far withstood the rigid test of coherence. Once God's nature is defined, Dr. Montague's conception of him as a struggling Divine Person ~~ever~~ creative of further good, fits with the facts of experience. However, man never yet, in spite of such keen reasoning powers as enabled him to construct the atom bomb, has been able to produce even the simplest type of mind from mere matter. Were this possible, it seems most probable that some genius would have performed the miracle by now. For this reason, Dr. Montague's

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God whose personality evolved from what he (Dr. Montague) calls fundamentally matter (force) must be dismissed as an apparent impossibility. There is no evidence which can warrant such possibility, in spite of the wonders of modern science. Dr. Brightman's view alone remains intact against the scrutiny of reason. Yet there arises the question as to whether a person so limited might not be defeated, because of insufficient power, in the battle against evil. Dr. Brightman thinks not. God is a Divine Person, at all times in control of "The Given" though not its creator. At times he (God) is obliged to change avenues leading to a goal because of difficulties with brute facts within "The Given." These facts require constant kneading and mixing and redirection ere they can acquire expression. While man struggles with evil and is often overcome to such an extent that he must abandon the good fight, God, given time, is able to transmute and control all evil, and completely to overcome much of it. Such a struggling God sympathizes with man, and suffers for man out of love. No matter how great man's burden, God's burden is greater, because every burden of man is borne by God in addition to his own. God helps man in his struggle. God is never defeated completely, and never lacks the energy to help in man's struggle. It seems fair to conclude that a God who struggles with evil, but is never wholly overcome by it, who continuously transmutes evil into good, and who suffers with and for man because of love, is worthy of the title Divine Personality, and as such is demanding of worship and reverence.

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tion² state explicitly that evil can be understood properly only when viewed against its necessary background of good, and the other three imply the same. Wherever one finds purpose or aim, one finds there value or disvalue. Those processes or objects which help toward the realization of the purpose are called good or are said to possess value, and those which prevent or deter the realization of purpose are called evil. Some goods are more efficient than others in hastening the realization of purpose, and so goods are said to be relative. An object or process acquires value only when it is in relation to some aim or purpose. Of all God's creation, man alone has true purpose and so man sets up a scale of values which is superior to all other scales. Upon these facts all of the philosophers discussed in this thesis agree.

However, their scales of value differ according to their particular views of man's purpose. Since each of them looks upon God as the source of all value, each thinks that man's purpose ought to conform with that of God. Evil, for each, is that which prevents or delays God's purpose.

For Dr. Knudson, God's set goal for man, and so man's highest good, is development of moral character. It is the will which determines to what extent man becomes morally perfect. Any voluntary choice of a less helpful means toward perfection of moral character constitutes an evil. Those choices (system of choice) which eventuate in complete breakdown of man's moral character are the worst of all evils. Since God's will is perfect, no evil exists in him. Dr. Knudson's theory is good in

2. Dr. Brightman, Dr. Montague, and Dr. Wieman.

so far as it goes, but it explains only moral evil. Man is an integrated whole of whom moral consciousness is but a part. Man is also a creature of desires, conflicting ones at that, and would like a better explanation of their strength and sometimes dominance in spite of his choice. Man would like an explanation of the soil (the physical world) that offers greater nourishment to many of his lower desires than to his more lofty ones. Given an adequate explanation of evil so that man will not think his failure to achieve maximum morality a sign that he is fundamentally evil, Dr. Knudson's goal of moral perfection would seem ideal.

Dr. Rashdall also puts morality, which he identifies with a rational will, at the top of his scale of values. But he posits the moral law as part of the ultimate nature of things. Therefore anything, voluntary or otherwise, which obstructs or delays the rationality of the universe is evil. Hence, man is not the author of evil since he did not choose hurricanes, earthquakes, imbeciles and other examples of dysteleological and surd evil. Dr. Rashdall's view is more reasonable than Dr. Knudson's because it offers a more inclusive explanation of disvalue.

In Dr. Garvie's account, the supreme good is self-realization through self sacrifice, attainable in its completion only by God. Man's highest value is his conscious awareness and voluntary fulfilment of God's purpose for himself, nature, animals, and fellowmen. Will, for him as for Dr. Knudson, is the determining factor in man's achievement of the good. Evil is, for him, a negative attitude of the will, the conscious choice of a less helpful means toward self-realization of any kind. This explanation fails to account for the judgment that man is an end in himself. There exist many evils in the world which have no bearing what-

ever on man's choice. Yet man experiences these situations as evil. For this reason, Dr. Garvie's explanation is inadequate.

Dr. Montague puts actualization of potentiality (God) at the top of his scale, and anything that delays, interrupts, or prevents the continuity of the developing process is evil. The degree to which the continuity is affected determines the acuteness of the evil. He, with Dr. Brightman and Dr. Wieman, finds goods variable and growing as well as relative. Hence, evil is likewise variable and growing. That which is good today may be evil in a later stage of development. Society is reluctant to overhaul its standards of value, yet progress requires readjustment and the integration of values. In a world of growth, that which is merely distasteful today may be a serious evil tomorrow. The poor taste of the past century's attitude toward peoples of different culture may turn out to be this decade's greatest evil. Dr. Montague finds intensive enthusiasm and inclusive love, enjoined, the form of good which remains constant in spite of change. Indifference and hate may be said to characterize evil in so far as evil has any definite structure. Dr. Montague's views are very coherent. From observation, it does seem that without enthusiasm and love the human personality (greatest value next to God) not only becomes negative and useless, but is apt to exert a negative effect on contacting personalities, thus interfering with complete actualization of many potentialities.

The process of creativity is Dr. Wieman's highest good, and all interferences are evil. Many of the world's most prized achievements become evils by blocking the course of the creative event (God). The principles behind creativity are reason and love, but a type of reason

and love that are not discernible to man. Goods are relative, varying, and growing, as are evils. Wieman's view is excellent from the mere social point of view. It is true that people resist social change in certain directions because these changes threaten to destroy values to which they have been conditioned and on which their happiness depends. It is true that resistance to progress demand that the old order yield place to new is a form of social evil. Also, it seems scientific, once a cultural value has been chosen, to advocate a change in lesser values in order to be compatible with the new chosen cultural value. However, goods, for Dr. Wieman, seem to have a much more "fleeting" existence than reason or experience warrants, and evil too quickly consumes the good. Although time marches on, affecting the standard of values in the light of new discoveries and meanings, it does not proceed at so fast a rate as to make goods useless or even develop hindrances in so short a time as Dr. Wieman would have one believe. Dr. Brightman thinks the integrated rational personality is the most valuable object in the universe, and that the highest good to which man can aspire is that of holiness. Holiness, for him, includes the whole scale of values beneath it. Any voluntary act which leads to a less rational total personality is evil, as is any lack of rationality (incoherence). For Dr. Brightman, values as well as their corresponding evils (opposites) are relative, varying, and growing, although norms are absolute. He associates good with reason and love, and evil with incoherence. Since incoherence exists in the universe itself without regard to man's choice (evidences of dysteleological and surd evil), Dr. Brightman considers evil a part of "The Given" in God, of whose mind the physical world is an expression. This theory seems very

reasonable. When one analyzes the evils about him, he realizes that in every case there is evident a lack of reason or love.

Drawing from all the sources presented, and in consideration of past conclusions that the universe, God, and man, are of the nature of mind, it sounds reasonable to define value as any object of self-approved, coherent desire (which is sufficiently specific to have alternatives or substitutes, and which sometimes must be chosen at the cost of those alternatives) which leads to a more dynamic, loving, integrated personality. Evil, in turn, might be defined reasonably as any object of random choice or natural inclination which is or is not sufficiently specific to have alternatives or substitutes (dependent upon whether evil is moral or natural) and which sometimes (as in the case of natural evil) must be expressed without regard to choice, resulting in a less loving personality, or incoherence.³ Natural evil leads to incoherence, and moral evil to disintegration of personality.

Relationship of evil to Divine Personality and human personality. In what relationship does evil stand to the Divine Personality and to human personality? The two most acceptable interpretations of evil, those of Dr. Brightman and Dr. Montague, look upon the source of evil as certain types of brute facts existing within God's very nature, and a slow-yielding, recalcitrant force within God, respectively.

In both instances, evil involves struggle for God, struggle

3. These definitions of good and evil were derived from the foregoing conclusions combined with Folsom, FDS, 50.

which is momentary, constant, or eventual, dependent upon the time, persistence, and depth of evil's duration. Throughout all the conflict, it is always the laws of reason enforced by love which is the aggressor and final victor to the extent that victory is possible, and evil which is the "resister" which can find no faithful allies to aid in its resistance, for it is a characteristic of evil that it lacks positive identity. At one time and place it may be entirely different in character from evil at any other time and place. This is not true of good. All good, when analyzed, "displays a substratum of positive identity."⁴ It is God's spirit (will) and truth (laws of reason) which, as allies, so devitalize evil that it never can dominate the world.

Man is particularly adapted to serve in God's army under the command of reason and love, to hasten the destruction of evil. Man alone, of all God's creatures, exists as evil's receptive agent. Man has no choice in this matter. It is the very nature of personality to be receptive to both good and evil. Man can, and at times it almost seems he does, welcome evil as a royal guest, serving it above all other things which seep into his personality. Or, man can serve as neutral reciprocator, neither resisting nor approving of his inevitable invader. There is work to be done, insipience to overcome, and both weak and mechanical man slow up God's progress toward perfection, causing all of God's creation to suffer in the loss that might have been a gain. On the other hand, man does have within him, the resources to enable him to serve as rebuffer of this transgressor which man ought to consider his arch enemy. In this

4. Wieman, SHG, 84.

way man, as chooser of good in preference to evil, becomes a co-worker with God and serves as God's most efficient instrument of growth toward perfection.

Evil vs. God and man. Will God, with man's help, eventually overcome evil completely? Neither Dr. Brightman, nor Dr. Montague, nor Dr. Wieman thinks that evil will be completely overcome, nor do they see any need for such. They think that a God who continues to increase the world's supply of value and to diminish its stock of evil is sufficient unto man's happiness. They find no evidence to back such a hope, and even think that a world of static perfection in itself might be considered evil. The good must be increased as well as sustained in a world of value. Yet man craves complete perfection in his ideal, and man's desires are an integral part of his total personality, a fact which cannot be ignored when arriving at a true conception of God. Perhaps this idea is due to a desire born of man's love for his new-found creator, perhaps it is a mere lingering element of former beliefs. At any rate, at least some men ponder as to whether there may come a time when God's perfect reason will organize the brute facts existent within his personality so inclusively as to cause them all to be transformed into empirical facts which in turn might become converted (by means of rational man's suffering and love) into ideal values. This, of course, is mere speculation; but, should such a belief be true, it might enable man better to bear his seemingly undeserved sufferings. Man willingly even dies for a worthy cause, but shrinks from suffering in vain. It seems reasonable to believe that disintegration of mind, perhaps the greatest evil that can befall

man, occurs only when man has come to consider his sufferings useless. To think himself a necessary helper of God in a winning fight against evil in all its forms might be just the prop man needs to carry him across what Dr. Wieman calls "the high divide into the valley beyond."⁵ Although Dr. Brightman himself is an empiricist, one can find grounds for speculation in his view of a finite God, especially since neither he, nor Dr. Montague, nor Dr. Wieman states, at any time, that God's perfection is unattainable. Dr. Brightman does speak of inexhaustible perfectibility. Could not this refer to God's perfection on a higher level of growth?

Were such perfection possible, it seems that it could happen only upon mankind's attainment of oneness in spirit. In spite of present warfare and modes of destruction among military organizations and statesmen abroad in the world, nevertheless the facts point to a very slow yet discernible step in the direction of world spirit. Rational man is beginning to question old established views of racial, religious, social, and sex superiority. At least recognized, as well as more obscure, spiritual leaders are beginning to melt down these ancient barriers to world unity, and that is a step, be it ever so small, in the direction of man's appreciation of God's spirit. Add to these advancements the force of proper universal education resulting in the craving of man's spirit for relations based on love and reason rather than from any rigid type of internal commitment or outside invasion (feeling of obligation or force, respectively), and humanity would seem a worthily-equipped moral theatre wherein God's perfection might be displayed.

5. Wieman, SHG, 52-3.

Adequacy of a finite God as object of worship and prayer. For the purpose of worship and prayer is a finite Divine Person as adequate as an omnipotent One? Dr. Knudson thinks not, and believes that man has a right to doubt a finite God's power to save. As a matter of fact, he openly criticizes Dr. Brightman's finite God as a too-human God who may not be able to save the world from the evil with which he has been struggling so long. All of the other philosophers mentioned think in terms of varying degrees of difference. Dr. Rashdall believes that man has a right, because of the facts that are, to suppose that there is a future existence, in order to justify the willing of so evil-ridden a world as this by a God of infinite goodness. This, in spite of his belief that God is limited in power by the laws of reason and freedom of the will. Man seems justified in seeking a God worthy of his devotion regardless of a future existence. Such a God would seem a better guarantor of a future life of value, anyhow. Dr. Garvie thinks that a God restricted in power by factors necessary to the fulfilment of his purpose (redemption) is capable of wooing and winning man's confidence and obedience through love rather than obedience. Since there is no limit to God's flow of sacrificial love, he (God) seems, in Dr. Garvie's view, worthy of devotion. This fact is not questioned. Man can start afresh at any time he chooses to make life more worth while, evidence of God's patience and love. The strength of a determined good will can do much to give order to man's "given." The donor of such life is indeed worthy of worship. But, Dr. Garvie's God is also a God of vengeance and of wrath, thereby accounting for much of the suffering of the world. The human heart concedes to love rather than force or domination. For this reason Dr. Garvie's God does

not seem the most worthy object of man's devotion. The finite God of Dr. Brightman as well as Dr. Montague and Dr. Wieman, seems worthy of man's worship for several reasons. (It is to be remembered, however, that God's nature is that of a Person, not a force.) In the first place, God is growing constantly with man, to meet man's demands. Because God struggles himself in his process of development toward perfection, he is much more capable of sympathizing with man. A father or a mother is more sympathetic with their child than are strangers, because he (or she) not only is conscious of, but feels responsible for, certain tendencies that need directing. In much the same way the finite God is conscious of and feels responsible to a certain extent for the inherited weakness of man. Such a limited God has greater appeal to rational man than has a God who can, but does not, make all things good. Again, to compare God with parents: the parent whose original decision is fixed law without taking into consideration any of the needs, or deficiencies, or intentions, of a child soon either causes the child's personality to become mils, or loses the child's respect and confidence. Man's relation to God is very analogous to that of a child to its parents. If man thinks that God's way of fulfilling his purpose is set from the beginning, he soon thinks it a waste of hope to plan on God's help in time of trouble. Such an attitude leads to gradual indifference to God rather than to devotion. On the other hand, if God is constantly improving his modes of expression there seems a chance that he may heed his creatures' petitions if worthy and reasonable. Another thing: belief in a finite God tends to make man more cooperative in producing a better society. Man is more apt to feel that he himself is important and useful to God's purpose. Man acts very much

as do children when the teacher states that she is perhaps incapable, alone, of both developing personalities and maintaining perfect classroom discipline. For her, either one is possible, but at the risk of sacrificing the other. Since both are necessary, the individuals themselves must share in the creation of the desired atmosphere. Knowing that they are necessary factors in the resultant spirit, rational children gradually develop a feeling of cooperation and responsibility that is lacking in children who must live in a classroom dominated by a single individual's spirit, even though that spirit be noble. So it is with man. However small his contribution toward the world spirit, the feeling that he is helping God to make this the best of possible worlds, makes man a more responsible person. Belief in a finite God is far more likely to produce such an attitude than is belief in an omnipotent God who already has the world "all sewed up." Belief in a finite God who is growing toward greater perfection himself gives man a feeling of hope for the future. It even makes more possible a belief in immortality. The finite God always has produced more value out of less, and it seems probable that he will continue to increase value. If this is so it is not likely that he will cut short the greatest of all values, personality. For these reasons especially, the finite God seems not only an adequate object of man's worship, but more adequate than an omnipotent God in view of the facts as they now stand.

CHAPTER VII

EVIDENT CONCLUSIONS AND A SUGGESTED HYPOTHESIS

. with regard to truth, we shall count as equally crippled a mind which, while it hates deliberate falsehood, cannot bear to tell lies, and is very angry when others do so, yet complacently tolerates involuntary error and is in no way vexed at being caught wallowing in swinish ignorance.¹

I. CONCLUSIONS

It is in the spirit of feeling vexed "at being caught wallowing in swinish ignorance"² that the following conclusions have been found as possible truths about the problem of evil in the light of man's limited available knowledge.

1. Evil exists as a genuine problem.
2. All evil is real, and nonmoral evil presents an even greater threat to rational man's belief in God than does moral evil.
3. Freedom of the will is the major setting for moral evil.
4. Natural evil leads to incoherence, and moral evil to disintegration of personality.
5. In spite of the prevalence of evil, there is a God, and his purpose is good.
6. God is limited in power beyond the mere restrictions of reason and man's freedom.
7. God's spirit so devitalizes evil that it (evil) can never dominate the world.

1,2. Plato, Rep. VII. 535 in Cornford, RP, 257.

8. Belief in a finite but potent God is more adequate for the purpose of prayer and worship than belief in an omnipotent God.

9. God is a Divine Personality not so limited in power that he cannot save man and his world from the forces of evil.

10. It is possible but not probable that God will reach a stage which this world would view as perfection.

II. HYPOTHESIS

Positing God's purpose as dualistic in character, one of perfection as well as growth, it is suggested that God will become omnipotent simultaneously with man's attainment of spiritual perfection. (Of course this feat would require millions of years of proper universal education.) Attainment of such perfection will result automatically in the coalescence of man's power (which, through the purifying processes of love and sacrifice, will have become rational) with God's, man thus paying for his perfection with surrender of his power of further choice, surrender of his freedom. God, upon becoming omnipotent (perhaps, once more, for it may be that the process of perfection-growth-perfection has repeated itself many times) will begin a new process of growth toward an even higher level of perfection. Man, having lost his potency, will review with interest rather than participate with anxiety in this further process. It may be that the most spiritual of this world's beings will be invited to participate in God's new growth, hence enjoying an active immortality.

All this, of course, is mere speculation, but even if man never will reach perfection,

Still in loving tenderness,
 Doth the Master wait to bless
 All of those who heed his plea,
 "Suffer man to come to me."

III. ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN SOME RECENT PHILOSOPHIES OF RELIGION

Whatever the period of civilization investigated, there always has been asked, over and over again, the question: What is good and what is evil? There is no doubt that this is one of the most persistent problems of philosophy. Many answers have been given, yet the problem has continued to arise with each new advancement in scientific discovery, until to-day, with man's fearfully tremendous power of control over the forces of nature, it stands as the most important problem of the hour.

Is there an absolute, ultimate, and unquestioned measure of good and evil, one that has existed from the beginning of time, and that will last until life is no more (if there can be such a time)? A great many people have believed in such a measure.

On the other hand, there are thinkers who have believed that value is relative to existing conditions, and that an act which is good in one situation will be evil in another.

There are many theories of good and evil between these two extremes. Philosophers who believe in the absolute goodness of God have had great difficulty sometimes, in explaining the existence of death, suffering, and sin in a universe supposedly created by a God of infinite goodness. Many ingenious arguments to reconcile a good God with this evil world have been offered.

Ancient religion failed to reach a solution which could cohere with the undeniable facts of modern science. However, modern philosophy's attempt to reach a satisfactory solution was as futile as that of religion. Recent philosophic thought about the problem has been much concerned with man's social relationships, and has offered an ethics of the human group rather than that of divine laws. Upon one fact, many thinkers have agreed. It is that reason alone is capable of grappling victoriously with the problem.

Some Twentieth Century philosophers have offered reasonable solutions to the problem, with a view to helping man gain a vantage ground from which to attack with renewed effort, his ancient enemy. Briefly, some of these views will be considered.

Hastings Rashdall, a personal idealist, believes that God is the ultimate source of all being in the universe, and that man's moral consciousness, which is the sole judge of good or evil, is God-derived. All evil, he thinks, is a means toward a higher good. He believes that God, in creating the world, was limited by the laws of reason and freedom of the will. So, although God is the ultimate author of evil, man alone wills evil as otherwise than a means to the good. God expects man to help in the struggle to diminish evil and increase the good, and the extent and rapidity with which the goal is met is dependent in part upon human effort. Immortality is a necessary corollary to belief in a God of infinite goodness, for Dr. Rashdall.

Alfred Ernest Garvie, more of a theologian than a philosopher, believes in a God limited by the direction of his (God's) perfection, which is sacrificial love. Dr. Garvie holds to the doctrine of revelation,

and maintains that the only real evil in the world is due to man's freedom.

For Henry Nelson Wieman, a religious naturalist for whom God is the ameliorative process in nature, evil is that which obstructs this process. This obstruction is caused by man's placing "false gods," such as Democracy, Communism, Racial Superiority, and the like, before God (for Wieman, an impersonal force). As a natural process, God can accomplish only that which is causally possible, he teaches. Man can help or hinder God by cooperation with the creative event (another term Wieman uses for "God"), or lack of cooperation, evidenced in the worship of "false gods" in the forms of created goods upon which man has allowed himself to become too dependent.

William Pepperell Montague, a realist, offers a solution to the baffling problem based on the hypostatization of God as a person who grapples with recalcitrant factors within his own nature. The real world, Dr. Montague teaches, is God's internal environment. God struggles continuously with these recalcitrant factors (evil), and forever is transforming evil into good.

According to Albert Cornelius Knudson, an orthodox theist, only sin, moral evil for which man is consciously responsible, is real evil. He teaches that all other evils are values from God's point of view.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman has found perhaps the most ingenious and reasonable solution to the problem in what he calls "The Given" within God. "The Given" consists of

the eternal, uncreated laws of reason (including logic, mathematical relations, and Platonic

Ideas) and also of equally eternal and uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects, disorderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is the source of surd evil.³

Some of these thinkers agree more or less upon certain theories. However, the ultimate criterion of the probable truth of a theory rests upon its coherence with the facts of experience.

It is difficult for modern man, with his great respect for science and human reason, to find adequate ground for an absolute theory of right and wrong. All the evidence which commands his respect seems to point away from this to a relative position conformant with a personal, dynamic God of infinite goodness who is sufficiently potent to preserve his world from the forces of evil, yet is not omnipotent.

Possible truths about the problem of evil, which do not seem to clash with reason in the light of man's latest scientific discoveries and experience, are:

1. Evil exists as a genuine problem.
2. All evil is real, and nonmoral evil presents an even greater threat to rational man's belief in God than does moral evil.
3. Freedom of the will is the major setting for moral evil.
4. Natural evil leads to incoherence, and moral evil to disintegration of personality.
5. In spite of the prevalence of evil, there is a God, and his purpose is good.

3. Brightman, POR, 337.

6. God is limited in power beyond the mere restrictions of reason and man's freedom.

7. God's spirit so devitalizes evil that it (evil) can never dominate the world.

8. Belief in a finite but potent God is more adequate for the purpose of prayer and worship than belief in an omnipotent God.

9. God is a Divine Personality not so limited in power that he cannot save man and his world from the forces of evil.

10. It is possible but not probable that God will reach a stage which this world would view as perfection.

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